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Abstract
The international trade agenda has expanded in recent years to incorporate a wide range 
of non-trade issues, under pressure from the world’s two largest traders, the United 
States and the European Union. Incorporating policies on issues such as labour 
standards, the environment and health into trade agreements effectively turns them into 
‘imagined commodities’. The EU and US are exporting their values with the aim of 
harmonizing standards in other countries with their own. Like commodities, these 
standards would not vary in quality between producers. They have value to negotiators 
as bargaining tools, as policy models, and as instruments for compliance. Although the 
actual impact of these policies on developing countries is debatable, policymakers and 
interest groups imagine them to be very important, sometimes important enough to 
derail trade negotiations.
Mixing elite interviews with textual analysis of press releases and key government 
documents, I examine the use of non-trade policies by US and EU trade negotiators to 
achieve their secondary goals - whether this is legitimating the policy process, 
distracting critics, or projecting the image of a benign foreign power. Examining 
interactions between interest groups and policy officials I find that while US officials 
use these new issues to benefit domestic constituencies, EU policymakers use them to 
enhance the EU’s international standing in foreign policy. Behind this story are 
fundamental differences in the way that trade policymakers interact with key diffuse and 
specific interest groups. The consequences of this expanding trade agenda are a need for 
better coordination between government departments and agencies, increasing pressure 
on negotiators to address unfamiliar issues, and uncomfortable questions about the 
nature of policymaking in a globalized world.
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1 The Expanding Trade Agenda
‘The catch is it takes two to tango and 149 to reach a consensus ’
-  United States Trade Representative Susan Schwab, 20061
The World Trade Organization (WTO) has passed its tenth birthday. It stands at the tip 
of an international trading system designed to harmonise trading practices across the 
globe. Its unique dispute mechanism has brought a greater degree of order to 
international trade agreements and provided developing countries with at least some 
means of combating the hegemony of developed states. The number of WTO member 
countries has grown rapidly to (a perhaps unmanageable) 150-plus, and still more 
countries are clamouring to join.
But the WTO’s childhood has not been entirely happy. In the last ten years, trade 
agreements have come to symbolize the tensions at the core of the globalization debate: 
‘the hope of some for global prosperity and the fears of many that their way of life will 
be lost to international forces beyond the control even of their own government’ (Hall 
2001:55). Trade policy has once again become the subject of much wider non-trade 
concerns. Renato Ruggiero, who served as Director-General of the WTO from 1995 to 
1999, saw the situation like this:
‘...as the WTO becomes more important to the world economy, it also becomes a 
growing focal point for public hopes and concerns: How should the world protect 
endangered species and promote sustainable development? Should trade be linked 
to labor standards and human rights?...And what about eradicating poverty, 
reducing inequalities, and promoting the rights o f women?... We cannot-and  
should not -  ask the WTO to become a development agency, an environmental 
policeman, or a watchdog fo r  labor and human rights' (Ruggiero 2000).
Yet expanding the WTO’s agenda in this way is exactly what some proponents 
of ‘fair trade’2 demand (Schott 2000:467-8). Observing that the GATT (General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) regime and WTO rules bestow substantial benefits on
1 As reported by Steven Weisman and Alexei Barrionuevo, ‘Failure of Global Trade Talks Is Traced to 
the Power of Farmers’, New York Times, 27th July 2006.
2 Definitions of ‘free trade’ and ‘fair trade’ can be confusing. A ‘free trade’ advocate supports trade 
liberalisation, where growth is achieved via markets that become progressively more open. Its focus is 
therefore upon the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers. ‘Fair trade’ in the context of industrialised 
states often refers to the elimination of ‘unfair’ trade practices abroad and the creation of a ‘level playing 
field’. ‘Fair trade’ has a different meaning in terms of development policy, where it often refers to 
eliminating unfair practices that are biased against developing countries (as outlined in COM/99/0619). In 
Europe especially, ‘fair trade’ is often referred to by advocates as ‘trade justice’, which does not oppose 
trade per se, but the rules by which trade is governed.
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large multinational corporations in a policy arena that is relatively closed to other 
interests, many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and trade unions have taken an 
‘if you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em’ approach, lobbying for their own access and agendas.
The reason for this lies with contemporary conceptions of trade barriers. Formal 
barriers based on very visible tariffs have decreased, and firms and governments now 
pay more attention to ‘non-tariff barriers’, import restrictions which do not take the 
form of tariffs, but which may include restrictions on how a good is produced. 
Unfortunately, the international trading system conceptualises trade barriers in very 
broad terms, making it difficult to distinguish between domestic social policy measures 
enacted by a state to benefit its citizens, and trade barriers erected as deliberate 
protectionism (Wolfe 2005:349). This makes the WTO vulnerable to pressures from 
several directions. Actors who argue that trade should be as ‘free’ as possible believe 
that the WTO and its members are being distracted from their main objective (the 
progressive opening of markets) by new issues, and that these new areas are being used 
as distractions by developed nations that wish to avoid dismantling remaining 
protections. Radical opponents of trade also believe the world trading system has 
encroached too far upon national policy autonomy, and wish to see it dismantled. In 
contrast, both trade justice advocates and business interests who support the multilateral 
clarification of trade issues are pushing for new areas to be included in the WTO agenda 
(see Sally 2002; Shiva 2003).
Both proponents and opponents of expanding the WTO’s agenda have seen 
successes. The ancillary agreements to NAFTA (North American Free Trade 
Agreement) covering environmental and labour standards were a concession to 
American pressure groups, whose success depended on the formation of a broad cross­
issue coalition (Wallach & Woodall 2004). Similarly, the TRIPS Agreement 
(Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights) was the result of a 
particularly cohesive pan-industry alliance, the Intellectual Property Committee 
(McGuire 1999).
The New Trade Politics
Examined in isolation, no aspect of the current global trade environment is new. The 
association of trade and non-trade issues is not new. Some bilateral trade and
thenvironment measures can be traced back to the beginning of the 20 century (Vogel 
1995). The current extent of economic globalisation and free marketeering is not new
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(Braudel 1979; Irwin 1996; Schonhardt-Bailey 1997). Public dissent against trade is 
certainly not new: the Boston tea party and campaigns against the slave trade are just 
two well-known examples (Aaronson 2001). What is new is the juxtaposition of these 
factors with the extensive domestic regulatory systems that exist in modem 
democracies.
Young and Peterson (2006) highlight three major trends that constitute what 
they call the ‘new trade politics’: first, challenges to European and American hegemony 
in international trade from several developing countries with rapidly expanding 
economies such as China and India; second, the concerns of trade actors shifting from 
lowering tariffs to tackling non-tariff barriers to trade; and third, new actors such as 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) becoming more engaged with trade policy. 
Thus changes in the global balance of power encourage developed countries to expand 
the trade agenda, pushing trade policy to the top of the agenda for many NGOs that 
were previously not involved.
First, the balance of power among trading nations is changing. In 2007, 26% of 
WTO member states were from the lowest income group, while 52% were low or lower 
middle income countries (see figure 1.1). While the smallest and poorest countries 
continue to have little say over trade negotiations, rapidly growing lower and middle 
income countries have asserted their authority in recent years. They are make use of 
sophisticated bargaining coalitions and are more experienced at conducting negotiations 
than ever before (Narlikar 2003; Odell and Sell 2006). After playing an increasingly 
activist role in the Seattle and Doha WTO ministerial meetings, the G20 group of 
developing countries -led by China, India, Brazil and South Africa- asserted their 
authority at the 2003 ministerial meeting in Cancun, Mexico. Their strong opposition to 
agricultural subsidies in developed countries helped to derail the talks. The current 
indications are that this is a long-term trend, and large industrial countries such as the 
United States and European Union will increasingly have to become accustomed to 
sharing the global stage.
The second major change concerns the expansion of the trade agenda. 
Multilateral trade negotiations are often likened to riding a bicycle. Stop pedalling, so 
the story goes, and you risk falling off the bicycle completely. Successive rounds of 
trade talks are supposed to maintain the momentum for liberalisation and ease 
negotiation by keeping open the possibility for future deals. But even for staunch trade 
liberalisers, this creates a problem. The global trade agenda has been damaged by its 
own success. The eight rounds of trade negotiations since the creation of the GATT in
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1947 have seen bound tariff rates in industrial countries fall to 6.5% on average (WTO 
2001b). Instead of tariffs and duties, modem trade barriers are instead more likely to be 
of the non-tariff variety -  such as technical standards, government subsidies, or even 
regulations ostensibly designed to protect consumers, the environment, public health or 
workers. The use of highly visible tariffs has been reduced, leaving forms of trade 
protection which are much less transparent and therefore harder to eliminate (Kono 
2006). In the last two decades, the global trade agenda has expanded to include first 
agricultural products and trade in services during the Uruguay round (1986-1994), 
intellectual property (1994), the environment (1995), then investment, competition 
policy, government procurement and trade facilitation (1996), and finally development 
goals during the Doha round (2001-present). These trade related policies are collectively 
known as ‘trade and...’ issues.
Bringing domestic policy and regulation within the remit of the WTO brings it 
in reach of the unique WTO dispute mechanism. This mechanism allows WTO member 
governments to bring disputes against each other through a multilateral institution rather 
than in a two-way fight, where there is a much higher risk of retaliatory measures and 
the escalation of a minor dispute into a trade war. This tool gives the WTO the edge 
over the GATT regime, bestowing the ability to mediate and (eventually) resolve 
disputes according to a body of legal rules. But it is in the context of policies seen 
normally as domestic, the ‘trade and’ policies, where the consequences of this 
mechanism could be far reaching. Given that the ‘trade barrier’ status of much 
regulation is disputed, there is a greater chance that policy made by a set of democratic 
institutions to protect citizens could be overruled by an international legal precedent. It 
is very difficult to predict ex ante the effects of a WTO case, and few governments 
would sign up to having their authority eroded in this way. This is one reason trade 
policy experts are discussing subsidiarity for the global trading system, in an attempt to 
retain policy jurisdiction at the national level (for example, Howse and Nicolaidis 2003; 
Jackson 2002).
Third, the expanding trade agenda has caused new actors to pay attention to 
trade policy. Although some activists and policy entrepreneurs were paying fresh 
attention to trade politics as early as the 1980s, the anti-globalisation movement began 
to grab global attention in 1999, in what became known as the ‘Battle of Seattle’. The 
WTO ministerial meeting was intended to be the first in the ‘Millennium Round’ of 
trade talks. However, disagreements among participants, and shocking scenes in the 
streets of the city as protests escalated into riots and violent clashes with police, derailed
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not just the meeting, but the whole round, which was only relaunched in 2001 in the 
wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Protests outside the summit highlighted what many 
protesters saw as the elitist and secretive dealings of the WTO and the unjust balance of 
power within the world trading system.
Figure 1.1: WTO Member Countries by Income Group, 1995 and 2007
1st January 1995 31st December 2007
15%
44%
16%
25%
High Income 
Upper Middle 
Lower Middle 
Low Income
26%
26 %
■  High Income
■ Upper Middle 
Lower Middle 
Low Income
Source: Author’s calculations from www.wto.org , accessed 12th January 2008
Table 1.2: Use of Trade Instruments EU US
MFN Tariffs
' l
Average ad valorem duties 4.2 3.7
Agricultural Goods 5.9 -
Non-Agricultural Goods 4.0 3.3
Average non ad valorem duties 5.9 10.7
Contingency Measures
Anti-dumping 167 280
Countervailing Duties 16 55
Safeguards 1 0
Dispute Rulings (Complainant-Defendant) 26-21 26-47
Source: WTO Trade Profiles (2005) www.wto.ore. accessed 26th June 2006
This was the most visible part of a more widespread change. NGOs became 
more professionalised (Grant 2004; Jordan and Maloney 1997), and better and cheaper 
communications allowed more comprehensive international coalitions to form, 
coordinate activities and mobilise supporters (della Porta et al. 2006). Several developed 
countries experimented with new forms of governance, providing NGOs with new 
opportunity structures to exploit. Organisations in the Americas, spurred into action by 
the US-Canada trade agreement and the North American Free Trade Agreement
3 Ad valorem tariffs are a percentage of an asset’s value and are therefore the most predictable. Non ad 
valorem tariffs (NAV Tariffs) alter the initial percentage, usually based on the weight, size or currency 
value of the good. NAV Tariffs are prevalent in both the EU and US, particularly for agricultural imports. 
NAVs can translate of national policies into tariffs, determined by factors such as the alcohol or sugar 
content of a product, and thus are very opaque.
12 of 204
(NAFTA) were making their voices heard (Ayres 1998; Johnston 1998). In Europe, the 
Commission’s trade Directorate General had created a new forum for consultation 
specifically with non-profit groups. The WTO responded to the Seattle protests by 
attempting to make its procedures more transparent and accessible to NGO observers.
The launch of a new round of trade talks in Doha, Qatar saw a renewed promise 
to give the concerns of developing countries more consideration. This coincided with an 
increased emphasis on aid for trade facilitation and debt relief (see Chapter 5). The 
manifestos of new NGO coalitions, such as Make Poverty History and the One 
Campaign began to reflect the increased importance of trade as a development issue, 
outlining a three-fold prescription of increased aid, debt cancellation, and fairer trade- 
much broader requests, and much more difficult to orchestrate (Jarman 2006).
The modem global trading system is therefore increasingly complex. More 
actors are making a greater number of demands on the system, leaving the WTO’s 
decisionmaking process in deadlock. We have moved from highly visible to nearly 
invisible forms of trade policy. Tariffs are comparatively simple to administer and easy 
to enforce; if the trader fails to comply, they are prevented from distributing any goods. 
In comparison, even defining non-tariff barriers to satisfy all parties is a difficult task.
This complex, multilevel process, with its new actors and agendas, raises 
questions of accountability. Perhaps unsurprisingly in the wake of anti-WTO protests 
among NGOs, WTO staff are keen to emphasise that the organisation is ‘member 
driven’; many of its member governments are democratically elected representatives, 
acting on their own authority (Barton et al. 2006:212). In practice, however, the 
administrative details of the increasingly complex multilateral trading system give 
considerable power to individual bureaucrats. Compared to the World Bank and IMF, 
the WTO has a small staff and budget, and a much smaller cadre of experts. Trade 
Ministers meet at least once every two years, but a great deal of the real work is done by 
their delegates and their subordinates from Permanent Missions in Geneva. As studies 
of middle ranking bureaucrats have shown, such officials can have a big influence on 
policy by working out the details of more general positions (Page 2003; Page and 
Jenkins 2005).
‘Trade And...’ Issues as Imagined Commodities
How can states address the negative aspects of economic globalization? How can policy 
be made in a globalized world? The leaders of the old world order, including the United 
States and European Union, have reacted to these sweeping changes with varying
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degrees of success. This study focuses on one consequence of the new trade politics in 
particular: how and why the EU and US have used non-trade issues to further their trade 
policy goals.
In an influential essay, Habermas (2001) discusses the ‘postnational 
constellation’, exploring emerging economic and political patterns beyond the nation 
state, and ‘the question of whether politics can and should “catch up” with global 
markets’ (62). He asks:
'what would a political response to the challenges o f the postnational constellation look 
like?...the transformed constellation we are currently witnessing touches on the most 
basic functions and legitimacy considerations o f democratic nation-states' (61).
The new trade politics -changing patterns of state power and interdependence, the 
incorporation of ‘trade and’ issues into negotiations, and the increased involvement of 
non-governmental actors in trade politics- is one answer to this question. Countries have 
reacted politically to economic globalization, bringing new issues onto the trade agenda 
in order to influence the domestic policies of other states and minimise negative impacts 
on their home nations.
This section takes a closer look at ‘trade and’ issues in this new policy 
environment, examining how they have been used by governments as bargaining tools 
in negotiations, as normative policy ‘models’, and as mechanisms for enforcing trade 
mles. In the same way that Karl Polanyi (1944) documents the transformation of money 
and labour into commodities, as well as resistance to this process, I document the 
commodification of ‘trade and’ policies as a response to the negative externalities 
created by economic globalization.
Benedict Anderson famously described a nation as an ‘imagined political 
community...imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’ (Anderson 1983:6). It 
is imagined because ‘members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their 
fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the 
image of their communion’ (6). The nation, therefore, is built around shared ideas and 
collective identity, ‘conceived as a deep horizontal comradeship’, regardless of the 
actual inequalities that exist between individuals (7). The US and the EU are both 
products of experiments in forming collective identity and shared values. The 
developing US once struggled to unite its states within a federal structure. The EU 
continues to evolve and develop integrated policies despite persistent debates over its 
membership, legitimacy and constitution.
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Just as nationalism may be a response to an external threat, governments in 
developed countries have responded to the negative externalities of transnational 
markets by attempting to export their values: their environmental and labour standards, 
their ideas about democracy and development, and potentially, their health and social 
policies. In the context of global trade negotiations, these values are imagined 
commodities: domestic policies exported beyond the borders of the state.
‘Trade and’ issues are commodities because they have value to governments in 
formulating trade policy. They have no cash value as such (although they do have 
economic effects) yet they can be used to decrease transaction costs in negotiations.
True commodities are tradable goods which do not vary in quality between producers: 
copper or com rather than watches or stereos. This is the ultimate goal of developed 
governments in exporting their values: harmonising international norms in line with 
their own and incorporating them uniformly across trade agreements. In theory this 
would minimize the cost disadvantages to developed countries of regulation supporting 
those norms. Although the actual level of impact these policies have on developing 
countries is a matter for debate, interest groups and policymakers imagine them to be 
very important, sometimes important enough to derail trade negotiations.
Imagined commodities are valuable to governments in three ways: as bargaining 
tools, as policy models, and as instruments of enforcement. As bargaining tools, they 
counterbalance or provide justification for other policies which may otherwise be 
considered protectionist. Thus, agricultural subsidies may be justified on the grounds 
that they protect rural ways of life or promote animal welfare. The market liberalising 
effects of a bilateral trade agreement may be counterbalanced by efforts to consolidate 
democracy in the partner country via capacity building aid and policy initiatives. These 
arguments can be used equally to justify trade policies to foreign officials or to domestic 
groups who object to a particular policy initiative.
As policy models, imagined commodities assist officials in exerting soft power, 
attracting the attention of other countries who wish to emulate them and fostering 
communication and cooperation. This ‘attraction’ formed the heart of America’s 
‘competitive liberalisation’ strategy under United States Trade Representative (USTR) 
Robert Zoellick. By engaging in multiple bilateral and regional negotiations 
simultaneously, he argued that the US could create new champions for liberalisation and 
create deals that would serve as models for future trade deals within the WTO -US 
standards were integral to these deals. The European Union’s growing body of policy is 
a key element of its expansion agenda. By signing association agreements with the EU,
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new member states must agree to adopt the body of EU law which outlines European 
policies. Eastern European countries have been keen to do this, with the EU expanding 
to 27 members in January 2007.
Attached to enforcement mechanisms, imagined commodities expand the tools 
available to officials to coerce other states while protecting their own interests. 
Developed countries dedicate substantial resources to ‘trade defence’ activities. These 
include the identification of unfair practices identified under WTO rules, such as 
dumping. If a firm exports a product at a lower price than it normally charges in its 
home market, it is said to be ‘dumping’ the product. Anti-dumping measures are 
allowed under WTO rules (GATT Art. 6), as long as genuine injury to the industry can 
be established. Anti-dumping measures are therefore an indicator of the extent to which 
an industry feels threatened by foreign imports, and the Government’s sensitivity to 
those industry requests for protection. Both the US and EU raise large numbers of anti­
dumping cases with India and China, and the US in addition initiates cases in the 
Western Hemisphere: with Brazil, Mexico, Canada and Argentina in particular (WTO 
2007a). In the same way, other interest groups have argued for the inclusion of 
enforceable chapters protecting labour rights or the environment in trade agreements. 
‘Trade and’ policies have an added value for negotiators here: they can be used to 
demonstrate to domestic groups that human rights offenders will be punished, or to 
legitimate enforcement actions that might otherwise be deemed illegal.
The European and American Context
‘Europe still hasn't worked out how to be political about globalisation -  except, in 
most cases, by opposing it. That's our problem '
-  EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson, The Hague, 3rd September 2007.
‘Trade agreements are trade agreements. They are essentially deregulatory tools, 
or tools for deregulation, and should be seen as such’
-  Deputy USTR Peter Veroneau, Washington DC, 27th June 2007.
As much as the EU and US have both made use of ‘trade and’ policies as imagined 
commodities, there are also some important differences between their approaches. The 
US and EU are exporting their values through their trade agreements, yet they neither 
achieve this in the same way nor emphasise the same values. This section explores the 
different responses of these two major trading powers to the new trade politics: the 
dependent variable in this study.
16 of 204
The European Union4 and the United States are the world’s two largest traders 
(table 1.4). The US share of world trade in goods stands at 17.7% compared with the 
EU at 18.4%, with shares of trade in services at 19.4% and 26.9% respectively. They 
each account for just under a third of world GDP and are highly economically 
integrated: 20% of their external exchanges are with each other (see Paemen 2005; 
Meunier 2005). The standards and regulations adopted by these two large markets 
matter a great deal for the economic prospects of other countries, and attempts to export 
American and European standards in trade agreements should be closely studied. As 
economic powers with large and complex (although very different) regulatory systems, 
European and American reactions to the new trade politics have large implications for 
the future global trading system.
The history of American trade policy is as long as the history of America itself. 
When the first instance of delegation from the US Congress to the administration 
occurred on July 31st 1789, one of the powers granted by Congress was the power to 
‘estimate the dues payable on imports’ (Bertelli and Lynn 2006:75). In the days when 
the United States had less administrative capacity and was developing industrially, there 
were strong incentives to rely upon tariffs to raise revenue. Now, as dominant traders in 
the global system, with other sources of funds, the benefits gained from open trade 
generally outweigh those from maintaining tariffs. Trade has diversified greatly since 
that point -  both the EU and US have large and expanding service sectors, dealing in 
finance, travel and telecommunications in addition to more traditional goods markets.
The US model for the global economy has been the dominant international 
paradigm since the days of the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, and the creation of 
the Bretton Woods institutions. The US model of economic management which was 
incorporated into these international economic institutions advocated open markets, 
minimised transaction costs, and provided substantial opportunities for lobbyists 
(Cowhey and Aronson 1993). In recent years, the US has been successful at getting core 
political and legal values (such as priority for market access, reciprocity, rules-based 
agreements, and delineated jurisdictions) incorporated into the WTO framework and 
prolific in negotiating bilateral deals that reflect its views.
Given its origins as a customs union, we should not be surprised that much of 
EU policy can be interpreted as trade policy, as it affects the exchange of goods and 
services across borders. Trade policy is one of the oldest competencies of the European
4 The EU is represented within the WTO by the European Communities (EC). This distinction does little 
here except add complexity, so it is omitted.
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Commission5, as specified in the 1957 EEC (European Economic Community) treaty, 
Article 1136. Signed a decade earlier, Article XXIV of the GATT (1947) set out the 
rules governing customs unions, and thus shaped the form of the early EEC. Although 
the European customs union broadly conformed to the rules, it is interesting to note that 
strong American support for the EEC meant that GATT members waved through the 
agreement without giving it their formal approval, despite concerns about its 
‘discriminatory’ nature (Finlayson and Zacher 1981:568).
Dire predictions that the EU would become an ultra-protectionist bloc have not 
come true, however. Hanson (1998) sees trade liberalization in the EU as an integral 
part of the integration process between member state policies, accounting for the fact 
that external trade in the European Union has liberalized against economists’ 
expectations of a ‘fortress Europe’. It is therefore increasingly difficult to delineate EU 
trade policy in terms of internal/external (Holland 2002) or as distinct from other policy 
issues. The EU response to the new trade politics has been to take what has worked at 
the supranational level and transfer this practice to global institutions. This means an 
emphasis on cooperation between governments, coordination between policy areas, and 
consultation with relevant interests.
Table 1.3: The Basics EU US
Population (thousands, 2004) 455 297 293 507
GDP (million current PPP US$, 2004) 12 001 030 11 628 080
Current account balance (million US$, 2004) (27 205) (668 080)
Trade per capita (US$, 2002-2004) 6 013 8 979
Trade to GDP ratio (2002-2004) 25.0 23.7
Rank in World Exports
Merchandise 1 2
Services 1 2
Rank in World Imports
Merchandise 2 1
Services 1 2
Source: WTO Trade Profiles (2005) mvw.wto.ors, accessed 26th June 2006
I argue that studies of EU-US differences conflate two dimensions: the way that 
a policy agenda is pursued is confused with the policy agenda itself. In this research I
5 While trade in goods is an exclusive competence of the EU, legal competence in services trade and on 
intellectual property rights is divided between the EU institutions and EU member states. This is 
discussed in detail in chapter 3.
6 Just to confuse us all, Art. 133 of the Composite Treaty is equivalent to Art. 113 in the 1957 EEC 
Treaty. The Committee that bears its name can be referred to as both the Art. 113 Committee and the Art. 
133 Committee.
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use these two dimensions to characterise the different responses of the EU and US to the 
new trade politics. The first dimension, the means by which a polity seeks to harmonise 
the policies of other states with its own, relates closely to Nye’s (Nye 2004b) continuum 
of hard and soft power. At one end of the spectrum, a hard power approach to trade 
policy is concerned with using existing WTO rules and domestic instruments to enforce 
compliance among third parties. A soft power approach to compliance is less about 
enforcing rules and more about winning hearts and minds.
Joseph Nye coined the term ‘soft power’ to highlight the importance of non­
military aspects of American foreign policy in convincing other states to cooperate with 
the US or emulate its behaviour (Nye 1990, 2004b). Soft power works as a kind of 
social capital for states, enabling them to achieve their objectives without the need to 
threaten other countries with sticks or pay them in carrots. He argues that by focussing 
on the use of force, the Bush administration has allowed America’s soft power to ebb 
away by eroding the value of US culture and democracy abroad (Nye 2004a; Barbe 
2005). Nye envisions soft and hard power not as a dichotomy, but as a continuum. 
Coercion via force or sanctions is the hardest form of power, followed by inducement 
through payments or bribes. Agenda setting via institutions is a softer form of power, 
and attempts to co-opt or attract states using values, culture and policies is the softest 
(Nye 2004b:8). Force may not be a standard component of modem trade policy, but the 
other actions in Nye’s continuum can be easily transposed from a general analysis of 
foreign policy to the more specific case of trade.
Findings
The evidence in this volume shows that both the EU and US use harder and softer forms 
of power to pursue their trade interests: on some issues they are equally concerned with 
trade defence activities, identifying when other countries are breaking the rules and 
initiating countermeasures. They both take part in trade diplomacy: ministerial visits 
with key foreign officials and building relationships with other countries that result in 
new trade agreements. The EU and US use ‘trade and’ issues as tools of both ‘hard’ and 
‘soft’ power: as normative policy ‘models’, designed to attract potential trading partners 
and allies; as bargaining tools to shape agendas in negotiations; and at the other end of 
the spectmm, as mechanisms for enforcing trade rules.
But along the second dimension, the EU emphasises a broad ‘trade and’ agenda, 
encompassing multiple issues, while the model that the US presents to the world is 
much narrower, focussing on spreading competition and the rule of law, or increasing
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security. On signing separate bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with Chile, EU and 
US approaches to ‘trade and’ issues differed. A press release by the USTR emphasised 
the economic benefits to Americans:
‘The U.S.-Chile FTA will increase U.S. market access fo r  goods and services and 
provide strong protections fo r  U.S. investors in Chile. American workers, 
consumers, businesses, and farmers will enjoy preferential access to one o f the 
world’s fastest growing economies, enabling products and services to flow back and 
forth from the United States and Chile with no tariffs and under streamlined 
customs procedures’ (USTR 2003b).
The EU also issued a press release on signing their FTA with Chile, but took a different 
stance:
‘Respect for democratic principles, human rights and the rule o f law are essential 
elements o f the agreement. The promotion o f sustainable economic and social 
development, and the equitable distribution o f the benefits o f the Association 
Agreement are guiding principles for its implementation ’ (DG Trade 2002).
The EU goes to great lengths to state its commitment to traditionally ‘non-trade’ issues 
in free trade agreements. The list of related issues is a long one. An EU negotiating 
proposal on agriculture submitted in 2000 emphasizes the role that supposedly ‘trade 
distorting’ measures can play in promoting non-trade related issues, discussing food 
security, health and safety standards, the contribution of agriculture to sustainable 
development, and poverty reduction (European Communities 2000). The US, in 
contrast, takes pains to emphasise the specific gains to its manufacturers and business. 
The USTR often acts as a broker for powerful national interests, seeking increased 
access in foreign markets on their behalf. The US trade agenda is consequently much 
narrower, focussing on the benefits of free trade and competition or the spread of the 
rule of law.
So variation along the first dimension, ‘approach to compliance’, is not 
systematic, while the second, ‘policy agenda’, shows distinct differences. Why have the 
EU and US adopted these different approaches to ‘trade and’ issues? To examine 
linkages between trade and non-trade policies it is important to examine the internal 
constraints on policymakers: the institutional structures of the EU and US, the 
opportunities these present for interest groups, and the requisite effects of these on 
policymakers’ decisions. Understanding exactly which mechanisms are at work allows 
us to further explore why US and EU approaches have been different.
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Explaining the Differences
At a time when domestic policy issues -as non-tariff barriers- are increasingly the 
stumbling blocks in international trade negotiations (Paemen 2005), domestic 
institutional differences matter. This section summarises my explanation of why EU and 
US policy responses differ.
I follow on from an important body of recent research in political science by 
taking an institutional approach to explaining trade policy outcomes. This research 
argues that the strategies adopted by states in multilateral trade negotiations differ 
according to varying domestic institutional factors. Where the US tends to be more 
active and proposes maximum change, the EU tends to be more pragmatic and 
incremental (Meunier 2005; Narlikar 2003; Searight 2005; Young 2002; Zeng 2004). 
The fragmentation of the European Union and the lesser autonomy of the EU Trade 
Commissioner when compared to the USTR are thought to cause the EU to ‘play it safe’ 
-  proposing small cuts and taking fewer risks. Breaking each political system down into 
smaller institutional components, these studies explore the delegation mechanisms and 
decisionmaking rules, demonstrating that they can radically alter a state’s behaviour in 
trade negotiations.
But understanding the use of ‘trade and’ policies as imagined commodities 
means exploring not only the means of policymaking but also the content of policy. 
Although understanding the formal mechanisms of delegation and how they work in 
practice is vital, it is also important to determine why a particular ‘trade and’ policy 
came to be. Combining trade and non-trade policies is not inevitable, nor does it happen 
by accident. It is usually a considered response to a specific problem rather than a 
spontaneous decision by policymakers.
This study therefore uses two important explanatory variables: delegation, the 
transfer of negotiating authority from governments to trade negotiatiors, and 
representation, how interests (whether organised interest groups or the broader public) 
are represented in the policymaking process -their opportunities for accessing 
decisionmakers. Understanding delegation is important if we are to establish who has 
authority to negotiate trade agreements and make day to day policy decisions, how 
much autonomy they have from politicians and other bureaucratic units, and how their 
authority is determined -is  there a constant power struggle between negotiators and 
other government actors or is the relationship governed by stable rules? These are 
particularly important questions when discussing ‘trade and’ issues, which often cross
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policy jurisdictions and require a considerable amount of coordination between the 
interested parties.
Understanding which groups are represented in the policymaking process is also 
important. In developed democracies such as the EU and US, whoever has the authority 
to make trade policy needs legitimacy in order to maintain it. Policy decisions 
themselves and the mechanisms by which they are derived must be seen as legitimate. 
One important way of maintaining perceptions of legitimacy is to give sections of 
society limited input into the decisionmaking process, whether this is via elected 
representatives or directly between interest groups and officials. The mechanisms that 
decisionmakers use to consult outsiders create different opportunity structures for 
interest groups. Depending on how these opportunities are structured, different groups 
will be able to gain meaningful access to decisionmakers and influence the content of 
trade policy.
Interest groups, whether constituted broadly or more specifically, play an 
important role in defining policy alternatives and packaging solutions. There is a very 
large and distinguished body of literature (explored in chapter 3) examining interest 
groups in both the US and EU, among which several studies of trade policy play a 
seminal role. Paying attention to theories of interest group representation enriches our 
understanding of institutions, actors and of their strategies and interactions. What 
interest groups do, their strategies and preferred policies, reflects their collective best 
judgment about where power is, how it can be influenced, and which policy solutions 
are practical. Groups aim to identify the levers of power that they can pull given their 
unique membership. In turn, understanding which groups gain access to decisionmakers 
tells us something about the preferences and goals of policymakers themselves.
This study attempts to answer two key questions. First, how have the EU and US 
engaged in the new trade politics? I conclude that the two polities both use harder and 
softer forms of power but emphasise different issues, with the US consistently adopting 
a narrower ‘trade and’ agenda than the EU. Second, I ask why the EU and US have 
responded differently. I conclude that institutional differences, differences in delegation 
and representation, answer this question. While institutions may determine whether a 
state is protectionist or liberal, active or reactive, they also play an important role in 
determining the content of policy by controlling who can access decisionmakers.
The EU and US have responded to economic globalization by seeking to export 
their values and get them incorporated in key institutions. By doing this, they seek to 
reduce the impact of negative externalities on their home populations. These policies act
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as ‘imagined commodities’ in trade negotiations; they have a value to negotiators as 
bargaining tools and a value to officials in forming relationships with other countries 
and when justifying and enforcing systems of trade preferences and subsidies.
I argue that the European Union and United States use ‘trade and’ issues 
differently based on the set up of their domestic institutions. How these two polities use 
non-trade policies in negotiations can be explained by ‘delegation’ and ‘representation’: 
how trade negotiating authority is delegated from government institutions to negotiators 
and the relationship between them, and how societal interests and the public are 
represented in the trade policymaking process.
In order to gain enough domestic support for new trade measures, both US and 
EU officials have a need for their policy to be seen as legitimate. An institution or 
policy is legitimate if it is perceived as such, in other words, if it is popularly accepted. 
But where the US looks inwards -to Congress and a popularly elected President- to 
legitimate its policies, the EU is keen to legitimate its trade policy in the eyes of the 
European people and the rest of the world. US policy is more legalized, formal, and 
policymakers are more constrained by precedent, so policy is more likely to follow a 
stable trajectory. Lobbying is certainly dominated by business interests, and committees 
of interest group representatives convened to advise policymakers are politically biased. 
But it is much easier to find out who lobbyists are, what they are doing, and how much 
they have spent. The Congressional process for approving agreements is a blunt 
instrument, but it is an instrument backed up by the legitimacy of an elected body. In 
contrast, the EU has long debated its structural legitimacy (Moravcsik 2002; Majone 
1998; Follesdal and Hix 2006).
Although the European Parliament has consistently gained more influence with 
each Treaty signed, this influence does not touch trade policy. Likewise, discussions 
between member state governments are secretive, with trade policy itself largely 
decided not in the General Affairs Council but a subcommittee. The EU Commission 
has attempted to bring in more civil society groups to justify its policy at home and to 
construct arguments which make its domestic policies seem legitimate to foreign 
governments within the WTO.
In the EU, policy initiatives are an attempt to justify decisions that are not 
necessarily in the control of negotiators themselves -  to legitimate them in the eyes of 
the people back home. At the same time, the EU needs to justify its domestic policies 
(particularly its agricultural policy) to other WTO members, or risk them being 
unravelled by international trade agreements. To achieve these two objectives, the EU
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Commission has sought to find a greater role for civil society groups in the process of 
formulating mandates, and to link policies together to present a more united front to the 
world -where agricultural support is justified by sustainable development initiatives and 
the disadvantage to developing countries counterbalanced by tariff concessions to 
LDCs. The EU is trying to close the gap between the realities of EU policies and WTO 
rules, searching for intellectual coherence.
In the US, officials spell out what is gained for their domestic groups, and 
partisan politics plays a larger role. The Clinton administration paid attention to a 
coalition of labour and environmental groups (in addition to those of business) calling 
for the inclusion of their issues in trade agreements because the support of those groups 
was fundamental to its electoral success in both Presidential and Congressional contests, 
providing funding and organisational support. During the Bush administration, the 
labour and environmental portions of trade agreements persisted, largely due to the 
stable and highly legalised nature of US trade policy. Despite this, the Bush 
administration had no need to satisfy labour or environmental groups, and attempted to 
minimise their impact on trade policy by filling trade advisory committees with friendly 
representatives. The administration has been keen to satisfy the demands of business 
and agribusiness, acting as a broker to seek out new markets. US officials have framed 
trade policy in terms of compliance and economic growth.
The following chapters add substance to this framework using evidence from 
‘trade and’ policies in the EU and US between 1999 and 2007. To a review of relevant 
literature and primary sources, I add information about substantive trade policy 
preferences from an analysis of government documents, substantiated through elite 
interviews with interest group representatives and trade policy officials. The interviews 
were semi-structured, enabling greater coverage of groups despite limited time and 
resources and allowing for some unstructured input. The study focuses on the major 
interest groups involved in demanding ‘trade and’ policies: trade unions and peak 
associations; agricultural groups; environmental, public health and development NGOs. 
Where access to an actor was unavailable, every attempt was made to substitute a 
similar actor. Efforts were made to inform interview participants of the aims of the 
research and the uses to which the data will be put. A statement of intent, covering 
issues of anonymity, was provided to participants. An interview schedule can be found 
in Appendix 1.
The rest of this volume proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 provides a firmer 
evidence base on which to assess the different positions of the EU and US on ‘trade
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and’ issues, examining the development of the ‘trade and’ agenda from 1996 to 2007. It 
incorporates automated textual analysis of over 1800 press releases. I find that the EU 
and US both use harder and softer forms of power in pursuing their trade goals.
Contrary to what we might expect, the US often engages in trade diplomacy, promoting 
its agenda through new trade negotiations, and the EU often prioritises ‘trade defence’, 
compliance to existing legal rules. The main difference is that the EU employs a broad 
set of non-trade issues to justify its actions, while the US trade agenda is narrowly 
focussed.
Chapter 3 lays out the institutional structures -the mechanisms of delegation and 
representation- that shape and legitimate EU and US trade policies. Delegation, the 
extent to which trade officials can make policy independently, and representation, the 
representation of organised interests and citizens in this process have a strong influence 
on the final policy outcome. Differing institutional structures shape the ability of 
interest groups to get their views across to policymakers, resulting in different patterns 
of trade policy.
The second section of the book introduces the three policy studies, (labour and 
environmental standards before the Doha round, linking agricultural reform and 
development during the Doha round, and ongoing debates on access to medicines and 
health services) which look in much more detail at the key non-trade issues which have 
caused disruption in multilateral trade negotiations. Each chapter explores how and why 
these issues came to be associated with the trade agendas of the EU and US, and 
explores the differences between the two polities in each case.
The case selection deliberately cuts across national and supranational levels of 
analysis and concepts of the EU as sui generis. The European Union is not 
‘SuperNAFTA’: a regional trade agreement with extra appendages. The EU has its own 
elections, makes its own policy and passes its own laws, and has developed a great deal 
beyond policy coordination in the last 50 years. While in everyday life most Europeans 
would still be uncomfortable with calling it a ‘state’, for research purposes, the 
appropriate comparison is with the United States itself. Focussing on trade policy, 
which is highly centralised in both the EU and US and subject to common uses of 
terminology, increases comparability. The three case study chapters provide more detail 
about the dependent variable, show the mechanisms which cause that variable to alter 
and show variation that fits with my argument.
Chapter 4 analyses labour and the environment in the context of trade 
agreements, examining two of the first explicit non-trade policies to be used by Europe
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and America as protection against changing power structures in the global trading 
system. This provides a straightforward illustration of my argument. In the US, these 
two policy communities formed an alliance during the NAFTA debates of the 1990s, 
asking for the inclusion of labour and environmental standards in trade agreements. 
Although the two communities both lobbied the European Union for inclusion of these 
standards in trade agreements, they did so separately. These different patterns of 
representation have very different treatment of labour and environmental issues in each 
polity.
Chapter 5 contrasts the growing emphasis on trade as a development tool with 
continuing demands to protect domestic agriculture, analysing EU and US attempts to 
justify their trade policies within the development framework of the Doha round. This 
study tests my argument on the highly controversial question of who should be allowed 
to produce the world’s food. While the EU and US have a comparable level of 
protection for their farmers and strong agricultural lobbies, the EU has additionally 
attempted to promote the interests of development groups, and the reasons for this are 
explored.
Chapter 6 compares NGO campaigns for greater access to generic medicines 
with those surrounding the expansion of the trade in services agenda into health policy. 
This is a much newer issue, with the consequences of trade in health services in 
particular still to be played out. In the mid-1990s, business interests succeeded in 
getting their intellectual property agenda incorporated into world trade rules. The NGO 
community did not begin to effectively oppose this agenda until a group of 
organisations launched an ‘access to medicines’ campaign in the mid-1990s. The 
campaign was great success in the EU, cited as one of the most successful results of the 
civil society dialogue, and, surprisingly, an equal success in the US. In contrast, the 
trade in health services agenda has received little NGO attention on either side of the 
Atlantic, and yet the EU announced a moratorium on health in the services negotiations 
while the US has actively pursued a health services agenda. This case study, therefore, 
represents a harder test for my main argument.
In the concluding chapter, I summarise the evidence from the three policy 
studies and draw some broader lessons for the regulation of policies that cross the 
national/global divide. I discuss the future for ‘trade and’ policies, including the options 
for limiting the WTO’s expanding agenda through membership reform or subsidiarity, 
and for better scrutiny of these complex issues in domestic institutions. The global 
economy stands on the verge of a slowdown or perhaps a depression. The links between
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trade and non-trade policies, created in times of prosperity and open markets, may well 
be the source of bitter trade disputes in leaner times.
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2 EU Against US: ‘Trade and’ Policies in the Doha Round
In the last two decades, the interaction between trade and non-trade policy has taken on 
a new intensity, driven in large part by the actions of the EU and US. The Uruguay 
round expanded the global trade agenda to an unprecedented degree, placing 
agricultural goods, trade in services, investment and intellectual property on the 
negotiating table. It was ‘quite simply the largest trade negotiation ever, and most 
probably the largest negotiation of any kind in history’, according to the WTO (2003). 
When the round was finally concluded in 1994, the appetite for further negotiations 
amongst business and policymakers alike was small. However, below the international 
level, the US and EU continued to develop their own trade agendas, and began to push 
for these policies to be included in a ‘millennium round’ of talks.
This would not be an easy task. Defining an agenda for the new round took 
nearly seven years and threatened to rip the newly constructed WTO apart. The US 
failed to get labour standards included in the negotiations, and the EU bid to recognise 
the precautionary principle (a longstanding EU environmental principle which states 
that a course of action should not be followed until there is reasonable certainty that it 
will not cause harm) gained no support. Developing countries opposed these new issues, 
arguing that developed countries had not yet lived up to the promises they made during 
the last round. Outside WTO summits, protesters shouted their opposition to the global 
trading system.
But just one month after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, WTO members 
signed the Doha Declaration at the 4th Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar. This 
event was a watershed for trade policy, launching a new and very ambitious round of 
trade negotiations. The declaration states that
‘International trade can play a major role in the promotion o f economic 
development and the alleviation o f poverty. We recognize the need fo r  all our 
peoples to benefit from the increased opportunities and welfare gains that the 
multilateral trading system generates. The majority o f WTO members are 
developing countries. We seek to place their needs and interests at the heart o f the 
Work Programme adopted in this Declaration’ (WTO 2001a).
This was a formal recognition of the ‘new trade politics’ -  changes in power 
relations, the expanding trade agenda, and the mobilisation of an anti-globalisation 
movement (see Chapter 1). America and Europe seemed to have restrained their
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efforts to push for new issues in acknowledgement of the new bargaining power 
of developing countries. The Doha meeting seemed to have saved the global 
trading system from self-destruction.
By 2005, however, this apparent goodwill had largely dissipated. The EU and 
US had come increasingly under pressure to make larger concessions on agriculture, 
and developing countries had proved that they were willing to assert their authority at 
the Cancun and Hong Kong WTO Ministerial meetings. Businesses in Europe and 
America were likewise frustrated at the lack of progress on the services agenda. 
Negotiations eventually continued later that year, but have since been intermittent and 
disappointing. At the time of writing it seems likely that a final deal will be reached, but 
that it will be far less ambitious than originally intended and deliver very little for 
developing countries.
This chapter establishes that the EU and US have approached this new era in 
significantly different ways. It examines the period 1996-2007, comparing the 
development of ‘trade and’ issues in EU and US trade policy from the establishment of 
the WTO through to the breakdown of the Doha round negotiations. A analysis of press 
releases by DG Trade and the USTR from 2001 to 2007 tracks the efforts of EU and US 
trade negotiators to justify policy decisions during that time.
The history and content analysis shows that trade policy, rather than being a 
simple dichotomy of “hard” and “soft” or “liberal” and “protectionist”, instead falls on 
two axes: officials’ approach to compliance, and the breadth of the trade agenda they 
put forward (figure 2.1). The first axis is very similar to Nye’s (Nye 2004b:8) concept 
of a hard-soft power continuum, with the difference being that the use or threat of 
military force is highly unlikely in the modem era. At one end of the continuum, a hard 
power approach to trade policy is concerned with using existing WTO rules and 
domestic instruments to enforce compliance among third parties, a practice commonly 
referred to among policymakers as ‘trade defence’. Such an approach would make 
heavy use of antidumping measures and countervailing duties allowed under the WTO 
in retaliation against a breach of the mles, or involve public threats to do so. A hard 
power approach could involve the unilateral imposition of tariffs against a trading 
partner, including restrictive mles in trade agreement that are stricter than the equivalent 
multilateral standard, but also aid payments made to developing countries, as the threat 
of withdrawing aid confers power on the donor. A soft power approach to compliance is 
less about enforcing rules and more about winning hearts and minds. These activities 
would include sending trade ministers abroad to promote new trade agreements or
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regional blocs, setting policy agendas by building certain preferences into trade 
agreements, offering incentives to cooperate on policy in the form of support for 
capacity building programmes, and giving special concessions such as lower tariffs or 
slacker reciprocity rules to developing countries to encourage them to participate in the 
WTO regime. While a tough approach to compliance is about a state getting what it 
wants, outside the scope of WTO rules if necessary, a softer approach is about agreeing 
rules that a wider range of countries see as legitimate.
Figure 2.1: Framework for Interpreting EU and US Statements on Trade
Scope of Trade Agenda
Narrow Broad
Hard 
(Trade Defence)
Approach to 
Compliance
Soft
(Trade Diplomacy)
Hard and soft approaches are not, however, the only dimension. The content of 
the policy that is being pursued in a hard or soft way also matters. On the second 
dimension, each polity has a choice about which issues or ideas to invoke to justify its 
trade policy. At one end, the trade agenda can be narrowly defined, focussing perhaps 
on the economic imperative of reducing barriers to trade or maintaining food security. 
At the other, more diffuse issues such as environmental, social, or development 
concerns are used to justify and legitimate a policy action, whether this is participation 
in a new agreement or the use of a measure that restricts trade. Heavily influenced by 
the demands of interest groups, filtered through its internal bureaucratic structure, a 
state adopts a strategy that either prioritises a few narrow policy goals or promotes a 
broader agenda that incorporates many more ‘trade and’ issues. At one extreme, a
Fights hard to defend 
domestic interests 
using trade defence 
mechanisms
e.g. use or threat o f 
antidumping, cvds, 
safeguards, TRIPS
Fights hard to defend 
domestic interests 
using diffuse issues 
as justification
e.g multifunctionality 
in agriculture, sanctions 
over labour standards
Promotes new 
agreements/measures 
using free 
trade justifications
e.g. FTAs, RTAs
Promotes new 
agreements/measures 
using diffuse 
issues as justification
e.g EPAs, AGOA, 
Access to Medicines, 
cooperation agreements
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narrow agenda focuses on the benefits of free trade and sees its economic consequences 
as key, viewing the other effects of trade agreements as of marginal importance. At the 
other, a broad agenda attempts to use these secondary effects to the benefit of the 
trading state. One good example of this is the EU’s support for ‘multifunctionality’ in 
agriculture; the EU argues that agricultural subsidies not only support farmers, but 
maintain a quality of life in rural communities that would otherwise be lost. The EU’s 
complex and fragmented bureaucracy is visible in the numerous ‘trade and’ issues that 
the Commission continues to promote throughout the round. The EU trade agenda 
gradually becomes more complex as the round moves on, pushing issues together and 
blurring the boundaries between them. At the same time, the American trade agenda 
narrows, focussing down on key priorities: market access and security issues.
Figure 2.2 summarises EU and US movements along these two dimensions 
between 2001 and 2007. It is an important but basic point that both the EU and US do 
move over time; even in this relatively short period their positions are not static. Until 
2005, the EU shows a very clear tendency to justify its trade policy using diffuse issues. 
The US, in contrast, sticks to a fairly narrow trade agenda, focussing on increasing 
global competition, with lesser themes of spreading freedom and the rule of law. The 
US moves further into the bottom left quadrant as it emphasises this agenda and spends 
more time trying to sign new agreements. The US is more consistent in its policy stance 
when compared to the EU. In other words, the systematic difference between the US 
and EU is in the breadth of their agendas rather than their approaches (table 2.2).
This chapter uses several types of evidence to track the EU and US along these 
dimensions, establishing a clearer evidence base for perceived differences between 
American and European approaches to ‘trade and’ policies. Historical analysis of the 
years leading up to the beginning of the Doha Round of trade negotiations in 2001 gives 
context to the analysis which follows, explaining how ‘trade and’ issues came to be an 
important part of the Doha agenda. This is accompanied by a textual analysis of 1800 
press releases issued by the USTR and DG Trade between 2001 -the year of the Doha 
declaration and the start of the round- and 2007. The results for the years 2001, 2003, 
2005 and 2007 are displayed here, chosen in order to show the progression of EU and 
US positions during the round. This captures what the EU and US were saying about 
trade around important ministerial meetings: Doha in 2001, Cancun in 2003, and Hong 
Kong in 2005 and contrasts these with statements after the break down of the talks.
Each year is divided into two six month periods. Splitting the analysis up in this way 
allows us to see two things more clearly. First, any differences between administrations
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as one trade minister hands over to another, and second, as the ministerial meetings 
always occur in the second half of the year, the effect of WTO ministerials on what the 
EU and US say.
Table 2.2: EU and US Statements on Trade, 2001-2007 
EU US
Approach to Scope o f Approach to Scope of
Com pliance Agenda Com pliance Agenda
2001Jan',,me Softer Broad Harder Narrow
July-Dee Harder Broad Softer Narrow
2002Jan'June Softer Broad Harder Narrow
July-Dee Softer Broad Harder Narrow
2003 Jan'Iune Softer Broad Softer Narrow
July-Dee Harder Broad Softer Narrow
2004 Jan'June Harder Broad Softer Narrow
July-Dee Harder Broad Softer Narrow
2005Jan'June Neither Broad Softer Narrow
July-Dee Harder Broad Harder Narrow
2006Jan'June Softer Broad Harder Narrow
July-Dee Harder Narrow Softer Broad
2007Jan'June Softer Broad Harder Narrow\^M\M i
July-Dee Softer Broad Harder Narrow
Correspondence analysis of this text allows the researcher to explore complex 
patterns in the data. Using the text analysis programme Alceste, I draw out the key 
themes in each six month period, and analyse the proximity of officials’ policy positions 
to these themes over time. The purpose of this analysis is to explore further what many 
authors have anecdotally observed: that the EU and US emphasise different trade policy 
problems at any one time, and to link this to their different bargaining styles.
It is important to stress that this is an exploratory method that allows me to 
create a framework for the more detailed policy studies in the next three chapters. It is 
not a measure of causal relationships but rather a way to simplify and portray a large 
amount of complex data and show the movements in EU and US positions over a period 
of time. It is still essential for the researcher to be thoroughly familiar with the data (I 
read every single press release and referred back to the original text throughout).
Using press releases as a way for the US and EU to ‘self-report’ is key: we can 
assume that both the USTR and the European Commission want to portray themselves 
in the best light. This builds up a picture of the arguments that trade officials think are 
important, and who these arguments are directed at. Press releases are fairly short and
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use common everyday language, minimising the very technical jargon that occurs in 
other trade policy documents and increasing the comparability between US and EU 
texts. The texts of trade agreements are not suitable for this kind of analysis. They share 
a good deal of the same language simply by being international legal agreements, and 
their formality does not capture the informal aspects of policymaking that lead to ‘trade 
and’ linkages, much as a written constitution tells us little about everyday policymaking.
Method
1800 press releases from the USTR and the European Commission’s DG Trade dating 
between January 2001 and December 2007 were analysed using the text analysis 
programme Alceste. US press releases were downloaded from the USTR’s online 
document library7, while EU press releases were downloaded from DG Trade’s ICentre 
in English8. These were then consolidated into plain text files for analysis, edited lightly 
to remove extraneous text (such as tables), and ensure consistent spelling. Each file 
comprised EU and US press releases for a six month period.
Alceste is an automated textual analysis program which takes large amounts of 
text and subjects it to hierarchical classification analysis- splitting it up to discover the 
key ‘themes’ at the heart of a body of text. Alceste was developed in 1974 by Max 
Reinert, based on the ideas of Jean Paul Benzecri on correspondence analysis in 
linguistics (Reinert 1983; Benzecri 1981). As described meticulously in Schonhardt- 
Bailey (2006), it has been used extensively in the humanities and the social sciences 
(Greenacre and Underhill 1982; Weller and Romney 1990; Blasius and Thiessen 2001; 
Lahlou 1996; Allum 1998) and in the last decade has been utilised as a method in 
political science (Brougidou 2000; Bailey and Schonhardt-Bailey 2005; Schonhardt- 
Bailey 2006).
Alceste is very different from standard content analysis in that the initial analysis 
is ‘automated’, meaning that the programme determines themes in the text statistically, 
without input from the researcher. The benefits of content analysis are retained in that it 
is easy to relate individual words, sentences and themes back to the original text, and to 
ask multiple questions of a rich form o f data, but some of the common problems 
associated with traditional content analysis can be minimised. Alceste allows us to start
7 Available at http://wwA v.ustr.gov/D ocuniem  Library/Section Index.htrni. accessed between February 
2006 and June 2008.
8 Available at h ttp ://tradc.ec.eu ropa.eu /doclib /ciin /doclib  se a rch .c lm /ac tio n -sea rch . As the ICentre is a 
relatively new database containing press releases added retroactively, press releases from the ICentre 
were compared with those held on the central EU RAPID database at
http://europa.eu/rapld/pressReleascsAciion.do7rcicrencc-IP/08/1142 to ensure a complete list.
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with the notion that EU and US approaches to ‘trade and’ policies are different, without 
the need to establish a set of concrete hypotheses and coding structures before exploring 
the data. Automated analysis therefore reduces the temptation to impose a structure on 
the data from the outside, avoiding bias introduced by the researcher. It allows a 
researcher to gain an overall picture of a large amount of data in a relatively short time.
It also addresses problems of reliability in the coding by minimising researcher input. 
Increasing the statistical component of the analysis has a price, however, and it is 
possible for automated analysis to miss nuances that might have been captured by 
traditional content analysis (Schonhardt-Bailey 2005). Overall, this method is highly 
suited to my purpose -translating ‘hunches’ about how EU and US policy approaches 
are different into a more concrete dependent variable. The analysis has allowed a more 
systematic comparison of differences between EU and US statements, uncovering two 
dimensions (breadth of agenda and approach to compliance) which are obscured in the 
literature.
Alceste codes the data using hierarchical classification analysis. First, the 
programme splits up the text into ‘Elementary Context Units’ (ECUs). ECUs are 
‘gauged sentences’, which are constructed by Alceste based on word length and 
punctuation in the text (Schonhardt-Bailey 2002:8). Alceste slices up the text into 
ECUs, slicing thickly or more thinly based upon punctuation and word length to 
maximise the number of ECUs it can analyse. Alceste then looks for words that are 
present in multiple ECUs. It notes the distribution of these words among ECUs, 
recording the presence or absence of words in a matrix. All ECUs in the corpus are 
divided into two groups or ‘classes’ (here I have called them themes) with the least 
number of overlapping words, using a chi-squared criterion to compare their distribution 
with the average distribution of words among ECUs. This process -  hierarchical 
classification analysis- is repeated until repetition fails to create any new and distinct 
themes. The chi-squared criterion reads as follows, as laid out by Schonhardt-Bailey 
(2006):
Where
kJ2 = k if ; fc2 = ^  k2J ; kj = k2j +  k 3J
i e l 2 £ 6 l i
Where K2j is the frequency of contextual units in class 2 containing a specific word (j).
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Validation of Alceste results is determined by the proportion of ECUs that the 
programme can classify. A result is considered to be valid if 60% of ECUs are 
successfully classified. Table 8.1 (in the appendix below) details these figures for the 
analyses performed in this study. As the analysis seeks to explore data rather than 
establish causal relationships, this measure should not be compared to an R-squared 
statistic: it is not a measure of statistical significance.
The final output is presented in a number of different ways. Two of these are 
particularly useful for our purposes. For each theme, characteristic words are identified 
using their chi-squared values. A high chi-squared value means that a word is closely 
associated with that theme. For example, in the first half of 2001, the words develop+ 
(^=95.0), medicine+ (x2=85.1), disease+ (x2=73.0) and drug+ (x2=66.9) are closely 
associated with theme 6. A *+’ symbol indicates a lemmatised word, so ‘develop+’ will 
include the words develop, developed, developing, and so on. By examining the whole 
list of characteristic words and referring back to the sentences and paragraphs which 
give them context, the researcher can give each theme a descriptive label, ‘Access to 
Medicines’, in this case.
Alceste then uses these figures to produce a correspondence analysis chart which 
maps the relationship between the themes in two dimensions. Correspondence analysis 
is a type of factor analysis which uses categorical (non-continuous or discrete) 
variables. Alceste attempts to explain as much variance as possible along these two 
dimensions. The greatest amount of variance is always displayed on the horizontal axis, 
making it the most important for interpretation. Alceste then attempts to display as 
much of the remaining variance as possible along the vertical axis, and so on.
Distance between the numbered themes on the chart therefore represents the 
strength of association between them; themes shown as close together on a particular 
axis are more closely associated. The charts also show the relationship between the 
themes and any descriptive variables ‘tagged’ to each press release. Here I have tagged 
each press release with the name of the EU trade Commissioner or US Trade 
Representative in office at that time.
Finally, by looking at the analysis overall, the researcher can interpret the 
meaning of each axis and give it a name. In this case, I have interpreted the axes as 
showing the approach to compliance of each political system (harder or softer) along the 
x  axis, and the trade policy agenda (broad or narrow) along the y  axis. It is important to 
stress that these are interpretive axes, indentified based on patterns in the data. They 
were incorporated into the theoretical framework of this study after the analysis and
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were not imposed on the charts according to theoretical assumptions made before the 
analysis was carried out.
Going back to our example then, Pascal Lamy is situated in the upper right 
quadrant, indicating a softer approach to compliance and a broader policy agenda,
Robert Portman is placed in the bottom left quadrant, indicating that the USTR’s 
statements take a harder approach to compliance and mention fewer issues. Lamy is 
most strongly associated with discussions of trade diplomacy, a softer theme which 
concerns the EU’s bilateral relations with countries attempting to join the union and 
other neighbouring states (theme 2 , 3^ = 194.65). He is also closely associated with 
discussions of corporate responsibility, a broad theme which links economic arguments 
to both environmental and social policy (theme 7, %2=89.23). Both the EU and the US 
talk about a possible increase in aid designed to assist developing countries in building 
up their capacity to trade (trade assistance, theme 6). While the US narrowly discusses 
an increase in trade assistance, the EU opts for a broader agenda which advocates not 
only increased trade assistance but also better access to generic AIDS drugs and 
humanitarian assistance.
In contrast, Zoellick discusses three narrow themes (1,3, and 5, x2=73.28, 
X2=49.97 and x2=59.37 respectively). After stepping into office, he recruits staff for the 
USTR’s trade advisory committees and makes statements about trade to Congress in 
terms of freedom, leadership and security (theme 1). Trade defence is another important 
concern (theme 3), discussing import restrictions and anti-dumping initiatives in 
dispassionate legal language. Intellectual property rights are discussed in terms of 
enforcement and measures to ‘combat piracy’ (theme 5). Theme 4 represents a very 
small proportion of the data and is thus discounted.
The next section sets out the results of the analysis. By creating a timeline that 
follows the evolution of ‘trade and’ policies from key documents, correspondence charts 
which map the key concerns of EU and US negotiators at six month intervals, and 
interviewing officials and interest group representatives to test the integrity of these 
frameworks, this chapter and the three detailed policy chapters that follow show why 
links between trade and non-trade policies were formed, and how the EU and US use 
them to their own ends.
The Road to Doha
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Trade conflicts emerging during the current round have their roots in previous 
negotiations. We must not fall into the trap of thinking that the trade debates during the 
Doha round appeared from nowhere. This section provides context to the analysis which 
follows in this chapter and the next three case study chapters. It covers four important 
events which cast a long shadow over the use of ‘trade and’ issues in the current round: 
the creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1992, the 
conclusion of the Uruguay round in 1994, the introduction of new issues at the 
Singapore WTO ministerial meeting in 1996, and the failure to set the agenda for the 
new round at Seattle in 1999.
The North American Free Trade Agreement was a milestone in the use of ‘trade 
and’ issues. In 1990, the H. W. Bush administration needed extra time to continue the 
NAFTA negotiations. The legislation (known as ‘fast track’) which gave the 
administration the ability to negotiate trade deals with minimal Congressional approval 
was due to expire in 1991. In order to secure its renewal, the administration had to listen 
to NAFTA critics who raised labour and environmental issues with the Democratic 
chairs of the committees of jurisdiction. The administration agreed to provide 
adjustment assistance for displaced workers, support labour standard enforcement in 
Mexico and environmental standards in both the US and Mexico (Destler 2005). These 
promises split the opposition, and in May 1991, the administration won the fast track 
authority it needed.
The NAFTA negotiations were completed in August 1992, in time for Bush to 
use the agreement as political capital in his Presidential election campaign. His 
opponent, Democratic nominee Bill Clinton, struggled to contain splits within his party 
over the deal, coming under pressure from opponents to increase its labour and 
environmental components (Shoch 2000). Clinton eventually endorsed the agreement, 
in October, but proposed a compromise. In a perfect example of ‘triangulation’, Clinton 
went for a third option, negotiating side agreements on labour standards and the 
environment with Canada and Mexico. Facing the prospect of years of obstructive trade 
policy from the US, and a tight deadline, the other NAFTA participants agreed (Gabriel 
and Macdonald 2006:82). Clinton often triangulated between outlying policy positions, 
creating a ‘third way’ that lay between them and appealed to the hypothetical median 
voter. On very salient issues, it was essential for Clinton to build electoral coalitions of 
core party groups and swing voters in order to shore up his support (Rockman 1996). 
Clinton’s triangulation approach was very visible in his trade policy: he simultaneously 
pursued trade liberalisation through negotiation of NAFTA and the new GATT
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agreement, market opening in Japan to appeal to beleaguered manufacturers, and 
showed varied degrees of support for labour and environmental standards as necessary 
to appease domestic trade unions and environmental NGOs (Shoch 2001:166). The 
coalition of trade unions and environmentalists which formed during debates over 
NAFTA would persist in the US for the next decade and a half.
Table 2.3: Trade Representatives by Year, 1995-2008
Year USTR President Commissioner Presidency
1995-1996 Mickey Kantor Clinton Leon Brittan 
(Santer)
Spain Italy
1996-1997 Ireland Netherlands
1997-1998 Charlene
Barshefsky
Luxembourg UK
1998-1999 Austria Germany
1999-2000 Pascal Lamy 
(Prodi)
Finland Portugal
2000-2001 France Sweden
2001-2002 Robert Zoellick Bush Belgium Spain
2002-2003 Denmark Greece
2003-2004 Danuta Hubner Italy Ireland
2004-2005 Peter Mandelson 
(Barroso)
Netherlands Luxembourg
2005-2006 Rob Portman UK Austria
2006-2007 Susan Schwab Finland Germany
2007-2008 Portugal Slovenia
Meanwhile, in the EU, a power struggle took place between the Commission and 
the member state governments of the EU as represented in the Council of Ministers. The 
Blair House accord between the EU and US in 1992 signalled a new direction for trade 
policy, solving an impasse that had grown between the two powers on agricultural 
liberalisation. The agreement was made possible by efforts of Commission officials who 
sought to gain greater negotiating autonomy from EU member state governments. As a 
result, French officials detested the accord, blamed it on the failing institutions of the 
EU, and demanded that the Commission’s reign be tightened (Meunier 2005 Chapter 4, 
especially pp-112-117). External Affairs Commissioner Leon Brittan argued for wider 
powers for the Commission to negotiate, and an end to the requirement that trade policy 
be approved in a unanimous vote by member states, to make trade policymaking more 
efficient (Barber 1997).
The Marrakesh agreement in 1994 marked the successful conclusion of the 
Uruguay round and laid the foundations for the creation of the WTO. But it set off 
another vicious competency battle between the European Council and the European 
Commission. The Commission requested that the ECJ advise on the matter. On 15th 
November, just six weeks before the new WTO was supposed to come into being, the 
Court delivered Opinion 1/949. The result was much less of a victory than the
9 Opinion 1/94 (1994), ECR 1-5267,5283.
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Commission had hoped for and left widespread constitutional confusion: on trade in 
services and intellectual property, the Court reasoned that the competence was relative 
to the degree of internal harmonisation in these policy areas, and thus the Community 
could not be granted sole competence (Elsig 2002:96; Eeckhout 2004:28-35).
By 1996, NAFTA had been in existence for two years, the WTO for just one. 
The Clinton Presidency, represented by Mickey Kantor at the USTR, wanted to 
incorporate its new labour and environmental agenda into the WTO framework. Intense 
lobbying of the EU by the US persuaded them to follow suit and support a broader 
agenda at the WTO meeting in Singapore that year. In July 1996, the Commission 
pressed the Council to include a proposal on labour standards for the forthcoming WTO 
ministerial meeting in Singapore, and in 1997 the Commission proposed to include 
labour and environmental standards in its Generalised System of Preferences, as criteria 
for granting better terms to the EU’s trading partners.
This was a surprising turnaround. Just one year earlier, the EU was all business. 
In 1995, an EU/US summit founded the Transatlantic Business Dialogue after a series 
of meetings between US Secretary of Commerce Ronald Brown, EU External Affairs 
Commissioner Leon Brittan and Internal Market Commissioner, Martin Bangemann 
(Green Cowles 2001). It looked likely that Brittan would realise his ambitions for a 
broader EU-US free trade area (although plans were later scrapped in the face of 
objections from French President Jacques Chirac). In February 1996, the Commission 
called for a ‘sharper’ trade policy, focussed tightly on gaining market access for 
European industry and promoting its interests (European Commission 1996).
But although Brittan was a committed free trader, he came round to the idea that 
limited labour and environmental standards should be addressed in trade agreements on 
the grounds that this would deflate the case for stronger protectionist measures, under 
pressure from US officials (see Chapter 4 below). As this quote demonstrates, Brittan’s 
stance contains some severe contradictions. Brittan outlines his support in favour of 
positive but not negative sanctions in terms of labour, the environment, and trade:
1My own thinking has evolved from a belief in the single-minded pursuit o f trade 
liberalisation towards a belief that we may often need to engage in a balancing act 
between that aim and wider policy considerations. We must avoid protectionism 
like the plague, and recognise that it often raises its head insidiously in more 
innocent-looking guises. But that should not prevent us giving serious attention to 
non-trade concerns that have genuine legitimacy' (Brittan 2000:147).
This ‘evolution’ was founded on the premise that these new trade policy areas would be 
limited in scope and address universal values:
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7 would say that compliance should be rewarded. It is in this spirit that the 
Commission’s proposal for GSP reform includes a provision for additional trade 
access for countries respecting international standards on free association, child 
labour, slavery, bonded labour and prison labour. These constitute a relatively 
narrow set o f core issues on which I  think we can all agree ’ (Brittan 1998:46).
However, stiff opposition from developing countries to the proposition at Singapore led 
the WTO to concur that although trade and environmental matters fell under the WTO’s 
jurisdiction, the correct arena for dealing with trade and labour issues was the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO, see Chapter 4 below). It became obvious that 
developing countries, as an increasingly large percentage of the WTO membership, 
were more willing to voice their opposition to developed country proposals.
In the face of this opposition, the EU began to move away from advocating the 
incorporation of labour and environmental issues into trade agreements and towards a 
round which would highlight trade policy as a means of development. This change of 
position had an instrumental purpose. In 1998, the EU started to plan for some very 
important future agreements, initiating a new round of negotiations with ACP countries 
and starting consultation on the new millennium round. In November of that year, 
Brittan met with ‘70 industry, consumer, labour, environmental and development 
organisations’ (European Commission 1998), one of a series of meetings that eventually 
became the more formal Civil Society Dialogue under his successor, Pascal Lamy. This 
process pre-empted the Commission’s 2001 White Paper on Governance, and has 
become became a testing ground for new forms of consultation (see Chapters 5-7). 
Brittan also announced that an assessment of the sustainable development implications 
of the millennium round would be commissioned.
These initiatives left a legacy that changed the scope of EU trade policy under 
his successors, Pascal Lamy and Peter Mandelson: a transatlantic dialogue that included 
not just business but consumers and NGOs, requirements to consult civil society and to 
assess the non-economic impacts of trade agreements, and the momentum for a new 
round of trade talks. The millennium round that Brittan favoured would finally 
materialise, but Brittan himself ran out of time. He resigned in 1999, along with the 
other 19 Commissioners, amid allegations of fraud and corruption.
The US administration’s ability to influence trade policy was severely 
diminished in 1998 with the loss of fast track negotiating authority. The alliance of 
interest groups that came together to lobby for stronger labour and environmental 
standards in trade agreements felt that they had been betrayed over NAFTA and were
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keen to impede further trade deals. They saw the fast track mechanism as an 
undemocratic means to force through agreements without ‘trade and’ standards. Enough 
Democrats were persuaded that this was the case: only 29 of them voted in favour of the 
final fast track agreement. Clinton searched again for a compromise between the 
proponents and opponents of fast track, but to no avail. The famous ‘Congressional 
bipartisanship’ on trade, support for free trade agreements spread across both parties, 
was shattered.
The last years of Clinton’s Presidency saw a dramatic ‘trade and’ conflict, the 
so-called ‘Battle of Seattle’ at the 4th WTO ministerial meeting in 1999. The Seattle 
WTO ministerial was supposed to launch the new ‘millennium’ trade round promoted 
by Clinton’s European counterpart, Leon Brittan. Inside the conference, the US strongly 
supported the creation of a WTO working group on labour standards and a ‘thick’ trade 
agenda that included ‘trade and’ issues. Ironically, outside the conference, the same 
coalition that had pushed for the inclusion of these standards in NAFTA protested in the 
streets, joining the voices calling for the radical reform or abolition of the WTO. 
Developing country opposition from within the conference, and extensive media 
coverage of the protests outside, caused the meeting to fail utterly. For both sides this 
was a watershed. Anti-globalisation activists celebrated a great victory that they would 
try to emulate (with less success) at other international summits. For free traders, 
however, the ministerial left a lasting scar.
Pascal Lamy, only one month into his term as European Commissioner for 
Trade when the meeting was held, took this lesson to heart. Lamy stated his aim as 
ensuring that globalisation was ‘maitrisee’- managed. Managed globalisation was a 
‘broad and encompassing doctrine that subordinated trade policy to a variety of trade 
and non-trade objectives, such as multilateralism, social justice and sustainable 
development’ that lasted for the duration of Lamy’s term (Meunier 2007). DG Trade 
staff spoke fondly of Lamy, which is surprising given his reputation as the ‘Beast of 
Berlaymont’, the ‘Gendarme’, and the ‘Exocet’: nicknames that refer to his 
uncompromising attitude towards the staff below him (Eppink 2007:22-3). Originally an 
enarque10, Lamy worked as Chef de Cabinet for Jacques Delors in his role as President 
of the European Commission, then in the private sector, taking up the role of Trade 
Commissioner in 1999. Under him, DG Trade further eroded the boundaries between 
development, environment and trade policy. Those who admired Lamy’s goals of a
10 A graduate of the Ecole National d’Administration in Paris, famous for producing high flying civil 
servants who often go on to become key figures in French politics.
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more socially acceptable form of globalisation felt that it was a uniquely European take 
on trade policy that addressed broader problems in the global system.
In 2000, Lamy announced a more formalised consultation process in the form of 
the Civil Society Dialogue. The dialogue built on meetings with civil society established 
under Leon Brittan, and fed into the discussions on Governance which culminated in the 
Commission’s 2001 White Paper. This was part of a wider strategy of building up the 
EU’s support in and among developing countries. As the failed Seattle ministerial 
effectively ended previous US and EU efforts to promote an international trade and 
labour standards agenda (see Chapter 4), Lamy started to emphasise the EU’s 
distinctiveness in the international trading system. This included establishing a 
‘development discourse’ that brought trade and development issues together to 
neutralise opponents in the Commission and Council, and build a broader coalition of 
support in the WTO to counterbalance American dominance (Van den Hoven 2004). 
Continuing negotiation of 77 Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with ACP 
countries put pressure on the Trade Commissioner to be development-friendly. The 
failure of America’s labour and environment agenda and the shift of the EU towards a 
broader developmental approach to trade set the scene for the creation of the Doha 
Development Agenda in 2001.
Trade And '  Policies During the Doha Round
‘Bush can seem disengaged. When he flew to New York to visit a Harlem school 
and promote his education program, he brought along New York congressmen on 
Air Force One, including Democrat Charles B. Rangel, chairman o f the House 
Ways and Means Committee. The White House was in the midst o f tough 
negotiations with Rangel over trade pacts. But Bush did not try to cut a deal with 
Rangel, chatting instead about baseball. "He talked a lot about the Rangers," 
Rangel said. "I didn't know what the hell he was talking a b o u t . (Baker 2007).
President George W Bush has been much less engaged than his predecessor Bill Clinton 
in the details of trade policy. He and his representatives, however, have a very clear idea 
as to the goals of trade. His statements, when he makes them, talk about the need for 
maintaining freedom and developing democracy in other countries through free trade. In 
the 2000 election, Bush opposed linking environmental and labour standards to trade 
agreements, and supported the restoration of fast-track authority. His candidacy speech 
makes his position clear:
77/ work to end tariffs and break down barriers everywhere, entirely, so the whole 
world trades in freedom. The fearful build walls. The confident demolish them. I  am
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c o n f i d e n t  i n  A m e r i c a n  w o r k e r s  a n d  f a r m e r s  a n d  p r o d u c e r s .  A n d  I a m  c o n f i d e n t  t h a t  
A m e r i c a ' s  b e s t  i s  t h e  b e s t  i n  t h e  w o r l d ’ 1 1
After the election, it became obvious that the administration was opting for a narrow 
policy agenda with a tight time horizon, the new leaders had a ‘“90-day focus” : they 
talked only about those problems with a potential to cause a disaster within the next 90 
days’ (Diamond 2005:434). For this reason, one international environmental NGO did 
not feel that it was worth their time in keeping a US office open to deal with trade 
issues:
‘ S o  I m e t  w i t h  [ a  U S  T r a d e  N e g o t i a t o r ] ...I t h o u g h t  i t  w a s  i n t e r e s t i n g  h o w  h e  
d e s c r i b e d  t h i s  n i n e t y - d a y  h o r i z o n  f o r  t r a d e  p o l i c y  i n  W a s h i n g t o n .  W h e r e  e v e r y t h i n g  
w a s  m o r e  d r i v e n  b y  b u s i n e s s ,  w h e r e  t h e  U S T R  w a s  r e a c t i v e  t o  a l l  t h e  d e m a n d s  p u t  
u p o n  i t .  W h e r e a s ,  a t  l e a s t  i n  L a m y ’ s  t i m e ,  D G  T r a d e  w a s  m u c h  m o r e  o f  a  t h i n k i n g  
p l a c e '  (Environmental NGO Representative, Brussels, November 2006).
2001: Competitive Liberalisation
Robert Zoellick (who later became President of the World Bank), was Bush’s first 
USTR. Under Zoellick’s watch, the US signed a large number of new bilateral and 
regional trade agreements. The US spent the period cementing relations with Central 
and South America and the Middle East before moving on to Asia, conducting parallel 
bilateral, regional and multilateral negotiations. Zoellick’s strategy of ‘competitive 
liberalisation’ reflected his views on negotiation and US hegemony. Zoellick argued 
that not only were parallel bilateral, regional and multilateral negotiations beneficial, 
but that US bilateral deals outside of the WTO framework put pressure on WTO 
members to push forward multilateral talks. In his view the new FT As would create new 
‘champions’ for liberalization in the WTO and ‘serve as models’ for countries that 
‘need to embrace openness’, while also creating ‘a momentum that strengthens U.S. 
influence’(Zoellick 2003). America saw itself as playing catch-up in the ‘FTA game’, 
being only party to one trade agreement out of the 30 in existence in the Western 
Hemisphere (Feinberg 2003). Zoellick began to announce the first agreements in a long 
list of FT As: with Australia, Central America, Morocco, Africa, and Asian countries.
We often think of the US as the aggressor in trade relations, but it is important to 
remember that many of these agreements were initiated by other countries. The US 
competitive liberalisation agenda had an element of soft power, with states buying into 
the US model because it held a degree of attraction for them: they wished to compete
11 Candidacy Announcement speech, Cedar Rapids, Iowa Jun 12, 1999, reported by www.onthcissues.orij:.
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for access to its large market and gain political capital with America for use in other 
policy areas.
While pursuing this agenda, the US also acted to protect its domestic interests, 
particularly logging, dairy and grain producers. In 2001, the USITC initiated 92 
antidumping and 24 countervailing duty investigations, a huge increase on the previous 
period. Despite the Bush Administration’s staunch arguments for ‘free’ trade, in 2002 
the US introduced a protectionist tariff of up to 30% on imported steel, ostensibly for 
three years. The decision was heavily criticised both domestically and abroad, and the 
measures were repealed in 2003, but only after a WTO ruling that they were illegal and 
threats of retaliatory tariffs from the EU.
The USTR sought to link passage of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)12, 
legislation providing the USTR with extensive autonomy to negotiate agreements and 
requiring only that Congress vote the final text up or down, to its ability to negotiate 
agreements that would ‘improve the economic environment for US agriculture’ in an 
attempt to persuade Congress that a vote for TPA was a vote for protecting farmers. 
Negotiators argued that opening markets abroad should be the major focus of any trade 
deal ‘because 96 percent of all consumers in the world live outside the United States’ 
(USTR 2001). In May 2002, the US Congress passed the Farm Security and Rural 
Investment Act, which increased support to farmers at a time when the US was telling 
others to reduce theirs. This sent a signal to other countries that the US was not serious 
about agricultural reform. Notably, the USTR did not put out a statement on the passage 
of the Act, and in July released a ‘Comprehensive U.S. Trade Proposal to Expand 
American Farmers' Access To Overseas Markets’, calling for a levelling of the playing 
field with the EU on subsidies allowed under WTO rules (USTR 2002a). In July 2002, 
the House passed the TPA bill with a narrow majority of 215 to 212. The administration 
had won a mandate to negotiate the new trade round.
12 Previously known as ‘fast-track’.
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Between January and June 2001, (Figure 2.4) Lamy occupies the soft/broad quadrant 
while Zoellick occupies the hard/narrow quadrant. The large number of themes 
indicates that the trade discourse at this time is very fragmented and a clear pattern is 
not yet apparent. Lamy is most strongly associated with discussions of trade diplomacy, 
a softer theme which concerns the EU’s bilateral relations with countries attempting to 
join the union and other neighbouring states (theme 2, x2=194.65). He is also closely 
associated with discussions of corporate responsibility, a broad theme which links 
economic arguments to both environmental and social policy (theme 7, x2=89.23). 
Theme 4 represents a very small proportion of the data and is thus discounted.
In contrast, Zoellick discusses three narrowly constituted themes (1,3, and 5, 
j?=13.28, x2=49.97 and x2=59.37 respectively). After stepping into office, he recruits 
staff for the USTR’s trade advisory committees and makes statements about trade to 
Congress in terms of freedom, leadership and security (theme 1). Trade defence is 
another important concern (theme 3), discussing import restrictions and anti-dumping 
initiatives in dispassionate legal language. Intellectual property rights are discussed in 
terms of enforcement and measures to ‘combat piracy’ (theme 5).
In preparation for the WTO ministerial which would take place later that year, 
both the EU and the US begin to talk about a possible increase in aid designed to assist 
developing countries in building up their capacity to trade (trade assistance). Lamy 
nonetheless still dominates this theme (theme 6, x2=63.84), and while the US narrowly 
discusses an increase in trade assistance, the EU opts for a broader agenda which 
advocates not only increased trade assistance but also better access to generic AIDS 
drugs and humanitarian assistance.
The second half of 2001 contrasts dramatically with the first (figure 2.5). With 
the new US administration preparing for the Doha ministerial meeting, the trade policy 
agenda becomes greatly simplified. The overall trade discourse is much more coherent, 
with only four main themes shown. Zoellick occupies the narrow/soft quadrant while 
Lamy occupies the broad/hard quadrant. Zoellick has finished his policy planning and 
his coherent ‘competitive liberalisation’ strategy can be clearly seen, with press releases 
advertising multiple diplomatic visits and the initiation of new negotiations (theme 3, 
X2=212.99) This theme represents softer forms of power, particularly attraction, but it is 
also narrow, promoting the economic benefits of free trade above all other issues. As in 
the first half of the year, press releases associated with Zoellick (theme 2, x2= 19.68) also 
discuss trade defence measures in flat legal terms, particularly descriptions of disputes 
within the WTO.
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Lamy also discusses trade defence, but attempts to balance enforcement of trade 
rules with a broader justification of their existence (themes 1 and 2, ^=118.62 and 
86.72 respectively). Enforcement of intellectual property rights is described as essential 
for encouraging investment, but special provisions which allow developing countries 
greater access to generic medicines are also promoted. Enforcement of core labour 
standards is discussed alongside initiatives to foster ‘social development’. Tariffs on 
developing country exports such as textiles and bananas are balanced by a discussion of 
development assistance. The EU’s issue linkage approach is apparent here -linking 
development, both aid for trade and access to essential medicines, with the environment 
and social issues. This becomes a common strategy for the EU during the Doha round, 
where officials try to form a coherent policy stance that balances the more protectionist 
aspects of EU trade policy with ‘development friendly’ initiatives.
2003: Managed Globalisation
By 2003, WTO members had solidified the agenda for the Doha round. Between 
January and June 2003, the overall trade discourse reflects this. Lamy occupies the 
soft/broad quadrant, while Zoellick once again occupies the soft/narrow quadrant. While 
the two positions show a similar approach to compliance, they demonstrate very 
different agendas.
Again, Zoellick is most strongly associated with narrow discussions of 
competitive liberalisation (theme 2, x2=487.44) and trade defence (theme 5, x2=37.25). 
These two strands of US trade policy remain fairly static from 2001, discussing the 
negotiation of new bilateral agreements and the enforcement of trade rules respectively.
Lamy is most closely associated with the broad theme of trade and health (theme 
6, ^=181.29). The EU discusses the trade consequences of contemporary international 
public health debates, including the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, and 
reform of the International Health Regulations on communicable diseases. Statements in 
this theme broadly discuss the health aspects of development, including the provision of 
clean water and sanitation in developing countries.
Descriptions of trade diplomacy distinct from Zoellick’s competitive 
liberalisation discourse are placed in theme 1, which is moderately associated with 
Lamy (x2=49.74). This theme is strongly related to competitive liberalisation as it 
describes many of the same trade diplomacy activities such as summits and ministerial 
visits. However, Lamy’s trade diplomacy discussion places a greater emphasis on
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cooperation with other states and dialogue with civil society groups. Lamy also 
discusses WTO negotiations regarding the services sector (theme 4, x2=31.59). This is 
also a broad theme, as most of his energy is spent in reassuring activists that various 
public services such as education and health will not be deregulated by stealth via WTO 
rules.
Both the EU and US discuss agricultural issues, which form a core part of the 
Doha agenda (theme 3). But while the EU discussion of agriculture is broad, its 
American counterpart is narrow. US negotiators focus on opening agricultural markets 
abroad, discussing the agricultural benefits of new free trade agreements for US farmers 
and the regulatory barriers to exporting their products:
‘United States agricultural exports would be even greater without the NTBs [non­
tariff barriers] that are used against them. Since the European Union imposed a 
moratorium on imports o f agricultural biotech products in 1998, for example, US 
com exports to the European Union have declined by 55 percent * (USTR 2003c).
In contrast, EU statements in this theme discuss reform in the EU’s Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). The CAP (discussed fully in chapter 4) reflects the EU’s 
multifunctional approach to agriculture, its view that subsidising the agriculture sector 
not only supports farmers but performs other functions such as ensuring the quality of 
produce, animal welfare, defending rural ways of life and preserving the rural economy. 
The 2003 reform of the CAP fulfilled promises made by the EU during the Uruguay 
round to break the link between support payments and quantity of production. This was 
considered a great achievement by free traders, seen as paving the way to the successful 
conclusion of the Doha round.
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In the second half of 2003, we can see the effects of the WTO ministerial 
meeting held in Cancun. Lamy occupies the hard/broad quadrant, while Zoellick 
occupies the soft/narrow quadrant. Zoellick’s narrow focus on his competitive 
liberalisation agenda is beginning to pay off (theme 5, ^=636.14). Zoellick’s agenda is 
dominated by negotiations for the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) 
and the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) to the exclusion of the Doha 
round -he is not strongly associated with any other theme in this period. CAFTA was a 
medium sized regional agreement between the US, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua. The FTAA, however, was far more ambitious, including 34 
countries -all of the Western Hemisphere except Cuba. This is not to say that the US 
did not have a strong interest in showing support for developing countries. Unlike the 
EU, the USTR chooses to promote these relationships as diplomatic ties rather than 
economic ones. Zoellick spent a week in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2002 (USTR 2002b), 
travelled to South Africa in 2003 to propose an FT A between the US and the South 
African Customs Union (USTR 2003d), and visited ‘local legislators, farmers and 
businesspeople’ in Senegal, Benin and Mali in 2004 to talk about cotton and the Doha 
Round (USTR 2004a). When the US does talk about aid to developing countries, it is 
aid for trade capacity building rather than a wider concept of development.
While the US discourse focuses on its pursuit of trade agreements outside of the 
WTO framework, the EU’s discourse on trade issues is firmly multilateral. Lamy is 
strongly associated with discussions of the Doha round (theme 1, x,2= 168.25) the 
Cancun ministerial in particular (theme 3, y£= 159.2), and the EU’s primary trade 
defence concerns for the Doha round, agriculture and textiles (theme 2, ^=31.83). 
During this period, Lamy promotes his frequent visits to foreign countries to discuss the 
progress of the round and reaffirms the EU’s commitment to a development agenda 
(theme 1). Lamy reassures the EU’s developing country trading partners that Europe is 
concerned about not just trade, competition and intellectual property issues, but also 
public health and human rights (theme 3). Even during the most protectionist 
discussions (theme 2), the EU promotes a broader agenda by balancing them with 
statements concerning poverty reduction in developing countries.
Lamy’s agenda at this time is best illustrated by a paper Lamy wrote in mid-
1 ^2004 proposing a new type of safeguard based on a polity’s ‘collective preferences’: 
the issues on which governments cannot compromise during negotiations for fear of
13 A trade measure, usually a temporary restriction of imports, allowed under WTO rules to protect a 
specific domestic industry.
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derailing domestic support for the eventual agreement (Lamy 2004; Chamovitz 2005). 
The collective preferences initiative was popular among NGOs, but deemed impractical 
by others. It was seen as
‘an attempt to start a discussion about the legitimate concerns that WTO members 
have about environmental, social, and health issues. And finding a way o f actually 
making it legitimate to keep those while compensating those whose trade interests 
were hurt. That's something that could never have come out o f the USTR’ 
(Environmental NGO Representative, Brussels, November 2006).
But this kind of diffuse, consultative trade policy would soon be under threat. With the 
Doha round facing severe difficulties, Lamy’s successor would come under strong and 
increasing pressure to deliver.
2005: Global Europe
Two quotes from the same speech, delivered just minutes apart, illustrate the difficulties 
faced by the European Union in simultaneously trying to promote trade liberalisation 
and development through trade:
‘...future EPAs [Economic Partnership Agreements] will have a clearer 
development focus. They should no longer be conceived as trade agreements in the 
conventional sense where both sides are seeking mutual advantage. The EU is not 
pursuing an equal bargain in relation to our EPA partners. ’
‘I  am on the side o f growth in Europe because the renewal o f growth is our only 
route to full employment, social cohesion and long term sustainability...my primary 
responsibility is to the people o f Europe. My ability to pursue a pro-poor agenda is 
dependent on delivering outcomes that they support and benefit from. ’ -  Peter 
Mandelson, London, 4th February 2005
The tension between these two goals, awkwardly joined at the hip within the negotiation 
process, characterised EU policy development under the EU’s new Trade 
Commissioner, Peter Mandelson.
Peter Mandelson’s leadership style is dominated by his relationship with the 
media and his reputation has been overshadowed by the failure of the Doha 
Development Round. He has to manage a difficult agenda -  economies around the 
world are tightening their belts and building walls against the threat of Chinese imports. 
Mandelson presided over the ‘Bra Wars’ (a tabloid editor’s dream), and similar disputes 
over footwear and other Chinese imports after the WTO’s Multifibre Agreement (which 
phased out textile quotas) ended on 31st December 2005. On June 10th, Mandelson 
negotiated replacement textile quotas with China under pressure from EU textile
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manufacturers who expressed concern at the surge of Chinese imports that hit Europe 
after the phasing out of the agreement. Importers had little time to adjust to the new 
arrangements and quickly rushed to acquire export licences, leaving unlucky retailers 
without licenses and their stock languishing in European ports. Mandelson was forced 
to negotiate a replacement deal on quotas at short notice with the Chinese government. 
The chaos and the subsequent emergency negotiations damaged Mandelson’s 
reputation.
The second USTR during the Bush administration was Robert Portman, a close 
friend of President Bush and a former Congressman and lawyer. His tenure was 
shortlived, lasting from May 2005 to May 2006, and unlike Mandelson, he closely 
conformed to his predecessor’s conceptions of trade policy while in office. During this 
time, he also used his Congressional connections and Ways and Means Committee 
experience to make bargains with Representatives and key interests. American attention 
during this period is therefore concentrated on the domestic ratification of free trade 
agreements and the negotiation of still more.
Between January and June 2005 (figure 2.8, Mandelson creates a broad trade policy 
agenda, but adopts a neutral approach to compliance. Both Portman and Zoellick 
occupy the soft/narrow quadrant. Portman and Zoellick are highly associated with 
narrow discussions of FT A negotiations (theme 2,3^=371.53 & x2=292.69 respectively) 
particularly the domestic ratification of CAFTA. Upon stepping into office, Portman 
announced that he planned to
'pursue an aggressive agenda with a focus on opening new markets, enforcing our 
trade agreements and trade laws, spreading economic freedom, and working in 
close partnership with Congress * (Portman 2005).
This continued the two-pronged strategy adopted by Zoellick of trade diplomacy 
(‘spreading economic freedom’) and trade defence (‘enforcing our trade agreements and 
trade laws’, reflected in themes 4 and 5). Both the EU and US discuss the services 
agenda (theme 4), including the financial, telecoms and audiovisual sectors. They are 
also both concerned with preserving intellectual property rights and fighting the 
proliferation of counterfeit goods (theme 5). Mandelson in particular is associated with 
discussions of major disputes concerning footwear and textiles (^=21.58).
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Although Mandelson attempts to carve out his own tough agenda, he must still 
cope with Lamy’s policy legacy. The EU contributes significantly to discussions on two 
broader themes. Mandelson is highly associated with discussions of the Doha 
Development Agenda and dialogue with civil society (themes 1 & 3, x2=145.14 &
% =181.26). Statements in this theme are broad, referring not only to trade issues but 
also to aid, debt, climate change and security issues.
In the second half of 2005, both the EU and US have abandoned talk of trade 
defence to focus on the ailing Doha round and the forthcoming ministerial meeting in 
Hong Kong. The major components of Mandelson’s agenda have changed very little, 
and he remains neutral on compliance while invoking a large number of issue linkages. 
Portman occupies the hard/narrow quadrant. Once again, the trade discourse overall is 
focussed in preparation for the meeting, with just four key themes. Portman is once 
again very strongly associated with discussions of trade diplomacy (theme 4, %2=596.62) 
particularly the extension of CAFTA to the Dominican Republic and the creation of a 
new bilateral FTA with Oman. US statements are only weakly linked to other themes.
In contrast, Mandelson lays out a broad agenda for Hong Kong (theme 1,
176.42) discussing tariffs, key developing country exports such as bananas, 
subsidies, and market access. He also attempts to balance the nuts and bolts of the deal 
with attractive policies, by discussing human rights, climate change and other 
environmental protections, democracy and social provisions, with reference to dialogue 
and consultation with NGOs and other civil society groups (theme 3, ^=181.98).
Both the US and EU discuss agriculture extensively. The EU focuses on the 
multilateral Doha round, making statements about the need for additional aid for trade 
and the needs of developing countries. However the US focuses on domestic 
agriculture, particularly the benefits for US farmers from new bilateral FTAs. When the 
US does discuss foreign aid, it is in the form of food aid, a programme which provides 
food to impoverished countries by buying produce from domestic farmers. The US 
highlights the benefits of such a programme for its own producers.
But both approaches to the round, both bilateral competitive liberalisation and 
the EU’s multi-issue, multilateral agenda, were doomed to fail. The Hong Kong 
ministerial in December 2005 produced limited results and satisfied neither developed 
nor developing countries. The Doha round ground to a halt.
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2007: Limited Ambition
In July 2006, after last minute talks in Geneva failed to produce a deal to break the 
stalemate, the Doha round was officially suspended. The EU blamed the US, claiming 
that American inflexibility was the major cause of the collapse (BBC 2006). US 
negotiators claimed in turn that they were not receiving enough market access 
concessions in return for their commitments to reduce agricultural subsidies.
The first half of 2006 saw a further change of personnel in the US, with Rob 
Portman replaced by Susan Schwab. Schwab, a seasoned trade negotiator and USTR 
veteran, inherited a chaotic trade agenda. Replacing the charismatic Portman at a crucial 
point in the negotiations, her selection was seen by some as a signal that the US had lost 
interest in the Doha round (although this argument undoubtedly reflects a degree of 
misogyny). Her tenure has seen a renewed attempt to solve the problems of the round, 
with an emphasis on agricultural liberalisation. But the administration continued to 
show little sympathy towards dissenting interest groups, with Schwab saying that the 
‘hard sell’ of trade policy was made more difficult by “‘the proliferation of television 
channels, cable channels, the internet, blogs” and “un-checked communication”. This 
has increased “the capacity of demagogues to reach well beyond the beltway”, she says, 
empowering the anti-globalisation movement’. Schwab rejected calls for a ‘new 
dialogue’ in trade policy which puts more emphasis on aspects of trade beyond core 
principles (Callan 2007).
After several months of heavy criticism for the collapse of the round, Mandelson 
displayed his own vision more clearly in an attempt to appease the fears of business. In 
October 2006, DG Trade published ‘Global Europe: Competing in the World’, a report 
outlining Mandelson’s response to these challenges (from business) and his new 
approach to negotiations. Mandelson promised a ‘hardnosed’ approach to opening 
foreign markets, signalling that he would pursue a renewed bilateral agenda. 
Development NGOs reacted with horror. An Oxfam representative commented: ‘It 
seems the wolf has taken off its sheep’s clothing. This is an extremely aggressive 
agenda’ (Beattie and Bounds 2006). Mandelson’s approach shows up in the Alceste 
analysis as a close correspondence between the EU’s desire to protect its own interests 
and its attempts to enhance its image as a benevolent foreign power.
Meanwhile, the US focussed heavily on finalising bilateral deals: trade and 
investment agreements with Asian countries, bilateral deals furthering diplomacy and
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security concerns in the Middle East, and negotiating FT As with Latin American 
countries, including Peru and Colombia. By May of 2007, after extended bargaining 
with a new, Congress controlled by the Democratic Party, these negotiations resulted in 
a four new FT As. These agreements were intended by Congressional activists to be a 
model for future agreements. The Peru FTA, for example, included text addressing 
labour and environmental standards, port security, and the ability of developing 
countries to access essential medicines. But USTR defence of the new FTAs remained 
focussed on compliance and economic growth: in the face of an increasingly sceptical 
domestic political climate, the Deputy USTR Peter Veroneau justified the FTAs as 
follows:
‘Is it worth it?...There's a couple o f data points in the future that will, at least for  
myself give me that answer. One will be, in the near term, Congressional passage 
o f these four free trade agreements...the longer term but obviously equally 
important data point concerns the operation o f these FTAs: economically, are they 
producing the goals...namely, economic growth across the broad spectrum o f 
society, and secondly, in a more legalistic way but still important- is this agreement 
being abided by? It has to be both. It has to be producing the ultimate goals that we 
envisioned fo r these FTAs, but part and parcel o f that has to be adherence and 
compliance to the agreement. Without compliance to the agreement political 
support to them understandably withers,14
Between January and June 2007, Mandelson occupies the soft/broad quadrant, while 
Schwab occupies the hard/narrow quadrant. The breakdown of the multilateral trade 
agenda is apparent here -both the US and EU concentrate on the negotiation of regional 
and bilateral agreements. Mandelson’s agenda is dominated by the negotiation of 
Economic Partnership Agreements with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries 
(theme 1, %2=439.26). These agreements are broadly conceived, discussing not only 
trade but wider developmental, environmental, and social issues. Mandelson links these 
debates with both wider discussions of the EU’s diplomatic relations, mainly with 
Russia and China, and exchanges on climate change, energy security and biofuels. 
Facing criticism from EU member states and the European Parliament, Mandelson tries 
to defend this cluttered agenda:
‘the key rationale fo r  the European Union lies in projecting Europe ’ collective 
interests in a globalised world, and in equipping Europeans fo r  the economic and 
social challenges it brings'.
14 Deputy USTR Peter Veroneau, 30th June 2007, American Enterprise Institute, comments recorded by 
author.
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While Mandelson attempts to shape the EU’s amorphous agenda, Schwab’s discourse is 
still dominated by bilateral agreements. At this time, the Democratic party had taken 
back control of Congress (and with it leadership of the powerful Ways and Means 
Committee), and this complicates her agenda considerably. While discussions of new 
bilateral investment treaties remain narrowly focussed (theme 2, ^=189.13), the 
ratification of new FTAs by Congress is disrupted by discussions of ‘trade and’ issues 
(theme 4, x2=l 12.07). In May 2007 a bipartisan deal was reached between 
Congressional Democrats and Republicans in which Democrats agreed to support new 
FTAs if they included chapters on labour standards, environmental protections and 
access to essential medicines, among other issues. This theme is consequently much 
broader than previous discussions of bilateral trade agreements under a Republican 
Congress. Discussions of WTO disputes are also moderately associated with Schwab 
(theme 5, x2=95.14). Theme 3 is a common discourse which discusses the enforcement 
of intellectual property rights. Statements in this theme reflect concerns about the piracy 
and counterfeit goods, particularly in relation to the expanding Chinese economy.
In the second half of the year, the independent effect of the WTO ministerial 
meetings is absent and the discourse remains stable -without the need to prepare for a 
multilateral summit the two polities remain focussed on their own goals. Mandelson is 
closely associated with discussions of the EU’s relationships with China and Russia. As 
before, this discussion is broad, reflecting renewed European concerns about climate 
change, energy policy, and markets for European ‘green goods’ (theme 3, x2=245.93). 
The final stage of negotiating a series of Economic Partnership Agreements with ACP 
countries (theme 4, %2= 154.53) remains a big concern, reflecting again broad 
discussions of development, the environment and social policy.
Again, Schwab has two main concerns, a narrow discussion of new bilateral 
investment treaties (theme 1, x2=l 11.23) and a much broader debate concerning new 
FTAs. This need to address non-trade issues in trade policy is reflected in theme 5, 
which is common to both Mandelson and Schwab. Concerns about piracy and 
counterfeit goods are tempered by discussions of climate change, health and safety 
issues, and regulatory cooperation.
Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the different approaches of the EU and US to ‘trade and’ 
issues between 1996 and 2007 in order to substantiate more fully the differences
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between that portrayed by advocates of American dominance or European 
distinctiveness. Debates about the differences between the EU and the US often place 
the policy agenda and the means of accomplishing that agenda, hard or soft power, 
along the same axis. I have demonstrated here that by separating them we gain a clearer 
picture of the differences between the two polities.
The EU and US both use hard and soft approaches to trade policy. The US often 
engages in trade diplomacy. Officials promoted and negotiated numerous new bilateral 
trade agreements during this period and used those successes to entice further trading 
partners into making new deals, the essence of Zoellick’s ‘competitive liberalisation’ 
doctrine. Likewise, the EU often prioritises trade defence activities, taking a tough 
stance on US anti-dumping legislation, increased imports from China, and defending its 
substantial agricultural support. The big difference is that the EU tends to employ broad 
set of non-trade issues to justify its actions, balancing, for example, its agricultural 
subsidies with promotion of trade preferences for developing countries or its access to 
medicines policy. Both the EU and US share a narrow core of economic trade 
objectives, protecting key domestic interests such as agriculture, but in addition the EU 
places more emphasis on a supplementary agenda. This is at the core of EU attempts to 
replicate its standards abroad.
The more important difference lies in the scope of the trade agenda adopted by 
each polity -when talking about a trade issue, do the EU and US link this to other non­
trade policies? The amorphous EU agenda can be compared to a much narrower, two­
pronged, US strategy of trade diplomacy and trade defence. The EU combines many 
non-trade issues in its trade diplomacy- emphasising its support for development, the 
promotion of generic medicines for developing countries, and multifunctionality in 
agriculture -the importance of payments for supporting rural communities and 
improving animal welfare. The activism of the US in promoting trade and environment 
and trade and labour linkages during the Clinton years is a strong contrast with the 
narrow focus on competition during the Bush administration.
As this chapter has explored the complex dependent variable, models of ‘trade 
and’ policy, the next chapter builds on this analysis by explaining the institutional 
differences that lie behind these different models. The different ways that the EU and 
US have manipulated ‘trade and’ policies, as outlined in this chapter, will be explained 
by exploring differences in delegation, who has negotiating authority and the extent to 
which they can use it, and the representation of the public and organised groups in the 
policymaking process.
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3 Authority and Ambiguity in Trade Policymaking
The sheer volume of trade in the world today could not be sustained without institutions 
that enable predictable transactions, sales, and payment. Trade requires, at the very 
least, common understandings of the ‘rules of the game’ (North 1990), a means for 
applying those rules, and ways to implement the agreed strategies. As well as creating 
and sustaining a growing body of trade rules at the international level, the political 
institutions of the EU and US have several trade policy functions at the national level. 
Before negotiations take place, they provide a mandate for discussion and set certain 
parameters; during the negotiations, they separate negotiators from electoral politics and 
thereby seek to limit the access of special interests to the decisionmaking process; and 
after the negotiations, they either legitimate or reject the resulting agreement. Successful 
ideas become embedded in institutions and remain there long after their period of 
utilization by the interests that embedded them (Goldstein 1993).
Domestic institutional arrangements are vital, therefore, in determining not just 
the efficiency with which ‘trade and’ policy can be made, but also its direction. Given 
that policymaking in these areas is highly ambiguous, with ‘trade and’ policies often 
crossing issue boundaries and institutional jurisdictions, the direction of such policy is 
strongly affected by why, where and when authority, the legitimate use of political 
power to negotiate trade agreements, is delegated. The ‘why’, the reason for this 
delegation, is ostensibly the same in both the EU and US. In both, the authority to 
formulate positions prior to negotiations and carry them out is delegated so that a 
government can speak with a single voice and present the strongest possible bargaining 
position when face to face with representatives from other states. As part of this process 
in both the EU and US, the original position and the final agreement are sent through an 
approval process designed to legitimate the actions of the negotiators in the eyes of 
other parts of government and the wider public.
This legitimating process involves the representation of key groups which will 
be affected by the new policy, including both organised interest groups and the public, 
the latter represented largely by elected officials and occasionally through public 
consultation exercises. Delegation, which determines who gets to make key decisions, 
and representation, which determines the information presented to decisionmakers, are 
therefore the key variables in explaining how non-trade policies are formed and used.
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A recent example provides us with an illustration of the importance of differing 
kinds of representation and delegation. January 2005 marked the end of 40 years of 
quotas on textile imports to the United States and Europe. As per a WTO agreement 
negotiated during the Uruguay round of international trade talks, restrictions on 2,400 
items were abolished, ridding the system of an anomalous quota system not practiced in 
any other sector. There were, of course, winners and losers. The agreement ended an 
EU-US dominance of textile production which had hurt developing countries (especially 
China and India). Its elimination benefited consumers in the developed world who had 
previously absorbed the cost of the quotas. Despite a decade’s warning, however, 
neither America nor Europe seemed prepared for such a dramatic change. Business and 
organised labour strongly voiced their concerns on both sides of the Atlantic: 
manufacturers worried about cheap Chinese t-shirts, jeans and underwear flooding the 
market and competing with their own products, while trade unions predicted the 
migration of thousands of skilled jobs to countries where labour was cheaper. Within a 
year, both the EU and the US had responded to the concerns of interest groups by 
negotiating fresh bilateral quotas with China, but the results highlight important 
differences.
Textiles debates in the US focussed on traditional trade concerns and centred 
around a single institution, the USTR. Producers pushed for stronger quotas, while 
importers and retailers opposed them. The US Association of Importers of Textiles and 
Apparel (USA-ITA) went so far as to sue the government, gaining an injunction from 
the US Court of International Trade against the imposition of safeguard measures in 
December 2004. More highly geographically concentrated industries have much better 
resources, and are more likely to convince the Court of International Trade of their case 
during appeals (Unah 1998). Congress, however, expressing the opinions of labour and 
the highly concentrated textiles industry in the South, loudly voiced its concerns about 
the growing trade deficit with China. In May 2005, the injunction was stayed, and the 
US imposed a 7.5% quota on certain garments. In November 2005, the USTR signed a 
bilateral quota deal which allowed Chinese textile imports to rise slowly between 2006 
and 2008.15 The debate remained focussed on which policy would be best for American 
business, workers and consumers and the USTR was able to reach a compromise 
between these competing interests, legitimating the policy in the eyes of elected 
representatives.
15 This allowed WTO member governments to ‘take action to curb imports in case of market disruptions 
caused by Chinese exports.’ http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr243_e.htm
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The European situation was not so straightforward. In June 2005, the EU agreed 
quotas with China on 10 categories of clothing until 2008, but EU transparency meant 
that producers anticipated the deal and sent large shipments of clothing in an attempt to 
export them before the deadline. This influx of goods very quickly exceeded the new 
quotas, leaving imports of Chinese clothing sitting in European ports. The blockages 
were sensationalised in the media as the ‘bra wars’ and a cascade of negative press 
ensued. The council of ministers, the main decisionmaking body on the issue, was split, 
with Italy and France promoting protection for their textiles industries whilst other 
member states supported their retail industries. A deal to unblock imports was reached 
in September 2005, but not without considerable loss of face for the EU Trade 
Commissioner Peter Mandelson. Without an elected body to approve the new policy, 
the legitimacy of the EU's agreement to the lower tariffs was easy to question in public. 
As a result the bra debate not only focussed on traditional trade policy issues, but 
questioned the fundamentals behind the European Commission’s much vaunted pro­
development, ‘distinctly European’ approach to trade (Heron 2007).
This chapter focuses on the role of delegation and representation in determining 
how the EU and US use ‘trade and policies’ to their advantage. I put forward my own 
alternative to the soft EU, hard US debate, arguing that the different EU and US 
bargaining styles can be better explained by focussing on domestic institutional 
differences. The next sections compare how negotiating authority is delegated, the role 
of elected representatives and interactions between officials and interest groups in the 
EU and US. I argue that examining these factors -delegation and representation- can 
explain why the EU and US adopt a different styles in relation to ‘trade and’ issues.
Why this approach and not others?
Viewing trade as primarily an economic policy, many studies in political science seek to 
explain a dichotomy: whether this is why a particular sector or industry is protected or 
liberalised; why a state chooses to actively pursue new trade agreements or react to 
those signed by others; or why a state holds particular preferences for regional or 
bilateral trade agreements. Even if a piece of research includes detailed case studies of 
particular policies, most of the time it is more concerned with using these to explain 
general patterns of functions rather than those of ideas. In short, we often make theories 
about the instruments of trade policy, but seldom about the content.
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If the subject of study is why and how certain trade and non-trade policies are 
combined, this point is particularly important. The protectionist/liberal dichotomy 
breaks down when we examine modem trade agreements. They are full of schedules on 
procurement, governance, intellectual property, environmental standards, and human 
rights. Protectionism or liberalisation cannot be measured using tariffs alone - a  whole 
raft of policy must be examined, and these debates are value driven. We only have to 
witness the struggles of the WTO agricultural negotiations to realise that one state’s 
protectionism is an expression of another’s essential values. It becomes clear that while 
a dichotomous view of trade can be very useful for building theoretical models, it is not 
particularly helpful in understanding many of the issues in contemporary trade politics. 
Once we reframe the dependent variable in this way, the most common independent 
variables used to explain trade policy are no longer adequate and further thought is 
needed.
Convincing political science studies of trade policy (Meunier 2005; Sell 2003; 
Meunier and Nicolaidis 1999; De Bievre and Diir 2005; Dryden 1995; Gibson 2000; 
Destler 2005) all include an examination of delegation -the means by which authority is 
transferred from governments to trade negotiators- and the rules which govern 
decisionmaking. Knowing exactly how the transfer of authority is achieved and the 
extent to which negotiators are constrained in making trade bargains is essential in order 
to understand why a state is protectionist or liberal, active or reactive. Similarly, 
examining the rules which govern decisionmaking and their application, whether these 
rules govern Congress or the Council of Ministers, can tell us a great deal about the 
limitations placed on policymakers and how these affect likely outcomes. But although 
examining changing patterns of authority and decisionmaking rules might tell us why a 
state bargains in a particular way, it may not explain why a trade agreement contains 
environmental provisions- in other words, the breadth and content of the agenda 
discussed in the previous chapter. Finding adequate explanations for this more complex 
dependent variable does not mean abandoning these approaches, but rather requires a 
synthesis between them and other approaches which focus on how possible policies are 
framed and agendas set.
Interest groups of all kinds express and promote policy ideas. While 
policymakers sit in the policy ‘driving seat’ as the ultimate decision makers, interest 
groups, whether constituted broadly or more specifically, play an important role in 
defining policy alternatives and packaging solutions. There is a very large and 
distinguished body of literature examining interest groups in both the US and EU,
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among which several studies of trade policy play a seminal role. Paying attention to 
theories of interest group representation enriches our understanding of institutions, 
actors and of their strategies and interactions. What interest groups do, their strategies 
and preferred policies, reflects their collective best judgment about where power is, how 
it can be influenced, and which policy solutions are practical. Groups aim to identify the 
levers of power that they can pull given their unique membership.
In turn, understanding which groups gain access to decision makers tells us 
something about the preferences and goals of policymakers themselves. Adding theories 
of interest group representation to an examination of decisionmaking rules creates a 
broader concept of representation. As an independent variable, representation includes 
representation of the public and organised groups via access to elected representatives 
and/or trade officials in the administration. This approach contains elements of new 
institutionalism (March and Olsen 1984; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Streeck and 
Thelen 2005) which acknowledges that institutions affect the choices of individuals 
because they affect policy alternatives that individuals see as practical. Institutions, or 
more accurately the individuals within them, need to be seen as legitimate if they are to 
survive. The representation of organised groups beyond formal politics, whether 
business associations or broader constituencies, is an important part of achieving this 
goal. When USTR officials portray themselves as brokers for domestic interest groups, 
and when EU officials advocate consultation with NGOs, they are legitimating 
themselves and speaking of a system set up to legitimate their actions.
This chapter outlines a theoretical answer to the question of how and why EU 
and US approaches to ‘trade and’ policies have been different in the last decade. The 
next sections examine the specific institutional features of the two polities in turn, using 
literature on delegation and representation to define differences between the EU and US 
along these independent variables which will be fleshed out in greater detail in the 
policy chapters which follow. Amy Searight (2005) examines formal rules, informal 
rules and bureaucratic structures as influences on the ‘bargaining style’ of the US, EU 
and Japan in successive rounds of international trade negotiations. A bargaining style is 
a state’s position in a two-dimensional policy space (figure 3.1) which describes its 
engagement in the negotiations -  (its leadership in proposing new areas and supporting 
others in doing so) and its ambition (its aversion to risk and the scale of its proposals). 
Building on a series of earlier studies of international bargaining (Preeg 1970; Evans 
1971) and of domestic constraints on the ratification of treaties (Milner and Rosendorff 
1997), Searight finds that the EU and US bargain differently in international trade
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negotiations. The US is more active and more ‘engaged’. It has been the leader in the 
last three rounds of trade talks and an advocate for the process as a whole. It puts 
forward ambitious proposals, then threatens to withdraw if others do not match them. 
The EU’s bargaining style is somewhat different. It tends to respond to proposals made 
by the US rather than putting forward its own, and dominates in fewer issue areas. Its 
deals also tend to be less ambitious, in contrast to the US’s ‘take it or leave it’ approach.
Figure 3.1: ‘Bargaining Styles’ in the EU, US and Japan (Searight 2005)
US
ao
EU
Japan
Engagement
Grugel (2004) finds that although the EU and US have similar economic goals 
(building trade and investment markets) in negotiating trade agreements with South 
American countries, their ideas about the political and institutional environments the 
agreements create are very different. Europe’s negotiations with MERCOSUR have a 
political aspect based on European ideas of ‘democracy, social welfare and regional 
integration’, as part of a ‘model of liberal economic governance in which the market is 
mediated by authoritative supranational regional institutions. EU regionalism is based 
on ‘partnership’, ‘new inter-regionalism’, political and institutional reform, and social 
inclusion, while US regional agreements are ‘market-led’, spreading rules across Latin 
America centred around an American ‘hub’ instead of building institutions.
Delegating Authority
Nearly all modem governments delegate the power to negotiate trade agreements to a 
small group of officials. Principal-Agent theory, which examines the problems that arise 
when the delegator and their agent have unequal degrees of expertise and access to 
information, has crossed the Atlantic several times. Many Principal-Agent studies that 
examine the EU are largely based on American studies of delegation from Congress to
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non-majoritarian institutions (Huber 2000; Pollack 2003; Weingast and Moran 1983; 
Ferejohn and Shipan 1989; Calvert et al. 1987; Huber and Shipan 2000). In trade policy, 
the EU’s delegation mechanism itself was intended by Europe’s founding fathers to 
closely mimic the American system (Meunier 2005:8).
It is no surprise then that the delegation mechanisms at the heart of both the EU 
and US trade policy processes perform some well known functions. First, international 
trade agreements are highly complex and negotiating a good outcome requires 
considerable amounts of specialist information and knowledge. Politicians attempt to 
overcome these information asymmetries through delegation to experts (De Bievre and 
Diir 2005; Slaughter 2004). Second, a unified voice in negotiations is perceived as 
strengthening negotiating power. This allows politicians to make credible commitments 
in relation to agreements, reassuring other parties that deals will not be unravelled when 
they are referred to the national level for ratification. A third, related, point is that 
delegation can be used in an attempt to reduce the influence of special interests over 
trade policy, preventing policies that benefit limited sections of the population above the 
whole.
Delegation in the American System
Looking at US domestic institutional dynamics allows us to unravel America’s 
sometimes contradictory and confusing attitude to international trade. Under article 2 of 
the US constitution, the President has authority to negotiate international treaties, while 
under article 1, Congress formally retains the sole power to ‘regulate commerce with 
foreign nations’ (Destler 2005).
In the early 1900s, this meant Congress possessed a de facto power to set tariffs 
on imports, and thereby raise revenue. This brings us to the first point of tension: that 
between elected members as representatives of their districts and the as representatives 
of the national interest. This is a classic collective action problem. While it is in the 
interests of each individual representative to seek protection for their district, when all 
representatives act in their own best interest, the result is extremely high tariff barriers 
that damage the national economy as a whole. The 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act 
passed by Congress was the last in a series of such bills that raised tariffs to record 
levels. It is often credited with deepening and lengthening the Great Depression of that 
decade, as other countries retaliated with their own high tariffs. E.E. Schattschneider 
(1935) advanced one of the most influential analyses of American trade policy in his
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case study of the act. The paradox of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff was that although the US 
was extremely powerful in terms of the international trading system at the time, it still 
chose to enact protectionist measures. Schattschneider argues that this phenomenon was 
due to the pattern of competing demands for protection that were accommodated by 
Congress via an extreme process of logrolling. The legacy of this period among 
policymakers was a deep-seated rejection of protectionist measures and the high tariff 
schemes of the past. This ideological reversal was apparent in the trade policy of the 
new Roosevelt administration in 1933. Roosevelt’s Secretary of State Cordell Hull, was 
convinced that Smoot-Hawley was a substantial contributing factor to the depression, a 
conviction that came to be shared by the rest of the administration. This change in ideas 
was matched by a realignment of key interest groups -farmers and manufacturers- in the 
US economy, creating a Congress that was motivated to push for liberalization.
The 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) was a dramatic reversal in 
the American trade policymaking process, allowing Congress to delegate its authority 
on trade to the Executive for the first time. Just a few short years after the peak of 
protectionist sentiment, a consensus began to build around the need to dismantle tariffs. 
It was thought that this new delegation would separate grubby interest group politics 
from the pursuit of economic objectives, preventing another Smoot-Hawley. Office 
seeking members of Congress would be prevented from tacking tariff increases that 
served their local industries onto trade legislation.
In its modem incarnation, fast track negotiating authority, (renamed Trade 
Promotion Authority under the G. W. Bush administration) allows Congressional 
negotiating power to be delegated to the Executive on the condition that Congress can 
then only vote to accept or reject the trade agreement as negotiated, and may not 
propose amendments. Trade agreements must therefore be negotiated with a view to 
passing with a majority in both Houses (Woolcock 2000).
Although Congress retains oversight capabilities, in practice, this considerable 
delegation allows Representatives to indulge in rhetoric without having to take 
responsibility for tariff decisions which they have little actual control over once fast- 
track has been granted (Gibson 2000). According to Searight (2005), the US has created 
a structure that results in a higher level of delegation than is found in EU trade policy. If 
autonomy is determined by the relative preferences of the agents and its principals, and 
the extent to which agents are constrained by oversight mechanisms (Pollack 2003:201), 
the European Commission is less autonomous. It is the most constrained by its political
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principals, while the USTR has greater autonomy due to its ‘special institutional 
position’ between the Presidency and the Congress.
Currently, delegation occurs between Congress and an independent agency -  the 
Office of the United States Trade Representative. The 1962 Trade Expansion Act 
required the President to appoint a Special Representative for Trade negotiations (STR). 
Once created, the office of the independent trade representative was repeatedly 
strengthened and accorded greater independence. The office of the United States Trade 
Representative was separated from the State Department under the Kennedy 
administration, where it was felt that separating trade from other security issues would 
benefit negotiations by depoliticising them (Dryden 1995). The STR was elevated to 
cabinet level in 1974, in conjunction with an expansion of the powers of the office, and 
reorganised in 1979 to become the office of the United States Trade Representative.
The USTR has a clear responsibility as the lead agency for reporting to 
Congress. Other departments are responsible for negotiating and coordinating the 
implementation of side agreements or cooperation agreements, but ‘USTR has the lead 
according to the executive order for reporting to Congress on issues associated with 
that. We generally go with USTR when they are meeting with Congress on these issues 
but it's actually USTR's responsibility for reporting to Congress’ (State Department 
Official, May 2008).
The relatively powerful and autonomous agency that exists today is the product 
of a process of Congressional and Executive delegation of authority which was 
primarily a response to external events, and maintained ties between economic and 
political security. The USTR has a large team of negotiators representing a fairly 
consistent body of legal and political skills. The average USTR official is well educated 
(one undergraduate and one or two further degrees), from a diplomatic, Congressional 
or legal background, and once a member of the agency, spends a great deal of their 
career there, circulating through various posts. This reflects the large amount of expert 
knowledge required to negotiate trade agreements16.
The USTR is relatively under resourced. In April 2005, the USTR had 212 
members of staff, less than half the number of staff employed by the equivalent EU 
office at that time. Labour and Trade Capacity Building offices had 2 staff each, the 
Environment and Natural Resources office had 7 members of staff, while ‘Monitoring 
and Enforcement’ (trade defence- defending US trade policy from ‘unfair’ foreign trade 
practices) had 17 (Government Accountability Office 2005). The agency has a high
16 Based on a review of top level biographies available at vvww.ustr.gov in June 2007.
68  of 204
number of staff in the middle grades, reflecting its interagency role as an interest 
aggregator. The USTR sits at the head of a formal system of over 90 committees from 
different government departments, primarily Agriculture, Commerce, Labour, the State 
Department and the Treasury. As an understaffed body, the USTR relies on the 
resources of other departments to gather the information it needs, which prevents it from 
becoming too divorced from their trade goals (3 Trade Negotiators, USTR Official, 
Washington DC, June 2007). As table 3.2 shows, even after a large agreement such as 
CAFTA has been completed, multiple agencies from different parts of government take 
an interest. These bodies use the agreement as a basis for formulating regulations on 
many different topics -from textiles and futures trading to defence and environmental 
protection.
Table 3.2: CAFTA, Top 10 Rulemaking Agencies as of June 2008
Agency________________________________________ Count
Committee for the Implementation of Textile 
Agreements 42
Commodity Futures Trading Commission 19
Office of the US Trade Representative 18
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 16
Federal Acquisition Regulations* 15
International Trade Administration 10
Department of Defence 8
Securities and Exchange Commission 8
Customs and Border Protection Bureau 7
Environmental Protection Agency 6
*Multiple Bodies, usually led by General Services Administration, 
bringing Federal procurement into line with trade agreements
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data at Regulations.gov
The side effect of this dependence is that the USTR also relies on outside 
interests, particularly business interests, to work up trade briefings (Trade Negotiator, 
Washington DC, June 2007). This promotes networking (and sometimes circulation of 
personnel) between concentrated interests with adequate legal resources to undertake 
such work, and USTR officials.
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Delegation in the EU System
The European Union’s trade policy is the result of ‘double delegation’: first, from 
member state governments to the intergovernmental European Council and then from 
the Council to the European Commission. By design, the Commission is fragmented 
along issue lines, and extremely open to interests. The principal-agent relationship 
between the Council of Ministers and the Commission is at the heart of EU trade policy. 
It differs from the American system in several important ways. The isolation from 
electoral politics is much more complete in the European system. National electorates 
are a step further removed from the decisionmaking process, represented largely by 
member state officials and only to a very small extent by members of the European 
Parliament. The institutional set up may add distance between territorially based 
electoral interests and trade negotiators, but the Commission itself is a magnet for 
interest groups.
Article 133 of the Treaty on European Union divides the EU trade policy 
process into three phases: first, the Commission prepares a negotiating position, and the 
General Affairs Council confers a mandate via unanimity, where a measure cannot be 
passed if more than one party votes against it; or Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), 
where an oversized majority in favour of the measure is required, and votes are 
allocated based on each member state’s population. Secondly, negotiations are 
conducted, with the Commission speaking with ‘one voice’ on behalf of the EU as a 
whole. Thirdly, the results of the negotiations are approved by trade or foreign 
ministers, and adopted by the General Affairs Council via QMV. In contrast to the US 
Congress, the European Parliament plays a very limited role. The assent of the EP by 
simple majority is required under some circumstances, for example, if the agreement 
requires the amendment of EC legislation adopted by codecision (Woolcock 2000).
Where the US has created a structure that results in a high level of delegation, 
sitting between the President and Congress, autonomy in the EU is much lower. 
Although the EU Commission is technically the sole spokesperson on trade matters, this 
authority is not always absolute. Trade negotiations cover both areas of exclusive and 
mixed competence, and the Commission’s right to act has not gone uncontested, with a 
challenge through the European Court of Justice by eight member states in 1994 over 
competence to conclude international trade agreements in goods, and shared 
competence on newer issues such as trade in services (Holland 2002; Leal-Areas 2004; 
Meunier and Nicolaidis 2000:336). The Treaty of Nice further determined that most 
areas of services would fall under the competency of the Commission but still reserved
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certain powers for Member States (Smith 1999; Meunier & Nicolaidis 2000; Young 
2002). Young finds that the strengthening of the Commission’s authority versus the 
member states has not occurred ‘through a series of discrete quantum leaps’ but via 
political contestation between member states and the Commission, judicial intervention, 
and the pooling of sovereignty (Young 2002:159).
Pollack (1998) compares the Commission’s role in trade policy with the chief 
negotiator in Putnam’s two-level games model, while Moravcsik (1994:239) takes this 
further, portraying a ‘three-level game’ where the Commission negotiates with third 
party states, trade agreements are ratified by the intergovernmental Art. 133 Committee 
and the Council and national governments seek ratification among domestic 
constituents. Both of these models highlight the complicated and fragmented power 
structures at the heart of the EU which can be opaque and unpredictable to outsiders.
The Council’s role is theoretically governed by rules which determine its 
method of decisionmaking. In matters of exclusive competence, the Council is required 
to use QMV, while shared competence issues require unanimity and greater consultation 
with member states. Jupille highlights the importance of voting rules in the Council 
over international bargaining outcomes. He argues that when EU member states vote 
using unanimity to form what is known as a ‘Common Position’, the weight of the full 
complement of EU member states makes this position integral to international 
agreements (Jupille 1999). But member states do not always follow the rules.
In practice, decisions in the Article 133 Committee are usually made by 
consensus, without voting. And regardless of the formal structures for agreeing 
negotiating mandates and ratifying the final agreements, large and powerful member 
states may still retain a de facto veto over the process even when QMV is called for.
The Council is likely to agree to lowest common denominator mandates that are very 
flexible due to the need for unanimity, but the Commission may pay for this flexibility 
later if member states do not like the final deal (Nicolaidis and Meunier 2002:178-9).
In the past, the 133 Committee has been split between northern free traders (UK, 
Germany, Netherlands, Denmark and Luxembourg) and a protectionist ‘Club Med’ 
(France, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Greece and Italy) (Murphy 2000; Elsig 2002:36). 
With the enlargement of the EU to 27 member states, reaching a consensus is even more 
difficult. In the most comprehensive recent study of European trade policy, Meunier 
(2005) examines the effect of this internal fragmentation on the EU’s negotiating power. 
She argues that the EU’s ‘one voice’ negotiating authority enhances its bargaining 
power in international trade negotiations, but that this is subject to the decision rule
71 of 204
used. Where the EU is fragmented on an issue under certain rules, its ‘complex 
institutions and multiple masters’ fragment its negotiating power.
The Commission is also often treated as a single unit, but in reality different 
directorates have very different ways of working, shaped by their respective interest 
group bases (Cram 1994). In 1993, the Trade and External Relations portfolios were 
divided. In the months that followed, the coordination between Trade and External 
Relations policy suffered due to animosity between the two Commissioners (Lister 
1997:14). Christiansen (1997) argues that the Commission has ‘multiple accountability’, 
responsible both to the member states and European citizens, and a ‘politicized 
bureaucracy’, as it provides both executive government and public administration. The 
cabinets play a crucial horizontal and vertical coordination role, but discussions 
amongst cabinets are now more difficult as they are spread among different buildings 
(Christiansen 2001:752). In December 2005, DG Trade had 483 members of staff- 
making it a ‘medium-sized DG’ in comparison to others in the Commission. It was top 
heavy: 50% of staff were “A Grade” officials (equivalent to Head of Unit or higher). 
33% of the staff were engaged in trade defence measures -that is, working up cases 
against other WTO members or in defence of the EU’s own trade policy (DG Trade 
2005a). Where the USTR is forced to rely on the resources of other agencies, DG Trade 
duplicates the tasks of other DGs.
Elected Representatives
When negotiating authority is delegated to government officials, what role is left for 
elected representatives? Delegation is often seen as a solution which ‘prevents’ electoral 
politics from interfering in the trade policy process. This is not quite true. In 2001, 
Congress voted to renew fast track authority by a very narrow margin -215 to 214. 
When it looked as if the legislation would fail, the (Republican) Speaker of the House 
held the vote open for 37 minutes whilst the Republican Whip persuaded Rep Jim 
DeMint of South Carolina to switch his vote from ‘nay’ to ‘aye’. In exchange, DeMint 
received a protectionist concession for the textiles industry, a key industry in his district 
(Destler 2005:338-9). In the EU, although elected representatives in the EP have little 
say on trade issues, elected officials are also represented through the Council of 
Ministers. As Meunier (2005) has shown, although qualified majority voting (QMV) 
should theoretically be the norm for trade decisions, outcomes in the different phases of 
the Uruguay round agricultural negotiations were very different when unanimity was
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invoked. Therefore, while the rules used by elected representatives to control trade 
negotiators are important, it is also important to examine how those rules are applied.
Role o f Elected Representatives in the US
As an active parliament, where ordinary members are able to put forward their own 
legislation (a category occupied only by the US and Costa Rica, see Mezey 1979), the 
power of Congress to construct the legislative agenda is almost unique. In theory, 
Congressional oversight is relatively strong. Most US trade policy takes the form of 
primary legislation at some point in its life, with comparatively little work done through 
secondary legislation by agencies (table 3.2). Trade issues are discussed in the powerful 
Ways and Means Committee, and many members are very keen to get a seat on this 
important body. Due to the advantages enjoyed by incumbent candidates over their 
rivals, and the corresponding long Congressional terms of office, representatives serving 
on the Committee have the chance to develop considerable expertise. With each 
successive Trade Act since 1934, Congress appears to have increased its oversight 
functions, even as it has expanded the authority of trade negotiators first over tariffs, 
then non-tariff barriers. Successive legislation has seen the creation of a Congressional 
Oversight Group (COG) of ten members who can attend trade negotiations as observers, 
tighter deadlines for reporting to Congress, stricter reporting standards, and the ability to 
withhold a trade agreement from fast track consideration by passing a resolution of 
disapproval (Hombeck and Cooper 2007:5-7). Despite the considerable formal 
autonomy delegated to the USTR, negotiators must constantly keep the opinions of 
Congress in mind.
Table 3.3: The Limited Role of Secondary Legislation in US Trade Policy
Year Into 
Force Notices Rules
Proposed
Rules
Public
Submissions Other
NAFTA 1994 405 176 37 2741 260
Jordan FTA 2001 6 5 0 0 3
Chile FTA 2004 31 24 1 5 1
Singapore FTA 2004 13 38 1 2 3
Australia FTA 2005 11 13 1 3 6
Morocco FTA 2006 15 34 1 0 3
CAFTA-DR 2005 158 37 1 16 5
Bahrain FTA 2006 15 34 1 0 3
Oman FTA 2006 1 0 0 1 0
Total 655 361 43 2768 284
Source: Author’s Calculations, based on data at Regulations.gov
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Growing divisions within Congress are threatening its influence, however. Since 
the RTAA was passed in 1934, the central question asked by trade policy experts has 
been: what are the necessary conditions for maintaining a consensus for liberal trade? 
Maintaining this consensus is proving increasingly difficult, and scholars are now 
questioning whether we are seeing a permanent return to territorially-based, 
protectionist divisions between blocs of representatives. The fast track system that 
worked well at the peak of Congressional consensus -  sometime in the 1950s- is far less 
efficient and much more acrimonious in a divided political climate (Bailey et al. 1997; 
Hiscox 2002; Nollen and Quinn 1994). If the President and Congress aren’t willing to 
‘get along’ and build consensus between them -  something that incidentally gets harder 
the more the trade agenda affects domestic policy decisions- fast track loses its 
legitimacy. Authors such as Lohmann and O’Halloran (1994) have used veto points to 
demonstrate that divided government has impeded trade liberalization in the US, while 
unified government has promoted it.
There is some evidence that non-partisan consensus is unusual and transitory. 
Although the majority of Republicans currently favour free trade, they have a history of 
protectionism. Similarly, the Democrats have been advocates of both free trade and 
protectionist measures in the past (Goldstein 1993; Rogowski 1989; Destler 2005). Big 
changes to the interest group bases of the two parties in the mid-twentieth century 
caused these changes. The concentration of industry in certain regions of the US -  the 
Northeastern rustbelt, the agrarian South and the Western sunbelt -  pressurises elected 
representatives, and shifting alliances between regional factions can create winning 
Congressional coalitions (Bensel 2000; Trubowitz 1998). The longstanding voting 
alliance between Republicans and southern Democrats gave rise to the impression that 
trade was a non-partisan issue in the House, but declining manufacturing, competition 
from Asian markets, and disputes over new trade issues caused the consensus to falter 
during the 1980s and 1990s (Polsby 2004; Shoch 2001).
As Fiona McGillivray (2004) argues, industry often maps onto political 
jurisdictions, creating strong links between electoral rules and the industries that are 
allocated protection. She finds that as office seeking individuals, it is politically efficient 
for governments to offer protection to industries. Nor are Presidential candidates 
immune from regional interests. In current and 2003/4 political contests, many 
Democratic Presidential candidates have found it necessary to adopt ‘fair trade’ 
approaches in order to gain funding and support. In the 2006 Congressional elections,
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37 representatives from the freshman class were elected on the basis of promises to 
support ‘fair’ trade17. Trade unions provided campaign contributions to these 
candidates, whilst grassroots groups gave organising support. 41 out of 47 of the
Democratic Freshman class received a third or more of their campaign contributions
18from trade unions .
The importance of electoral politics in trade negotiations is never more visible 
than when fast track legislation is due for renewal. In May 2007, the a group of 
Democratic members of Congress held an impromptu press conference to announce a 
new ‘bipartisan deal’ on trade that they promised would satisfy the long-term demands 
of the left for labour and environmental standards to be placed in the core texts of trade 
agreements (reviewed in detail in chapter 4). A statement of principles was issued which 
promised that bilateral signatories such as Panama and Peru would be required to 
implement standards as determined by the International Labour Organisation and a set 
of multilateral environmental agreements. The ‘wish list’ also contained provisions 
protecting the rights of domestic state governments to make procurement decisions and 
foreign governments to access medicines19. Congressional Democrats in the Ways and 
Means Committee were very proud of the deal:
‘ W e  h i t  t h e  n a i l  o n  t h e  h e a d .  W e  g o t  e x a c t l y  w h a t  w e  w a n t e d  o n  l a b o u r  a n d  
e n v i r o n m e n t ,  I P R ,  i n v e s t m e n t ,  t h o s e  a r e  t h e  t h i n g s  t h a t  w e  w a n t e d .  N o w  d o e s  t h a t  
m e a n  t h a t  t h i s  i s  i m m u t a b l e ?  I f  t h e r e ' s  a  D e m o c r a t i c  p r e s i d e n t  n e x t  y e a r  i t  w o n ' t  
c h a n g e  a t  a l l ?  I t h i n k  w e ' l l  f i n e - t u n e .  . . b u t  I t h i n k  t h e  b a s i c s  a r e  t h e r e  ’
( C o n g r e s s i o n a l  S t a f f e r ,  W a s h i n g t o n  D C ,  M a y  2 0 0 8 ) .
But many groups on the left were unhappy with the deal. At the same time that House 
Speaker Nancy Pelosi and the Ways and Means Committee Chairman Charles Rangel 
(flanked by several Republicans) were speaking to the press, the AFL-CIO was still 
holding a conference call to discuss their position on the issue, and some alleged that the 
timing of Rangel’s announcement was deliberate in order to shut out fair trade 
advocates.20
Role o f Elected Representatives in the EU
17 Public Citizen, http://wvvwxitizen.orii/hot issut,s/issue.cfrn?lD= 1471 accessed 15th May 2007
18 Author’s calculation from Center for Responsive Politics data, 2006, www.opensecrets.org accessed 
11th May 2007
19 House Ways and Means Committee statement,
httn://wavsandmeans.liouse.g()v7Media/pdf/110/05%2014 /f2007/05^20 \4fl  2007 .pdf, accessed 10th May 
2007
20 Personal communication with grassroots organizers, Washington DC, 11th May 2007
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Compared to the central role played by Congress, the European Parliament (EP) is a 
minor player in trade policy, particularly in terms of multilateral agreements, where the 
EP is consulted, and may send an observer, but do little else. The EP is slightly more 
important in terms of adopting bilateral association agreements, (or those that alter the 
budget or fall under codecision) where the EP must approve via a simple majority vote. 
National parliaments play a even smaller role than their European counterpart. 
Scrutinising trade policy is difficult given limited parliamentary time and resources 
(Woolcock 2000), and may hardly be a rewarding task for upcoming politicians, 
especially in those systems where committee membership is not an attractive career 
option.
Both the EU and US are institutionally fragmented, but the constitutionally 
based separation of powers in the US is far clearer than the dividing lines between EU 
institutions. In the EU, the consensus required to reach a mandate for negotiation must 
occur in the Council of Ministers, technically representing an electoral mandate, 
although the negotiating proposal they discuss is drawn up by the unelected 
Commission. This has several implications. The mandate for negotiation is determined 
in closed meetings, amongst government officials rather than legislators, and under two 
different decision rules: unanimity or QMV. In theory, the rule used is determined by 
the type of agreement under consideration, but in practice, member state’s political 
preferences often override convention (Meunier 2005). Contrary to expectations, it may 
be easier for member states to achieve consensus under the unanimity rule. The rule as 
defined does not count an abstention as a vote against the measure. A member state can 
therefore abstain on a controversial issue, simultaneously demonstrating its commitment 
in front of the other member states and its resistance in front of unsupportive domestic 
interests (Hix 2005:84). As such, the electoral consequences of a policy can sometimes 
be divorced from the decisionmaking process. The role of the Commission in framing 
the policy alternatives discussed by the Council blurs the line between agenda setting 
and decisionmaking stages in the policy process, ensuring that the Commission must be 
part of any negotiating consensus.
Table 3.4: EU Secondary Trade Legislation by Type, 1999-2007
Regulations Directives Decisions Other Total
Council 242 1 12 3 258
Commission 136 0 76 13 225
Multiple Parties 0 0 7 0 7
Total 378 1 95 16 490
Source: Author’s calculations, DG Trade ICentre Database
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Table 3.5: EU Trade Legislation by Subject, 1999-2007 
Trade in Goods Count
Chemicals & Plastics 132
Steel & Metal Tubing 85
Textiles, Cotton & Footwear 52
Agriculture, Food & Wine 33
Semiconductors & Electronics 27
Dual Use Items 16
Raw Materials 4
Automobiles, Aircraft and Shipping 2
Pharmaceuticals 2
Other Manufactures 60
413
Total (84%)
Newer Issues Count
Development & General System of Preferences 19
Enlargement 8
Waste 7
Intellectual Property Rights 6
Labour Standards 4
Services 2
Competition 1
Weapons of Mass Destruction 1
Other Trade Diplomacy 13
Other Trade Defence 16
77
Total (16%)
Source: Author’s calculations, DG Trade ICentre Database
This is especially true in terms of ‘trade-and’ policies. Whereas Council 
communications and regulations tend to focus on more traditional trade concerns such 
as steel, textiles and technical issues, ‘trade-and’ issues such as social rights and 
development are discussed in Commission communications and regulations (tables 3.3 
and 3.4). In table 3.4, for example, all four pieces of legislation on Labour standards 
were initiated by the Commission. In principle, all EU legislation is subordinate or 
secondary, created by bodies other than the legislature itself (Page 1997:103-4). In 
comparison, US trade policy is conducted largely through primary legislation, with Acts 
of Congress corresponding closely to either an individual trade agreement (e.g. the Peru
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FT A) or substantial changes in the policy process (the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act 1988).
The tensions that this split creates in the EU system can be seen in this statement 
by Pascal Lamy on negotiations with the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries. Whilst he seems willing to follow through on European commitments to 
support development in the third world, he also shows a strong commitment to opening 
foreign markets:
‘Is development the objective o f these negotiations? Yes, o f course, but development 
cannot be negotiated, whereas trade can. That is why we are introducing certain 
elements o f trade negotiations, while keeping development as our 
objective...granting unilateral preferences to these countries, is not, fo r a number o f 
reasons, bringing about the transformation o f this trade liberalisation, which we 
decided unilaterally, into a genuine instrument for development...in particular, the 
ACP countries must work together to create markets that are large enough to 
interest investors. ’21
Whereas the Council focuses on national and sectoral interests, often taking a 
‘firefighting’ role in crises such as the bra wars, it is the Commission that seeks to 
extend this core of trade policy to other areas, attempting to increase its jurisdiction in 
the process. The Commission’s relationship with interest groups is key to achieving this 
goal.
Interest Groups
Exploring interactions between interest groups and policymakers can establish how 
negotiating stances reflect group activity. Trade is linked with some of the seminal 
works on interest group behaviour (such as Schattschneider 1935), which see the policy 
process as a competition for scarce resources, with individual groups struggling to 
maximize their share of the pie (Hall 1997). The lobbying activities of interest groups 
create demands on the government which affect both its preferences and its ability to act 
upon them. This study focuses on the formal organisations that lobby governments 
rather than the wider interests that they represent, and uses the activity of such groups to 
make assumptions about those larger sections of the population. Although interest 
groups may not be present at the negotiating table, there are still substantial 
opportunities within the process for them to influence the resulting agreement. As 
Bayne and Woolcock (2003: 75) argue, the consultation phase at the domestic level of
21 Pascal Lamy, response to European Parliament Question No 42 (H-0039/03) asked by Glenys Kinnock, 
28th January 2003.
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international economic negotiations often coincides with agenda-setting at the 
international level.
Factor endowment models of trade policy attempt to determine the coalitions 
that will win or lose under a given trade policy (Rogowski 1989; Lake 1988; Hiscox 
2002; Alt et al. 1996; Magee 1978). By measuring the degree to which factors of 
production (land, labour, capital) can move between sectors of the economy (their factor 
specificity), these models try to determine which groups will lobby the government to 
implement protectionist policies, and which will support liberalization, then examine 
what happens to these coalitions as factors in the economy change.
For example, Rogowski (1989) uses a model with varying land, labour and 
capital relationships (country can be high or low in either) to explain why countries 
have taken protectionist or liberal trade policy stances at different points in history. By 
examining a country’s relative endowment in these factors, he predicts how agricultural 
interests, industry and labour will conflict or unite to form coalitions along class lines. 
His analysis is based upon the Stolper-Samuelson model (1941) where economic factors 
are very mobile between sectors. Under this model’s assumptions, trade conflicts arise 
between owners of different factors rather than between different industries, something 
that does not always hold true in practice. Perfect mobility between industries is 
assumed, so in the model, all industries are affected in the same way by trade policy.
Other authors hold that a model with high factor specificity (i.e. low mobility 
between factors) may paint a more accurate picture. 'Ricardo-Viner' models assume 
immobility of one or more factor of production between industries. When changes in the 
economy harm an industry, employees of that industry are harmed too, unable to move 
to a different job in another sector. So coalitions form along industry lines rather than 
between workers, landowners and capital. These models produce results which are 
much closer to the pluralist view of competition between interest groups depicted in 
Schattschneider’s (1930) seminal analysis of interest group competition in American 
trade policy. Hiscox (2002) uses congressional votes on trade legislation between 1824 
and 1994 to show that US trade policy was dominated by conflicts between social 
classes when interindustry mobility was relatively high, and by inter-industry conflicts 
when mobility was relatively low.
As factor endowment models predict, the degree to which labour can move 
freely from one industry to another has definite consequences for workers’ demands to 
include labour rights in trade agreements. Workers who are able to find new jobs 
elsewhere as the economy changes are much less likely to demand protectionist trade
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measures. Similarly, farmers are more or less vulnerable to changes in the global 
economy depending on the versatility of their land (Alt et al. 1996:701).
This approach focuses on specific factors, but downgrades the importance of 
diffuse influences on policy. Political studies that apply factor specificity to areas of 
policy expect that diffuse interests will be less likely to organise effectively or engage in 
lobbying activity compared to specific interests. Given the strength of specific interests, 
their demands for protectionism, and the weakness of consumers, a common question 
asked by economists is ‘why do we find free trade policies at all?’ (Milner and Kubota 
2005). In the context of ‘trade and’ policies, the puzzle is slightly different. Given 
expectations that specific interests are strong and diffuse interests weak, why have 
diffuse interests such as consumers and environmentalists been successful in 
incorporating their interests into trade agreements in the last decade? Why are these 
issues being discussed at all?
In an extensive ongoing study, Beyers (2002) builds on Mancur Olson’s (1971) 
work to contrast the strategies used by diffuse interests that are ‘linked to broad and 
general segments of society’, (for example, consumers, women or those concerned 
about development or the environment) with specific interests which have ‘clear-cut 
stake in the production process’ such as trade unions, employers unions and sectoral 
associations (589-90). Within this framework, Beyers outlines four competing 
hypotheses which compare the access and voice strategies of these groups (Hirschman 
1970), arguing that the constituency type of an interest group can affect its ability to 
gain access to policymakers. He expects that diffuse interests will use more voice, 
whilst specific interests are more likely to seek (and gain) more access. Specific 
interests are more likely to have resources at their disposal and access is assumed to be 
the preferred strategy when money is no object, while limited funds cause diffuse 
groups to opt for cheaper (but less successful) voice strategies (Beyers 2004:216). In a 
detailed comparison of EU and US lobbying styles, Mahoney finds that lobbying pays 
off in the American political system, and that 75% of the time, industrial interests win. 
Industry is also successful in the EU, but other more diffuse groups, such as those 
representing consumers or environmental interests, are also successful (Mahoney 
2008:204). The following sections discuss these insights in the context of American and 
European interest group politics.
Interest Groups in the US
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The study of interest group behaviour has a long history in the US (Madison 1787; 
Herring 1929; Cater 1964; Salisbury 1969; Bauer et al. 1963; Heclo 1978; Baumgartner 
and Jones 1993; Heinz et al. 1993; Kollman 1998; Baumgartner and Leech 1998). 
Schattschneider’s work on the Smoot Hawley tariff (1935) was one of several studies 
that heavily influenced the pluralist approach as represented by Truman (1951). Later, 
Schattschneider built on his analysis (1960) to emphasise the struggle between interest 
groups and the power of the strongest to define policy alternatives, criticising the 
pluralist assumption that all groups had equal access to power. The most influential 
reaction to pluralism, however, came from Olson (1971), who challenged the very basis 
of collective action. Attempts to lower tariffs are a classic example of Olson’s 
influential framework. The costs of free trade tend to be concentrated in one sector or 
industry, while the benefits are diffuse, spread out among consumers. This inspired 
Destler’s (2005) observation that trade losers lobby and business gets on with business.
American trade politics since NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) 
has seen the creation of a new alliance between (concentrated) trade unions and 
(diffuse) environmental groups, who demand that labour standards and environmental 
protection should be included in the texts of trade agreements passed by Congress. Such 
alliances are mutually beneficial. Labour cooperates in order to gain increased political 
coverage whilst Environmental groups cooperate in exchange for access to increased 
funding. Negotiations have been decreasingly a ‘matter of balancing producer interests 
and more a public contest of competing social values’ (Destler and Balint 1999:46). 
However, analysis of the activity of diffuse groups in trade policy is limited to a few 
studies (Elliott 2003; Wallach and Woodall 2004; Destler and Balint 1999). There is 
some evidence, however, that they adopt distinct lobbying strategies, mobilising their 
members and the public to highlight issues on their behalf rather than pressurising 
representatives directly (Kollman 1998).
In 2006, 761 registered lobbyists filed reports of their activities on trade issues. 
Many of these were large firms or business associations, as we might expect. These 
associations spend an enormous amount of money lobbying on trade issues, (largely as a 
result of the need to fund Congressional and Presidential campaigns), and trade has been 
ranked between third and sixth in terms of lobbying expenditure per issue area for the 
last eight years22. What we may not expect is that a coalition of 715 grassroots groups 
and NGOs (known as the Citizens’ Trade Campaign and founded in 1993) also
22 Center for Responsive Policy, 2006 returns. CRP annually ranks expenditure on lobbying by policy 
area based on organisations’ self-reports.
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campaigns on trade issues at local, state and national levels. The difference between the 
lobbyists and the NGO coalition is that the latter remains on the fringe of American 
politics, part of what made the demonstrations at the 1999 Seattle WTO ministerial so 
astonishing to many observers.
One observer argued that the USTR is purposefully understaffed in order to 
reinforce its reliance on other agencies and enforce its inter-agency role. This has 
another side effect- a high rate of circulation between lawyers, interest groups and the 
USTR. Because USTR has few resources, industries are expected to do the legwork for 
their own disputes, such as preparing necessary briefings and garnering support (Trade 
Negotiator, Washington DC, June 2007). Non-profit interest groups may not have the 
necessary resources to duplicate this approach. A USTR official explained his first 
impressions of the USTR’s internal culture:
‘It's a very different perspective, from working for the Department o f Justice to 
working for an economic agency like USTR...[the two agencies] bring different 
concerns to the table. We represent different parts o f the government so we're 
advocating for different interests...then o f course USTR has a lead on negotiations 
where other agencies contribute, so much more o f my role is coordination' (USTR 
Official, Washington DC, June 2007).
Interest Groups in the EU
The study of interest group lobbying at the European level is more recent. In response to 
the more normative American studies which often highlight the deleterious effects of 
lobbyists on democratic systems, European studies focus on empirical process, asking 
‘what constitutes lobbying in the EU? Who lobbies, and what strategies do they use? On 
which institutions and levels are these activities focused?’
Comparing this activity to that of US interest groups is essential to an 
understanding of the way their governments behave as world traders (Woll 2008; 
Mahoney 2008). A small but growing literature addresses the differences. In general 
terms, EU lobbying may be characterised by greater consensus and less confrontation 
(Woll 2006). The relationship between firms in particular is less adversarial and 
encourages longer-term thinking (Vogel 1996; Coen 1999, 2004). The EU lobbying 
industry is also less involved in distributing money. The salience of voters and elected 
representatives within the process is quite different. Congress provides legitimacy for 
the US process, but the European Parliament is much weaker and has almost no 
influence on trade policy. The EU must seek legitimacy elsewhere, and does so through 
the participation of interest groups (see Meunier 2003).
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While American approaches can sometimes ignore differences in power and 
organisation between groups, such as distinctions between ‘producers’ and ‘consumers’, 
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ (Grant 1989, 2004) or groups with ‘diffuse’ or ‘specific’ 
constituencies, the European lobbying literature revels in them. Authors such as Streeck 
and Schmitter (1985) have argued that the EU is dominated by concentrated interests 
such as business. However, as the union has acquired new competences, the opportunity 
structure facing interest groups has changed (Greenwood and Aspinwall 1998; Marks 
and McAdam 1996; Mazey and Richardson 1993). These opportunities are examined by 
Pollack (1997), who argues that the diverse forms of EU organisation, fragmented 
institutions at multiple levels, present ‘opportunities as well as risks’ (573) for diffuse 
groups, enabling them to access decisionmakers via alternative routes. Where group- 
bureaucracy relationships in the US can be depicted as a series of ‘iron triangles’ (see 
Jordan 1981), the EU’s institutional structure allows more scope for fluid policy 
networks, based on consultation rather than negotiation (Page 1997:94). The European 
Commission goes out of its way to be open to interest groups, refusing to bring in 
accreditation schemes along the lines of those found in international institutions, and 
going so far as to foster and fund many groups (Greenwood 2003, Table 3.5). As the 
salience of voters and elected representatives within the process is quite different to the 
American system (Congress provides legitimacy for the US process, but the European 
Parliament is much weaker and has almost no influence on trade policy), the EU must 
seek legitimacy elsewhere, and does so through the participation of interest groups (see 
Meunier 2003).
Table 3.6: DG Trade Grants Recipients by Organisation’s Purpose, 1999-2005
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Business 
Environment &
3 2 3 1 1 0 0
Energy 1 2 4 2 1 2 0
Development 0 0 0 1 5 2 5
Social 0 0 1 3 0 1 0
Health 0 0 0 1 2 1 1
WTO 1 2 1 1 2 0 0
Other IGOs 0 0 0 1 4 2 0
Other Research 1 1 0 4 1 0 1
Total Groups 7 7 9 12 13 7 7
Source: Author’s coding, DG Trade Grant Recipients 1999-2005 
Note: Some groups cover more than one main issue area.
Latest data available as o f June 2008.
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The DG Trade Civil Society Dialogue includes several categories of groups 
under the rubric ‘civil society’: ‘labour market players’, including trade unions and 
employers federations; ‘organisations representing social and economic players’ e.g. 
consumer organisations; NGOs; and Community Based Organisations (CBOs) such as 
youth movements and religious communities. As of September 2006, there were 657 
organisations registered on the DG Trade Civil Society database. This included 144 
business associations, 137 development organisations, 69 consumer and public health 
organisations, 59 organisations promoting environmental protection, 30 trade unions, 
representatives of local and regional governments, and a sprinkling of think tanks, 
animal welfare, and women’s organisations. The active groups are much fewer, 
however, suggesting that the Commission may be getting the better deal. Of the 
organisations registered on the database in 2006, 271 had never attended a meeting, 447 
had not attended for over a year, and only 31 had attended half the meetings or more in 
the previous year23.
The Commission’s presentation of the process as a dialogue and a debate, with 
the intension of making ‘responsive policy’ (DG Trade 2005d) seems to imply some 
scope for deliberation amongst the groups, with the expectation that they may come to 
some sort of accommodation. DG Sanco (Health and Consumer Affairs) hopes to 
imitate the dialogue’s perceived success under its current Director General Robert 
Madelin, who was the motor behind the dialogue process in his former post at DG 
Trade. In practice, however, the dialogue is a deliberation process that fails to bring 
about deliberation. In fact, no consultation process to date has achieved this 
satisfactorily (Jordan 2007).
Conclusion
This chapter has explored the institutions that create trade policy in the EU and US. 
Together with the following three chapters, it argues that two variables, the delegation 
of trade negotiating authority, and the representation of diffuse and specific interests 
through institutions, can explain patterns of EU and US ‘trade and’ policies. This means 
that they explain which non-trade issues are incorporated into trade agreements, and the 
approach to compliance employed on those issues.
The US Congress is attempting to reassert its authority over the Executive’s 
negotiating powers, while the European Union attempts to externalise its domestic
23 Development NGO, personal communication, October 2006.
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policies through international trade agreements. As recent research has shown (Meunier 
and Nicolaidis 2006), the European Union is attempting to exert ‘power through trade’, 
attaching policy requirements to its trade agreements much as it did in its agreements 
with the new accession states. In doing so, it attempts to build its credentials as both a 
world power, and an alternative for American dominance in the international system. 
The ideal EU, driven by the Commission, would like to adopt the structural advantages 
of the American Presidency when negotiating agreements, as outlined in Federalist 
Papers 64 and 75: ‘unity, decision, secrecy, dispatch, stability of purpose, special 
sources of information -  [making] the executive the prime agent in dealings with 
foreign states' (Schlesinger 2004:xi). This is proving incompatible, however, with some 
of the EU’s other goals such as transparency in its dealings with society, legitimacy in 
the face of a widely discussed “democratic deficit”, and the ideal of a ‘social’ Europe.
At the same time, elected representatives in the US are under pressure to take 
back some of the power that they have delegated to the Executive, by strengthening 
their authority to shape negotiating mandates and oversee the negotiation process. The 
Congressional consensus on trade that seemed stable after the second world war has 
weakened in subsequent decades. A partisan Congress, facing a record trade deficit with 
China, makes the periodic delegation of authority increasingly difficult to achieve.
Exploring these differences in the context of the new and growing links between 
international and domestic policy spaces leads to several propositions. European 
governments and the United States Congress both delegate decisionmaking authority for 
external trade in order to facilitate trade negotiations and insulate themselves from 
interest group pressures. The key difference lies in the terms of the authority transfer. In 
the US, an elected Congress is insulated from an Executive Agency, the United States 
Trade Representative. We may expect that policy development is heavily influenced by 
electoral factors and the territorial concentration of certain interests, which can exert 
control through Congressional committees. Proximity to electoral arenas could induce a 
tendency for trade to take on distributive aspects (Lowi 1964). This may explain why 
trade policy becomes characterised in terms of a cost benefit analysis for domestic 
constituents. In the EU, national governments (as the Council of Europe) are insulated 
from the European Commission, but the Commission is deliberately open to interest 
group pressures. DG Trade has its own separate ‘Civil Society Dialogue’, providing an 
easy registration service for groups, subsidising travel costs to attend meetings, and 
publishing briefings and minutes. External trade, as one of the oldest and most 
Europeanized competences of the EU, gives the Commission considerable discretion in
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both agenda setting and decisionmaking, which take place in the same, non-electoral 
institution. Although the mandate to negotiate is conferred by member states, the 
proposal they consider is drawn up by the Commission, which gives it considerable 
influence on the outcome (Pollack 1997).
We can expect these differences in delegation and representation would have 
consequences for interest groups attempting to influence trade policy. In the US, 
delegation would favour specific groups. The electorally focussed terms of the debate in 
Congress and stable policy networks between insider groups and policy officials in the 
Executive could allow groups with greater resources and more readily identifiable 
constituencies to do better. The most accessible channel for diffuse interests, Congress, 
is effectively insulated from later decisionmaking which takes place through the USTR. 
Once delegation has taken place, the USTR has considerable discretion over the terms 
of trade policy, whilst Congress can only vote the resulting trade agreements up or 
down.
Delegation in the EU works differently, in that it serves to keep national 
governments insulated from voters and electoral constituencies out of the loop. The 
Commission is keen (rightly or wrongly) to bolster its legitimacy by remaining open to 
interest groups, which are consulted at an early stage when the Commission is 
formulating a mandate. In contrast, the EP and member state parliaments play a very 
limited role. The concentration of a large proportion of agenda-setting and 
decisionmaking power in the Commission may be more helpful to diffuse groups. 
Where there has been pressure in the EU for an accreditation-free civil society dialogue 
(so much so that DG Trade maintains its own database in addition to the Commission as 
a whole), access is achieved in the US via acceptance into a closed system of trade 
advisory committees at the discretion of the USTR.
Different interest group activity in the two cases contributes to different 
negotiating styles -starting with the differences in breadth of agendas noted in chapter 
two. The lobbying activities of interest groups create demands on trade negotiators 
which can affect both their preferences and their ability to act upon them. First, interest 
groups can alter the range of issues that must be considered before a negotiating 
position can be reached. They are able to frame policy issues, linking new domestic 
issues to the global economy. We would expect government attention to focus on a 
wider range of issues in the EU than the US. Second, in the US, the dominance of direct 
lobbying would benefit the government as well as insiders, by limiting the number of 
participants and keeping discussions largely private and insulated. The prevalence of
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campaign finance would keep Congress attentive to specific interests. In contrast, we 
may expect EU policy negotiators to come under pressure from a broader range of 
interests on a wider number of issues, making consensus more difficult and ambitious 
negotiating positions less feasible. The media, information and networking strategies of 
these groups, coupled with the Commission’s vulnerability to charges of illegitimacy, 
would make it harder for negotiators to keep secrets and sustain conflicting goals.
The next three chapters look at three strands of policy in greater detail: the 
export of labour and environmental standards, the creation of the Doha Development 
Agenda, and new developments in trade and health policy. These policy studies 
incorporate interview evidence, analysis of government documents and press releases to 
explain how and why each issue was initially placed on the trade agenda. I then explore 
the different policy mechanisms used to pursue the issue at the national level and the 
constellation of interest groups calling for change.
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4 Exporting Standards: 
Labour Rights & Environmental Protections
7 can look my own constituents in the eye and tell them that for the first time the 
new Democratic Majority has placed worker rights and environmental standards in 
a trade agreement-on equal footing as all other commercial provisions- and that 
with this accomplishment we have taken the first step to completely change U.S. 
trade policy ’
- Rep. Sander Levin, Round Robin Letter to Congressional Democrats, May 
11th 2007
‘Our core message is clear: rejection o f protectionism at home, activism in opening 
markets abroad. We need to look beyond tariff reduction, to the trade barriers that 
lie behind borders *
- Peter Mandelson, statement to the European Parliament, (DG Trade 2007)
The incorporation of basic labour rights and environmental standards into trade 
agreements were the first substantial policy reactions to the new trade politics, pre­
dating the creation of the WTO. Not only that, but they have persisted, and grown in 
importance, since that time. These two policy areas cannot be ignored if we are to 
understand how and why the EU and US incorporated non-trade issues into their trade 
agreements. This chapter examines two policies in the two polities: the different paths 
taken by the US and EU towards incorporating internationally recognized labour and 
environmental standards into their respective trade policies, paying special attention to 
the interactions between trade unions, environmental activists, and trade officials. It 
maps the pattern of EU and US resistance and acceptance of incorporating labour 
standards (such as the right to collective bargaining) and environmental standards (such 
as limitations on emissions) into the texts of trade agreements in the last two decades.
Trade unions in developed countries have long been concerned that trade 
liberalisation could result in a ‘race to the bottom’, where multinational companies are 
incentivised to seek out cheaper labour overseas, threatening jobs at home. Increased 
‘outsourcing’ of jobs in fields such as information technology and manufacturing in 
recent years seems to confirm this theory. Unions are also concerned that US and 
European companies will use the ‘race to the bottom’ as an excuse to behave badly. 
They fear that companies will pressurise governments to lower domestic labour 
standards and use outsourcing as a threat against unionised workforces to deter them 
from taking industrial action.
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Environmental campaigners take a similar stance. They argue that greater trade 
liberalisation without proper regulatory oversight will damage the environmental 
resources of rapidly growing states. They fear that companies will take advantage of 
lower environmental standards overseas in order to save money in the production 
process and avoid complying with what they often see as unnecessary red tape in 
developed countries. They also share the concerns of labour activists that the ability of 
multinational companies to move to countries where standards of regulation and 
enforcement are poor will put pressure on developed countries to compromise their 
standards in order to keep companies from leaving their shores. Both labour and 
environmental activists express concern that the WTO system places economic concerns 
above those of individual citizens, and even above the democratic process.
In order to explain how and why the EU and US have incorporated non-trade 
issues into their trade policy in the areas of labour and environmental standards, this 
chapter unpacks the forces at work at three different levels of interaction. In multilateral 
negotiations, I examine how and why the EU and US pushed for the inclusion of labour 
and environmental standards in WTO rules as part of their trade diplomacy efforts. 
Within each political system, I then explore the use of unilateral preference systems 
which link lower trade barriers for third parties with their performance on labour rights 
and the environment. Third, I describe how the two polities consulted with interest 
groups and how their policy stances changed as a result.
The rise and fall of the importance of the trade/labour/environment linkage at the 
international level reflects the changing dominance of the Democratic party in US 
politics. This emphasises the importance of Congressional and Presidential elections in 
determining and legitimising US trade policy: trade unions, in coalition with 
environmental groups, were able to access and put pressure on Democratic members of 
Congress and the President to change policy. This pressure disappeared under a 
Republican administration and reappeared when Congress came under Democratic 
control in 2006.
On 10th May 2007, congressional Democrats and the Republican administration 
reached a landmark agreement for American trade policy. In a deal intended to be a 
template for many future bilateral and multilateral agreements, the administration 
agreed to require trading partners to enforce provisions on labour and the environment. 
In return, negotiators hoped that the Democrats would not stand in the way of signing 
future bilateral agreements with priority countries -  particularly Columbia, Peru, 
Panama, and South Korea. The agreement was hailed by many as renewing bipartisan
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consensus in Congress on trade which had dissipated since the beginning of the Clinton 
administration. Some commentators welcomed the agreement, which contained the 
strongest text yet on labour and environmental standards. Trade unions, 
environmentalists and other NGOs were still unhappy with the deal, however, saying 
that it paid lip service to labour and the environment while paving the way for unfair 
trade agreements.
The EU, meanwhile, moved from shadowing US stances in the early 1990s to 
establishing its own unique take on trade policy that is as multifaceted and development 
oriented as its institutions: using ‘trade and’ issues to create a European policy model. 
This emphasises the decisions of Commission officials to consult a wide range of 
interest groups, not just business, during the decisionmaking process, in the hope that 
this would enhance the legitimacy of trade policy. Compared to the US focus on a small 
number of core labour rights and multilateral environmental agreements, the EU has 
chosen to frame these within a broader development and human rights agenda.
Multilateral Trade Negotiations
‘...this is what a southern delegate, clearly fed  up with the debate, had to say.
Quote, “I was recently in the United States strolling in a supermarket, when I  came 
across a can o f tuna labelled as 'Dolphin-Safe.' I  thought to myself, ” he said, “what 
about the godammed tuna, is it not lying dead in the can! Why doesn't anyone 
care! ” Needless to say the Committee realized that this was indeed a value-ridden 
debate. ’ -  Pascal Lamy, WTO Director-General, Yale University, October 2007.
Both the EU and US have incorporated labour and environmental issues into their trade 
diplomacy efforts since the creation of the WTO, attempting to get their domestic 
policies onto the global trade agenda. But while US positions have remained fairly 
consistent in multilateral negotiations, EU policy positions are much harder to predict. 
Europe’s trading partners often complain that EU decisionmaking is too slow, 
fragmented and contradictory. In trade/labour/environment debates, the EU follows this 
bargaining style: in two instances, the EU makes a seemingly sudden policy reversal, as 
the Commission struggles for free trade autonomy against member states. The pattern of 
US positions is much clearer, reflecting the stabilising factor of the USTR’s strong 
interagency authority and the strong pull of party politics: Democrats have advocated 
the inclusion of labour and environmental standards in the WTO, Republicans have not: 
‘there actually was a pretty dramatic change when the Democrats came to power in
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Congress [in 2006]...Congress basically told the administration that they wouldn't 
support those agreements unless the environment chapters and the Labour chapters were 
made more stringent.. .1 think the environment was provisions in those agreements are 
the strongest of any free trade agreement anywhere negotiated’ (State Department 
Official, May 2008).
The expansion of the international trade agenda was surprisingly slow before the 
creation of the WTO in 1995. Although environmental issues did have an effect on 
WTO negotiations as early as the Tokyo round (1973-1979) as part of discussions on 
‘Technical Barriers to Trade’ (TBTs), it was not until the late 1980s that trade and 
environmental issues were explicitly linked. In 1987, the Brundtland Report (Our 
Common Future) was published by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development. The report used the term ‘sustainable development’ for the first time, 
advocating policy solutions that put economic and environmental issues on an equal 
footing.
It was not long before this new linkage affected the multilateral trade agenda. In 
1991, the ‘Tuna-Dolphin’24 dispute between the US and Mexico put environmental 
issues firmly on the international agenda. Mexico launched a complaint under the 
GATT against a US decision to ban imported tuna that had been caught with a certain 
type of net thought to kill dolphins. The US argued that fishing for tuna with such nets 
contravened the 1972 Marine Mammal Protection Act, which prohibited the harassment, 
hunting, killing and importation of marine mammals into the United States. A dispute 
settlement panel ruled in favour of Mexico, concluding that a) the US could not ban 
tuna imports from Mexico because Mexican regulations on the way tuna was produced 
did not satisfy US regulations, and b) that the GATT did not allow for one WTO 
member country to enforce its domestic rules on another. Although the ruling was not 
formally adopted as part of the GATT, environmentalists in the US were horrified with 
the decision, which they saw as fundamentally undermining US environmental 
regulations; they began to pay much greater attention to trade issues. A second case on 
the same issue in 1994, nicknamed ‘Son of Tuna-Dolphin’, made sure that the WTO’s 
potential environmental role remained high profile25.
By 1994, the Marrakesh agreement- the blueprint for the WTO- contained 
environmental language, with the preamble referring to the need for sustainable
24 ‘United States- Restrictions on Imports of Tuna’, panel report, circulated 3rd September 1991. The 
decision was not adopted. This means that the ruling does not legally form part of the GATT. The US and 
Mexico essentially ‘settled out of court’. See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis04_e.htm.
25 ‘United States- Restrictions on Imports of Tuna’, panel report circulated 16 June 1994. The case was 
this time brought by the EU, but again the report was not adopted.
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development and environmental protections. The WTO’s environmental committee was 
created one year later. Under current WTO rules, states can adopt environmental 
regulations providing they are not discriminatory, in other words, as long as they 
comply with the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle and treat all WTO member 
states alike. As a result, environmental policies are still fashionable. The recent 
emphasis on climate change and carbon trading systems has brought trade and 
environmental issues back into the limelight. By contrast, Labour standards have never 
been fashionable and were treated very differently by the international system.
Labour standards were discussed in the context of the 1994 Marrakesh 
Agreement, but no consensus was possible on their inclusion. The US and the EU were 
powerful supporters of labour standards at this time, but strong opposition from 
developing countries prevented an agreement. These countries saw the proposal as a 
thoroughly protectionist attempt to take away one of their few advantages -  cheap 
labour. In 1995, the World Summit for Social Development held in Copenhagen 
indentified a set of internationally recognised ‘core’ labour standards, keeping the issue 
on the WTO’s horizon. The issue was taken up again at the first WTO ministerial in 
Singapore in 1996, but again, developing countries fiercely opposed US and EU support 
for labour standards. The 1996 Singapore ministerial declaration made it quite clear that 
the majority of WTO members were not very keen to take on any responsibility for 
enforcing core labour standards:
‘The International Labour Organization (ILO) is the competent body to set and 
deal with [labour] standards, and we affirm our support for its work in promoting 
them. We believe that economic growth and development fostered by increased 
trade and further trade liberalization contribute to the promotion o f these 
standards. We reject the use o f labour standards for protectionist purposes, and 
agree that the comparative advantage o f countries, particularly low-wage 
developing countries, must in no way be put into question' (WTO 2003).
Although the declaration put some pressure on the ILO to adopt its own 
declaration on fundamental labour rights, something it did in 1998 (Barton et al.
2006:190), this was not the result that the EU and US were hoping for. At the 
controversial 1999 Seattle ministerial meeting, the US, EU, and Canada called for 
inclusion of labour standards one final time: the US proposed a WTO trade and labour 
working group, the EU favoured a joint ILO/WTO forum, and Canada proposed a WTO 
working group to discuss the appropriate relationships between trade, development, 
social policy, and the environment (OECD 2000:11). As discussed in Chapter 2 above, 
the Seattle conference was a disaster for the new trade round. While civil society groups
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voiced their dissent outside the conference, the insistence of industrialised countries on 
forcing labour standards onto the agenda hastened its collapse from within.
In 2000, the momentum behind international labour standards dissipated. The 
Democratic administration in the US made way for a new Republican president, and 
labour and environmental standards in trade agreements were not part of President 
Bush’s agenda. This left the EU alone to defend the labour/environmental platform: 
rather than continue in the shadow of the US, EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy 
began to reorient European policy towards development issues (Van den Hoven 2004, 
See Chapter 5 below).
In the EU, the decision to support labour standards was made at the elite level, 
with little domestic lobbying. In January 1994, Leon Brittan, then trade commissioner, 
states firmly that the EU will not address labour standards in its trade agreements. Only 
a few months later, he stages a mysterious turnaround, announcing that the standards 
will be incorporated. Under pressure from France and US negotiators, the EU 
dramatically changed its policy within a few months. These two statements, attributed to 
Sir Leon Brittan as European Trade Commissioner, illustrate Europe’s embarrassing 
switchback. His strong opposition to Clinton’s trade agenda in January 1994 turns into 
support by March of that same year:
‘Europe's trade chief rebuffed President Bill Clinton's new trade agenda on 
Monday, saying that attempts to impose environmental and labor standards on 
developing countries could be merely a "disguised form o f protection." Sir Leon 
Brittan, the trade commissioner for the European Union, essentially dismissed Mr. 
Clinton's call to export the developed nations' higher labor standards as 
unworkable and unfair ’ (Buerkle 1994).
'Sir Leon Brittan, the European trade commissioner, called yesterday for workers' 
rights to be placed on the agenda o f the planned World Trade Organisation...Sir 
Leon's statement, which was broadly endorsed by fellow commissioners, follows US 
demands that human and social rights be made a WTO priority. It coincided with 
an apparent softening in the position o f France, which has favoured vigorous 
international measures to combat 'social dumping'...Sir Leon's remarks were 
noticeably more positive than his earlier stance, which appeared cool to US 
proposals for an early debate on workers' rights in the WTO ' (De Jonquieres and 
Buchan 1994).
As explained in Chapter 2 above, Brittan’s sudden change of heart was due partly to 
changing political realities and partly to his definition of core labour standards, which 
was focussed on narrow, fundamental human rights. The introduction of labour 
standards in EU trade agreements was thus initiated by governments and international 
organizations rather than by distinct pressure from below in the form of interest group
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lobbying. The EU also campaigned heavily to get environmental issues into the Doha 
round of negotiations, and officials are keen to point out this fact. The EU called for 
regulatory agreements in the WTO in investment, competition, environment, and 
labour- attempting to put ‘regulatory issues’ at the core of the Doha round (De Bievre 
2006).
Support for a ‘deep trade’ agenda in multilateral negotiations lasted until late 
2006, when another sudden change of tactics took place. By the publication of the 
‘Global Europe’ strategy in October 2006, this emphasis had faded. From the viewpoint 
of several civil society groups, Global Europe seems to be focussed not just on 
deregulation abroad, but also emphasises a need for internal deregulation. It is ‘very 
aggressive in [terms of] deregulation commitments by the EU’s trade partner countries, 
and in terms of access to natural resources in developing countries...also it has an 
internal agenda because it says that EU industry will have to adapt to more competition 
and so there's a also a lot of internal deregulation imperatives.. .It is leaving aside the 
whole question about sustainability and poverty eradication.. .which was in a way 
somehow discussed in previous communications by the Commission’ (Environmental 
NGO Representative, Brussels, November 2006). John Monks, General Secretary of the 
European Trade Union Confederation, showed dismay at inability of developed and 
developing countries to compromise on this issue, stating, ‘I do not know how we are 
going to get around this problem unless there is a concerted effort between the United 
States and the European Union to do so. And at the moment, the will to do so is lacking, 
not just in the Bush administration but in many EU capitals too’.
So under pressure from member state governments, DG Trade’s autonomy can 
be swiftly curtailed. On January 21st 2008, just two days before the much anticipated 
announcement of new Emissions Trading System (ETS) targets for EU member states, 
Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso announced plans to level the playing field 
for European companies by either giving them ETS allowances free of charge or by 
requiring ‘importers to obtain allowances alongside European competitors, as long as 
such a system is compatible with WTO requirements’ (Barroso, press conference, 
Lehman Brothers, London, 21st January 2008). Countries who had not signed up to 
strong carbon reduction targets would effectively be penalised. On the same day, 
Mandelson and Schwab completed bilateral talks on a number of issues of contention, 
including climate change. The remarks given by Mandelson did not chime with those of 
Barroso:
26 John Monks, General Secretary of the ETUC, LSE, Oct 2007
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‘I  don’t believe that trade restrictions are the way forward in combating climate 
change. They’re not cost efficient, they carry a risk o f retaliation, and they would 
result in increasing costs to European industry at large,2?
Facing strong pressure from the French government and German industry, Barroso had 
overruled Mandelson’s attempts to bury the policy. Reactions from American 
negotiators to the EU’s announcement were thoroughly negative, with Schwab 
‘dismayed at a variety of suggestions where we see climate or the environment being 
used as an excuse to close markets’28. One USTR official explains:
'The relationship between the various [Commission] directorates -in particular 
trade and environment- is perhaps not as integrated as it is in the US. So we think 
that there are things that DG Environment is doing that DG Trade is not fully 
supportive of, there isn’t the type o f integrated decisionmaking that there is here. 
They probably think that there are things that USTR is doing that EPA 
[Environmental Protection Agency] doesn't agree with. That is to some extent true 
but it seems much more a US government position than either an EPA or a USTR 
position’ (USTR Official, Washington DC, June 2007).
Preference Systems in Bilateral and Regional Agreements
At different periods in their recent histories, both the US and EU have used labour and 
environmental standards as part of trade preferences granted unilaterally to their trading 
partners. This section shows how these standards can be used as carrots and sticks- as 
positive and negative incentives to certain types of behaviour among trading partners. 
Either better trade preferences are given to those enacting certain domestic policies, or 
trade preferences are withdrawn from countries who don’t conform to those policies.
US Preference Programmes
The exact definition of ‘labour and environmental standards’ varies by trade agreement. 
Most commonly, provisions are based around ‘internationally recognised core labour 
standards’, a set of key principles administered by the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO). There are eight relevant ILO conventions, covering forced labour (Convention 
no. 29), freedom of association (87), right to organise and collective bargaining (98), 
equal remuneration (100), abolition of forced labour (105), non-discrimination in 
employment and occupation (111), minimum wage (138), and the worst forms of child
27 Peter Mandelson, press conference, Brussels, 21st January 2008
28 Susan Schwab, press conference, Brussels, 21st January 2008
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labour (182). Occasionally, however, agreements provide for the trading partner’s own 
domestic labour standards to be effectively enforced. In the US, which is not a signatory 
to the ILO conventions, labour provisions in bilateral agreements aim to mimic the 
ILO’s values while skirting around the precise wording29.
US trade unions were requesting links between a country’s labour protections 
and its trade privileges as far back as 1974. The introduction of the Generalized System
'J A
of Preferences (GSP) was the trigger for this strategy . Dealing directly with the 
administration (specifically the USTR) in tight relationships with officials drawing up 
the GSP, AFL-CIO officers were able to make strong policy recommendations on the 
granting or withdrawal of trade preferences to developing countries (Trade Union 
Representative, Washington DC, June 2007). The GSP included a variety of eligibility 
conditions, including: ‘whether or not such country has taken or is taking steps to afford 
to workers in that country (including any designated zone in that country) 
internationally recognized worker rights’. It is interesting that at this point the language 
is ‘worker rights’ and not ‘labour standards’. Initially, labour officials hoped that US 
trading partners would be able to use dispute mechanisms in trade agreements against 
the US and force it to adopt higher standards (Trade Union Representative, Washington 
DC, June 2007).
The aggressive lobbying that accompanies attempts to put these standards in 
trade agreements has resulted in a continuum of different texts (State Department 
Official, May 2008; Think Tank Representative, Washington DC, June 2007). Standards 
vary from agreement to agreement, depending on the strength of interest group lobbying 
and the power of Congress to impose its will rather than a comprehensive policy from 
the administration. The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC, 
signed 1993) was a side agreement of NAFTA, and only required the enforcement of 
‘high labour standards’ but included a robust dispute mechanism. The US-Jordan FTA 
signed in 2000 had labour provisions in the main text of the agreement, but with 
enforcement language so weak as to render its effect on labour standards negligible. The 
US-Singapore and US-Chile FT As signed in 2003 introduced an annual ($15 million) 
fine, but returned to NAALC-level requirements for evidence: labour violations had to 
be ‘sustained’ over a period of time to incur a fine. Other bilateral deals, such as the US- 
Cambodia textile agreement (Article 10D), contained a far simpler trade off: US offered
29 One reason for this is that ILO provisions on forced labour conflict with the US policy of assigning 
manual labour to prisoners.
30 Authorized under the Trade Act of 1974, initialized January 1, 1976.
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a 14% increase in textile quota if the Cambodia textiles sector complied with local law 
and internationally recognised standards.
The May 2007 bilateral agreements -with Peru, Panama, Columbia and Korea- 
have stronger language on labour standards in the core of the agreement, with 
Democrats seeking to improve on the perceived failure of the US-Jordan and Singapore 
FT As (Elliott 2003; Kryvoi 2007; Hepple 2005). Other issues such as government 
procurement were ‘related to the Labour standards issue...ensuring that state and local 
governments can consider Labour standards in government procurement contracts and 
that they wouldn't run afoul of their [WTO Government Procurement Agreement] 
obligations’ (Congressional Staffer, Washington DC, May 2008).
International environmental standards in trade agreements are taken from 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs). The current US provisions, included 
in the 2007 US-Central American FTAs are listed in box 4.1 below. Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements are more easily agreed upon and incorporated into global 
trade agreements than labour standards, but are comparatively narrow in scope. Unlike 
the EU, the US does not include agreements addressing climate change. As with labour 
standards, environmental provisions in the May 2007 deal also built on past agreements: 
signatory countries must adopt the listed agreements, they are prohibited from lowering 
their domestic environmental standards, and there is an additional provision to add new 
common ME As to those listed. The Peru FT A also includes requirements to cut down 
on illegal logging (Think Tank Representative, Washington DC, June 2007).
The US approach to GSP preferences uses formal legal rules and focuses on 
negative sanctions. In the first decade of the GSP system, over 100 cases concerning 
violation of labour laws were submitted to the USTR for review, mainly by the AFL- 
CIO, but sometimes in conjunction with human rights NGOs. As one trade negotiator 
put it, interest groups ‘always wanted to know “how will we punish these countries?’” . 
On two occasions after CAFTA was signed, signatory countries changed their labour 
laws and the US ‘had to get them to change their laws back’ (Trade Negotiator, 
Washington DC, June 2007).
Although the US approach tends to be heavy on the ‘stick’, there is also some 
‘carrot’. The US provided a total of $1.34 billion for trade capacity building (TCB) 
initiatives in 2005. This included $87,695,235 to promote ‘Human Resources and Labor 
Standards’ and $29,287,153 for ‘Environmental Trade and Standards’ (Bureau of 
International Labor Affairs, Office of Foreign Relations). TCB funding aims to 
‘strengthen the rule of labor law, build efficient and responsive labor markets, address
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HIV/AIDS through workplace prevention, and reduce the incidence of the worst forms 
of child labor’. Environmental protection is promoted through ‘programs that enforce 
domestic environmental laws and regulations and encourage citizen participation in 
environmental decision making’. Activities to ‘increase compliance’ include a web site 
on national labour laws, stronger inspection of the Ministry of Labor, enhanced 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and improving public awareness of labour 
obligations in trade agreements (USAID 2005).
Box 4.1: Labour and Environmental Components of the Bilateral Deal, 10th May 2007
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up (1998):
Freedom of association
The effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining 
The elimination of all forms of compulsory or forced labour 
The effective abolition of child labour and, for purposes of this Agreement, 
a prohibition on the worst forms of child labour
The elimination of discrimination in respect of employee and occupation 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission 
Source: Chapter 18, Peru FT A, as accessed from Trade Subcommittee Web Site, May 2007
The Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) created a Labor 
Cooperation and Capacity Building Mechanism (Annex 16.5) but leaves the question of 
capacity assistance in this area entirely up to the parties themselves. Funding for the 
mechanism has not been consistent, totalling $20 million in FY2002, $40 million in 
FY2003, and $20 million in FY2005. US labour activists look at past USTR funding for 
cooperation efforts and worry that poor capacity building efforts will render the 2007 
Colombia FTA ineffective in tackling violence against union organisers. For example, 
$40 million was provided to Guatemala to improve the efficiency of its labor ministry, 
but this had little effect upon the rate at which labour organizers are victims of violence 
in Guatemala (Rosenberg 2007).
EU Preference Programmes
Non-trade issues have long been included in EU trade preference programmes. The EU 
introduced its GSP system in 1971, five years before the United States. In 1989, the
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fourth Lome convention (a cooperation agreement negotiated between the EU and ACP 
countries) introduced human rights as an ‘essential elem ent’ of the agreement, while 
introducing environmental concerns through a protocol that allowed the EU to call on 
money from the 8th EDF budget (1995-2000) to support ACP countries in protecting 
their rainforests. Lome’s successor, the Cotonou agreement went further, introducing 
co-operation in the areas of labour and environmental standards- but in the strong EU 
tradition of issue linkage, even incorporated these aspects into the GSP on drug 
trafficking (Panagariya 2002:1423).
The experiences of reconciling social, environmental and economic goals during 
the consolidation of the single market and enlargement of the EU ’s membership were 
good preparation for incorporating environmental, social, and developmental goals into 
trade agreements. In 2006, the ‘GSP Plus’ initiative took the EU ’s existing GSP further, 
linking a state’s environmental regulation, human rights record and level of 
development with preferential tariff concessions. Under GSP Plus, developing countries 
‘have to ratify and implement 27 international conventions’ (Box 4.2). As this list 
shows, the EU ’s GSP Plus preferences are both more ambitious and ambiguous. This 
holistic tendency reflects treaty requirements for ‘coherence’ and ‘cohesiveness’. It also 
augments Commission authority in relation to that of member states, as only the 
Commission can play a coordinating role.
Box 4.2: ‘Conventions to be ratified and implemented’ under GSP Plus
Human & Labour Rights
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Convention on the Rights of the Child
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment
Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of 
Child Labour
Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour 
Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour
Convention concerning Equal Remuneration of Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value 
Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation
Convention concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively 
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid
Environment & Good Governance
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora_______________________
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Convention on Biological Diversity 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961)
United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971)
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988) 
United Nations Convention against Corruption (Mexico)
Source: European Commission, ‘Is GSP+ an alternative to an Economic Partnership Agreement?’, Brussels, 
September 27th 2007
Unlike US preference programmes, the EU’s policy contains quite a lot of 
‘carrot’ and not much ‘stick’. European Council Conclusions of October 1999 agreed 
that the EU should strongly support protection of core labour ‘rights’ in trade 
agreements and supported enhanced cooperation between the WTO and ILO, but was 
firmly against ‘sanctions-based approaches’. In 2001, the Commission added, ‘growing 
public interest [in this issue] is based on recognition of the universality of core labour 
standards, and does not aim to put into question the comparative advantage of low-wage 
developing countries’ (European Commission 2001b).
The EU approach to capacity building is to sign large-scale, long-term 
‘cooperation’ agreements. Signed in 2000, Article 50 of the Cotonou Agreement 
referred to ‘enhanced cooperation’ on trade and labour policy, including better 
information exchange, new and stronger national legislation, education and awareness 
programmes, and better enforcement of existing measures. Article 49 of the agreement 
commits the parties to ‘promoting the development of international trade in such a way 
as to ensure sustainable and sound management of the environment’. For example, the 
EU agreed a 7-year cooperation strategy with Chile in May 2007. The agreement 
focuses on funding for social cohesion projects, educational exchanges and 
scholarships, and innovation and competitiveness, including ‘the environment and 
sectors that facilitate trade with the EU in fields such as standardisation, technical 
regulations and conformity assessment procedures, trade-related intellectual property 
rights (IPR) and sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS)’.
European trade/labour/environment standards are also less likely to be enforced 
than their American counterparts. The EU has only denied special trade preferences on 
the grounds of labour practices on two occasions: against Myanmar in 1997, and against 
Belarus in 2006. These two cases were raised by the International Trade Union 
Confederation (ITUC) in conjunction with the ETUC and in close collaboration with the 
ILO. A third case, that of Pakistan (ITUC/ETUC complaint submitted in 1995), was a 
near miss, as member states were reluctant to launch an investigation against the
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country. Instead of trade restrictions, Pakistan received aid.
On 21st December 2005, the EU granted preferences under the GSP Plus system 
to 15 countries: Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Georgia, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Moldova, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Sri Lanka and 
Venezuela31. This was widely condemned by European and international labour 
organizations, with the ETUC stating that the decision showed ‘serious incoherence in 
the EU’s stated policy of using positive incentives to get its trading partners to respect 
workers’ rights’, pointing out that each of the 15 countries had been criticised by the 
ILO in the past for a poor record of labour standards (ETUC 2005).
Interest Groups
A New Issue Linkage: Interest Groups in the US
In the last two decades US organised labour and environmental groups formed a strong 
alliance to campaign on trade. Since negotiations on NAFTA (the North American Free 
Trade Agreement) began, interest groups have demanded that worker rights and 
environmental protections should be included in the texts of trade agreements passed by 
Congress. After over a decade of NAFTA, influences on trade policy have become 
much more diverse, including not just labour and environmental groups, but also actors 
on both sides of the debate concerned about health, peace, security and the promotion of 
democracy abroad. Such alliances can be mutually beneficial. Labour cooperates in 
order to gain increased political coverage whilst Environmental groups cooperate in 
exchange for access to increased funding. Negotiations became decreasingly a ‘matter 
of balancing producer interests and more a public contest of competing social values’ 
(Destler and Balint 1999:46).
These campaigners, as part of the ‘blue-green’ alliance (blue for blue collar 
workers, green for environmentalists) argue that rapid economic development without 
adequate checks on natural resources and urbanisation damages the environment in 
developing countries, just as rapid development using child, forced, or underpaid labour 
harms the welfare of the poorest in society. They argue that in a globalised world where 
capital can move swiftly, a lack of labour and environmental regulations in developing 
countries places pressure on developed country governments to curb such regulations.
31 Council Regulation (EC) No 980/2005 of 27 June 2005, Applying a Scheme o f Generalized Tariff 
Preferences.
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When asked to what extent their own members would be able to articulate the policy 
concerns of the ‘other side’, both environmentalists and labour officials were fairly 
confident that their members possessed a fairly good knowledge of the positions of 
other members of the coalition and had become increasingly articulate since the 
NAFTA battles (Environmental NGO Representative, 2 Trade Union Representatives, 
Washington DC, June 2007).
As early as 1988, American labour and environmental activists were producing 
jointly sponsored reports labelled with the symbols of both groups (Environmental 
NGO Representative, Trade Union Representative, Washington DC, June 2007). 
Describing the practice of running a string of Maquiladoras along the US-Mexican 
border as a ‘flight from US regulation’, the report alternates chapters outlining 
inadequate worker protections with examinations of poor environmental standards 
(Kochan 1988). As late as 2006, this alliance was still strong: the Sierra Club and the 
United Steelworkers announced a formalised ‘blue-green’ alliance in June 2006 to 
coordinate activities such as a campaign on logging in Indonesia. The alliance operates 
under the slogan ‘Good Jobs, A Cleaner Environment, A Safer World’ (Blue Green 
Alliance 2006), which echoes earlier sentiments of the labour/environmental movement. 
A decade earlier, the AFL-CIO used the slogan ‘Jobs, Growth, Worker Rights, Clean 
Earth’ for a similar campaign (Anderson 1996).
Figure 4.3 shows the peaks of interest in incorporating labour and environmental 
standards in trade agreements around the time of the finalisation of NAFTA in 1993, 
and the Seattle WTO Ministerial meeting in 1999. These peaks largely coincide with the 
peaks of labour and environmental NGO mobilization: over NAFTA between 1991- 
1994, around the Battle of Seattle in 1999, and in during the Congressional elections in 
2006. One American labour representative who has worked on this issue for two 
decades, thought that European trade unions did not have to fight as hard on trade issues 
as their American counterparts because they needed to be less combative in general. In 
the US unions have to fight hard even when the Democrats are in power. In Europe, 
unions are closer to national governments, and have more stable relationships with 
private companies. Congress and the European Parliament work very differently, so 
have less traction there (Trade Union Representative, Washington DC, June 2007).
Environmental groups suffered a damaging split over NAFTA. Some groups, 
used to good access as lobbying ‘insiders’, felt that economic and environmental 
concerns could be compatible. Other groups were much more firmly anti-establishment 
and grassroots driven. They opposed NAFTA strongly from the start. After NAFTA
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was passed, many mainstream groups felt dissatisfied with the weakness of the 
environmental side agreement and began to take a position closer to the outright 
opposition of outsider groups. After gaining little from their compromise (a fast-track 
renewal proposal with added environmental language was soon withdrawn) many 
groups felt betrayed by the administration (Destler and Balint 1999: 30-32).
Figure 4.3: Financial Times & Economist Articles Containing all of the Words 
‘Trade’, ‘Labour’ and ‘Environment’
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S o u r c e :  L e x i s N e x i s ,  F i n a n c i a l  T i m e s  a n d  E c o n o m i s t  a r c h i v e s
US trade unions are economically weak but politically strong. The US has 
several declining, labour intensive industries, including textiles and automobile 
manufacturing. In addition, the steel, lumber, automobile and semiconductor industries 
are highly concentrated, making them particularly sensitive to changing trade patterns 
(Krueger 1996). America’s level of organisation is lower than that of almost any other 
developed country, and its unions have never been the focus of a political party (Lipset 
and Marks 2000). The number of blue-collar unionized workers in the US 
manufacturing sector declined by 63 per cent between 1977 and 1997 (Baldwin 2003). 
We might expect that American unions would be less left-wing than their European 
counterparts, often supporting conservative viewpoints and sometimes Republican 
candidates and administrations.
However, American unions have a considerable influence on Congress and so 
play a pivotal role in determining trade policy. In the 2006 Congressional elections, all 
of the 47 Democratic freshmen elected had received campaign donations from trade
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unions. For 41 of those Democratic freshmen, labour contributions made up a third or 
more of their campaign funding; 8 of them received over half of their money from trade 
unions. Labour support was considerably partisan- of the six Republicans that received 
support, none received more than 5% of their funding from labour32. In an increasingly 
divided electoral climate, unions have definitely picked sides.
Environmentalists also currently give more to Democrats than to Republicans. In 
2006, they donated ‘$1.2 million to federal candidates and party committees, 86 percent 
of which went to Democrats’. In recent years, at least one big environmental NGO, the 
Sierra Club, has elected to give less money to candidates and spend more issue ads 
(Center for Responsive Politics 2006). Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show lobbying expenditures 
for the largest environmental NGOs and trade unions from 1999-2007.
Figure 4.4: Lobbying Expenditure, Top Spending Environmental NGOs 
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32 Author’s own calculations, from data compiled by the Center for Responsive Politics, available at 
www.opensecrets.org.
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Figure 4.5: Lobbying Expenditure, AFL-CIO
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The system of trade advisory committees established under the Trade Act of 
1974 reflects the different patterns of interest group opportunity that coincide with the 
state of the parties. There are approximately thirty trade advisory committees (TACs) 
with over 700 members, overseen by the departments of labour, agriculture, commerce 
and the EPA as well as the USTR. Members of the Committees are appointed jointly by 
the USTR and the Secretary of the relevant department for two years but can be 
reappointed. There is no payment, and travel is not compensated, unlike in similar EU 
consultative committees. All members must have Department of Commerce security 
clearance up to SECRET level. This reflects a key trade off: groups are allowed access 
to more detailed information about USTR negotiations, but must keep this secret. The 
USTR is then able to flag up policy issues without revealing their bottom line in 
negotiations. The administration is very careful about who can access this information:
‘I n t e r v i e w e r :  H o w  d o  y o u  d e c i d e  w h o  i s  g o i n g  t o  b e  o n  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  T P  A C  
[ T r a d e  P o l i c y  A d v i s o r y  C o m m i t t e e ]  ?
I n t e r v i e w e e :  I  d o n ’ t .  T h e y  m a y  b e  p r e s i d e n t i a l l y  a p p o i n t e d  o r  t h e  m e m b e r s  m a y  b e  
a p p o i n t e d  b y  t h e  U S T R ,  t h e r e ' s  o u r  p u b l i c  l i a i s o n  o f f i c e  a t  U S T R  a n d  o t h e r s  w h o  
m a k e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  t o  t h a t  o f f i c e  a b o u t  p e o p l e  t h a t  w e  t h i n k  w o u l d  c o n t r i b u t e  
t o  t h e  w o r k  o f  T P  A C .  S o  t h e y  m a k e  t h e  d e c i s i o n s .  I  k n o w  t h a t  t h e r e ' s  a  v e t t i n g  
p r o c e s s  - 1  s u s p e c t  i t  i n c l u d e s  t h e  W h i t e  H o u s e  b u t  P m  j u s t  n o t  s u r e .  I  s u s p e c t  t h a t  
y o u ' r e  n o t  g e t t i n g  a  l o t  o f  p e o p l e  w i l l i n g  t o  b e  v e r y  s p e c i f i c  a b o u t  i t  - 1  c a n ’t  b e !  ’ 
( U S T R  O f f i c i a l ,  W a s h i n g t o n  D C ,  J u n e  2 0 0 7 ) .
Although trade and environment and trade and labour have one dedicated committee
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each, the balance of representation on these committees does not always reflect what 
activists want. In 2006, there were more representatives for the sweetener industry (27) 
than environmental activists (TEPAC had 26 members total, including representatives 
from 4 law firms, 4 policy think tanks, 3 business groups, and the Consumers Union, 
but only 10 NGOs whose main goal is environmental protection). In the early years of 
the Bush administration, the Labour Trade Advisory Committee included a union local 
representative and other Republican unionists, while the President of the AFL-CIO was 
denied membership (AFL-CIO official, May 2007).
Divide and Consult: Interest Groups in the EU
‘The Union is changing.. .It will no longer be judged solely by its ability to remove 
barriers to trade or to complete an internal market; its legitimacy today depends on 
involvement and participation. This means that the linear model o f dispensing 
policies from above must be replaced by a virtuous circle, based on feedback, 
networks and involvement from policy creation to implementation at all levels ’ 
(European Commission 2001a: 12).
When it comes to ‘trade and’ policies, some countries use both carrots and sticks, but 
others are mostly carrot, ‘based on confidence-building aimed at raising awareness and 
persuading the trade partner of the importance of dealing with environmental issues’. 
The EU favours a cooperation and capacity building approach (OECD 2007), that rests 
broadly on a policy of consultation with key stakeholders, mainly through dialogue with 
civil society, and assessment of the impacts of future trade agreements.
Of course, in reality, the Commission’s ‘virtuous circle’ is far from perfect. 
Informal lobbying activity in Europe benefits those with the most resources, and is far 
less transparent than American interest group activity. While the EU’s consultative fora 
are good for information sharing and have at least brought diffuse groups into the trade 
policymaking process, they provide information to the groups, not power.
The environment was not mentioned in the Treaty of Rome but the EC 
developed environmental policy anyway- over one hundred environmental directives by 
the 1970s to mid 1980s. Article 100A of the Single European Act recognised the 
environment as an EU competence. Article 130R of the Single European Act states that 
‘environmental protections shall be a component of the Community’s other policies’, 
paving the way for links between environmental policy and the internal market (Vogel 
1995:60). From this viewpoint, incorporating environmental protections into 
international trade agreements seems a natural progression.
Despite this strong regulatory framework, the pattern of interest groups is quite
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distinct in the EU. Trade unions have historically been viewed as weak at the European 
level despite their national strength (Wallace and Young 1997; Greenwood 2007). The 
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), the main Europe-wide labour 
organisation, has been blamed for being too dependent on the Commission, too close to 
the socialist bloc in the European Parliament, and too accepting of the internal market. 
One theory is that if a group is strong at the national level, it will not seek an alternative 
arena in Europe. Approaches to labour are very different in each EU member state. The 
differences between Germanic, English-speaking and Southern attitudes to organised 
labour have led to significant differences of opinion at the EU level. On top of that, 
union membership has declined in a majority of European countries in at least the last 
two decades.
Tsogas (2000) claims that while in the US, labour organizations have taken 
advantage of the new GSP arrangements to promote labour internationalism, European 
trade unions have not reacted in a similar way and remain preoccupied with other 
issues. Tsogas gives three reasons for this: that labour standards in the EU were 
introduced in an era that was ‘less ideologically charged, and with totally different 
campaigning priorities for trade unions and NGOs’; that the EU labour movement was 
already fairly internationalized, but still rooted in Europe; and that EU trade with 
developing countries (especially in the industrial sectors which are most controversial in 
terms of labour standards) has been ‘much less than that of the USA’. In the US, there is 
a ‘lack of a developmental perspective’ in terms of labour standards and trade, meaning 
that there are fewer links with distributional aid policies (Tsogas 2000: 363). Stillerman 
(Stillerman 2003:596) argues that ‘because states have developed their capacity to take 
wages out of the market by bargaining with state actors at the national level, and 
because states utilized unions to carry out their foreign policy goals during the Cold 
War, unions and labor activists have had considerable difficulty “going global” whereas 
human rights or environmental organizations have had less difficulty in this area’.
EU environmental groups, meanwhile, ‘are highly capable of engaging policy­
making at a scientific level, drawing upon EU policy offices which are among the best 
staffed of citizen interest groups, a highly committed network of volunteers, and in the 
cases of Greenpeace, WWF and Friends of the Earth, the resources of global 
movements’ (Greenwood 2007:130). They are also highly institutionalised, getting 
funding from the EU commission. Between 1999 and 2003, the European 
Commission’s DG Trade provided funding for projects carried out by the International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, the United Nations Environmental
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Program, European Partners for the Environment and the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development. After 2003, however, this environmental emphasis drops 
away in favour of groups promoting development as Commissioner Pascal Lamy 
separates the EU’s agenda from that of the US (see Chapter 5 below).
One interviewee from an environmental NGO described this disparity in terms 
of ‘good cops and bad cops’, organisations that consider their role to be one of giving 
expert advice, gathering evidence, creating a reputation and making specific policy 
requests versus those who see their role as challenging the system and changing the axis 
of trade policy. The major environmental NGOs were put firmly in the first camp 
(Environmental NGO Representative, Brussels, November 2006). In other words, in the 
EU, environmentalists had no reason to form a lasting alliance with trade unions. 
Although NGOs and Trade Unions in the EU did work together briefly, the relationship 
got a bit uncomfortable. The NGOs thought that the unions were ‘crashing their party’ 
and so the relationship dissolved (Greenwood 2007).
The DG Trade Civil Society Dialogue was launched in 1999, pre-empting the 
Commission’s 2001 white paper on governance, and DG Trade’s dialogue is widely 
regarded in the EU as an example of good practice in this area. Other DGs, and even 
other countries (Canadian trade negotiators are said to have paid a visit to see the 
dialogue in action - Environmental NGO Representative, Brussels, November 2006) are 
interested in this new form of trade politics. As of September 2006, there were 657 
organisations registered on the DG Trade Civil Society database, including 144 business 
associations, 59 organisations promoting environmental protection, and 30 trade unions 
(Jarman 2008:28).
The Commission is very keen to bolster its legitimacy by incorporating groups 
into its decisionmaking that more closely represent the sections of society affected by 
the new trade politics (Commission official, Brussels, November 2006; Meunier 2003). 
Whether the dialogue is representative or not, the Commission realises that 
incorporating these groups is a way to make its own life easier. Incorporating them into 
the dialogue gives the Commission an opportunity to gather and disseminate vital 
information, and even to pit groups against each other.
Brian Hocking (2004) explains that this new consultation attempts to solve three 
deficits within the system: deficits of legitimacy, access, and knowledge. From this 
viewpoint, the dialogue can be seen as a bargain between the Commission and interest 
groups in which the Commission seeks greater legitimacy for its actions, while interest 
groups seek better access to policymakers. One environmentalist described drafting
108 of 204
legislation regarding genetically modified food and sifting evidence from GMO field 
trials, as well as informing officials of their partnership with the renewable energy 
industry.
‘what's funny is that regularly business associations claim that NGOs are actually 
more powerful than themselves because we do a lot o f public demonstrations, 
public events...Last time I  went to these meetings there was this guy from UNICE 
and he said “As business we were outnumbered 10 to one. There were 10 times 
more NGOs than business associations ” so we started this discussion on that and 
they are really convinced that we have more influence than them. But we think the 
opposite. Because I  think what happens publicly is just a percentage o f what is 
actually happening with the lobbying’ (Environmental NGO Representative, 
Brussels, November 2006).
One Commission official recounted that at first, civil society groups ‘did not know how 
to act’ in meetings with officials, resulting in dull briefings where NGOs read pre­
prepared statements. Eventually, the process moved on from ‘set piece’ meetings, 
breaking up into smaller groups, and more progress was made. NGOs began to take the 
initiative, making more ‘creative contacts’ with officials. Environmental NGOs, for 
example,
‘came to us and said “our analysis has focussed on the environment but we have 
become aware o f the need to look at social and economic factors. ” So we are now 
working on an integrated approach. This was the direct cause ofDG Trade 
developing Sustainability Impact Assessments ’ (Commission Official, London, 
September 2006).
Sustainability Impact Assessments (SIAs) must be carried out before a trade 
agreement is completed to assess its environmental and developmental impact. The 
‘three pillar’ impact assessment approach (economic, environmental, social) was based 
upon the Integrated Impact Assessment (DA) model introduced in 2002, which applies 
to the negotiating guidelines for international agreements as well as regulatory 
measures. The ‘economic’ pillar assesses the likely impact of an agreement on 
economic growth and competitiveness, administrative burdens to business and 
government, the potential for innovation and development, investment, among other 
economic factors. The ‘environmental’ pillar is broader, assessing potential impacts on 
climate change, air, water and soil pollution, land-use, bio-diversity, and public health. 
Broadest of all is the ‘social’ pillar, covering human capital, human rights, employment, 
job quality, gender equality, social exclusion and poverty, health, safety and consumer 
rights, social capital, security, education, training, and culture’ (Renda 2006:53-55).
SIAs are carried out for all of the EU’s trade negotiations, bilateral as well as 
multilateral, although they are not a strict legal obligation, and assessments are carried
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out by external consultants. SIAs are unusual in that they examine the impact of a trade 
agreement in both the EU and its trading partner. In comparison, US impact assessments 
usually focus on the environmental effects of trade policies on the US rather than on its 
trading partners (OECD 2007:65) and take a narrow environmental approach where the 
EU again demonstrates issue linkage.
SIAs are built upon stakeholder consultation, mainly through maintaining 
networks of experts and through DG Trade’s civil society dialogue. A basket of 
indicators is used to assess economic, social and environmental impacts, including 
‘average real income, employment, net fixed capital formation, equity and poverty, 
health and education, gender inequality, environmental quality of air, water and land, 
biological diversity and other natural resource stocks’. Position papers are developed 
that discuss possible ‘flanking measures’, including ‘capacity-building and trade-related 
assistance initiatives, international regulation, use of trade and regional policy 
instruments within the EU’ (DG Trade 2005e). The position paper is then discussed 
with the Article 133 Committee.
Some environmentalists, however, are not impressed: ‘Some of our members 
and partner organisations fear that this is mostly window dressing, greenwashing and so 
forth.. .it is also a PR tool, to have SIAs and to have consultation meetings on trade 
issues. At the end of the day, it's just the Council who decides on the policy and the 
Commission who drafts it, and that's it’ (Environmental NGO Representative, Brussels, 
November 2006).
Conclusion
This chapter has successively unpacked the forces at work at three different levels of 
interaction- multilateral, bilateral and regional, and unilateral- in order to contrast how 
and why the EU and US have used trade and environmental and trade and labour 
policies in the last two decades.
At each level, the EU and US pay attention to different types of interest groups. 
In the US, organised labour has been able to access the trade policymaking process via 
electoral politics -as a major funder of Democratic representatives and Presidents it has 
considerable influence. The fact that the devastation caused by the loss of 
manufacturing jobs is territorially concentrated strengthens their argument with elected 
representatives. Environmental NGOs are very important but secondary players, 
assisted in putting forward their arguments on trade by their participation in the blue-
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green alliance. Environmental NGOs in the EU arguably have greater influence, 
initiating some important aspects of ‘trade and’ policies. They are more likely to work 
together with development NGOs and other diffuse groups rather than trade unions, 
who have come rather late to the ‘trade and labour standards’ debate when compared 
with their US counterparts.
Although on one level, US campaigners have got what they wished for -a  voice 
in negotiations, certain standards in trade agreements, enforceability- the extent to 
which these mechanisms achieve the desired ends is debatable. US trade unions and 
environmentalists are closer to their long-term goal -  fully enforceable, internationally 
recognised labour and environmental standards in the core text of trade agreements- 
than they have been in the last 34 years, but some acknowledge that they have failed to 
campaign successfully on the range of domestic policies such as health reform that 
would actually bring substantial benefits to their members.
In the US, environmental concerns have arguably been more successfully 
integrated than labour standards, ‘[the environment has] been a less controversial area 
than labour has been... [Labor] has been a difficult issue - there are some powerful 
interests on both sides of the question. Environment hasn't had that and there’s much 
more consensus around and support for the issue’ (USTR Official, Washington DC,
June 2007). In the EU, groups have successfully gained a voice in negotiations, but not 
a vote in trade policy.
Contradictory EU/US strategies relate to their respective domestic institutions.
In the US, labour standards are included in international trade agreements by the federal 
government, under pressure from trade unions and under scrutiny from highly organised 
Congressional committees. The administration hopes that this will placate domestic 
opposition to trade liberalization, while trade unions hope that foreign pressure will 
improve domestic labour standards. In Europe, labour standards are included in 
international trade agreements largely by the European Commission, under pressure 
from member state governments. The Commission hopes that this will increase its 
foreign policy influence, while member states with high labour standards hope that the 
mechanism will externalize labour costs onto foreign business.
In early 2008, both EU and US policymakers were discussing the links between 
climate change and trade. This debate depicts in miniature the fundamental points borne 
out by the history in this chapter. Two bills were introduced into the US Senate which 
proposed a combining carbon trading schemes, carbon caps, and charges on imports 
from countries with a poor record of managing carbon. The bills received considerable
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input and support from American Electric Power and the International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers. Around the same time, the EU Commission was discussing similar 
measures- revealing strong divisions between DG Trade staff and Commission 
President Jose Manuel Barroso. Mandelson’s DG Trade wanted to maintain a free trade 
stance in the face of delicate Doha-related negotiations with the US. Barroso, reacting to 
pressure from member state leaders such as French President Nicolas Sarkozy and 
environmental NGOs, nevertheless announced that the EU was willing to seriously 
consider a tax on imports from countries without carbon reduction commitments. Many 
development NGOs in the EU have shifted their emphasis from the ailing Doha round to 
climate change in the last year. Now they have a dilemma over which path to follow: 
developing countries would strongly oppose a climate ‘tariff (Beattie 2008).
There are many problems with using such preference programmes or standards 
in the text of agreements as a means of inducing behaviour in a trading partner. 
Ratification of conventions does not guarantee implementation. In all of these debates, 
implementation and enforcement are rarely discussed: governments largely don’t want 
to discuss them. Even in the US, where dispute settlements are more substantial, only a 
small number of cases actually result in action by the US government, and that action 
cannot guarantee a change in conditions in a foreign country. GSP preferences are 
getting less important as tariffs generally decrease, while relaxing a non-tariff barrier for 
some trading partners and not others is not as realistic or simple an option as applying 
differential tariffs. In a more liberal trade regime, dominant countries must utilise other 
means to retain control. The next chapter looks at these means of control in greater 
detail, comparing domestic support for agriculture with aid for trade capacity building.
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5 Shaping Doha: Linking Agriculture to Development
‘All key players know they will have to move. The EU knows it will have to move on 
agriculture market access, the U.S. government knows it will have to move on 
agriculture domestic support — and emerging countries like Brazil, India or South 
Africa know they will have to move on industrial tariffs and services...Public 
opinion seems to be in favor o f support for the preservation o f rural life or the 
environment, or support fo r those small farmers with less comparative advantages, 
rather than lavish government spending that benefits a handful o f large farmers or 
farming companies. In short, what the public points out — perhaps without 
knowing — is a good, non-trade distorting farm policy. Pascal Lamy, as WTO 
Director General, (Lamy 2006).
‘I f  you look at our position in 2002 and you look at our position in 2006 absolutely 
nothing has changed. It's the deal which has decreased in its expectations, in 
ambition, in delivering for development’ - (Development NGO Representative, 
Brussels, October 2006).
The European Union is both the world’s largest importer and exporter of agricultural 
goods, with the US also a very large agricultural exporter. This chapter examines how 
two highly contentious issues, the liberalisation of trade in agriculture and the use of 
trade as a development tool, were combined to form the core of the Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA). In the months leading up to the WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle, 
1999, both the US and EU were still pushing for environmental policies and labour 
standards to be major issues in the Doha round. The US was keen to open foreign 
markets for its farmers, acting as a broker for their interests. The EU sought to protect 
its generous agricultural subsidies. But developing country dissatisfaction with the 
implementation of the last round caused the EU and US to adopt another strategy: 
working with the Director General of the WTO, they pushed for a ‘development round’. 
This was ostensibly aimed at the needs of developing countries, but also incorporating 
US calls for increased access to foreign agricultural markets. Agriculture and 
development issues were firmly linked, to each other and to the economic aspects of 
trade. Thus the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of EU and US approaches to ‘trade and’ issues cannot 
be understood without examining both the creation of this agenda and the different 
approaches of the US and EU to promoting it since 2001.
Back home after the Doha Ministerial of that year, EU Trade Commissioner 
Pascal Lamy and USTR Robert Zoellick viewed the development round very 
differently. Lamy used development rhetoric extensively to justify the trade round to 
dissenters at home and abroad, including the group of 77 ‘African, Caribbean and
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Pacific’ countries (ACP) and a host of European development NGOs. Zoellick soon 
dropped Doha’s development arguments and continued to emphasise benefits from the 
new round for concentrated interests: ranchers and farmers. The EU sought to legitimate 
its actions using ‘trade and’ issues, looking to domestic NGOs for support and justifying 
its trade policy to its developing country trading partners. The US focussed on 
representing concentrated territorial interests, compelled to find new agricultural 
markets abroad by an influential Congress.
The impetus behind the new trade round did not last. By 2007, the Doha 
Development Agenda had effectively stalled. Despite repeated attempts to get the 
negotiations moving, developed and developing countries could not reconcile their 
differences over agricultural tariffs, non-agricultural market access, and trade in 
services. Negotiators and commentators alike had been aware for some time that US 
fast-track negotiating authority was due to expire in June 2007. Unfortunately, the US 
Congress was also due to discuss a new farm bill in the early part of that year. The 
juxtaposition of these two deadlines spelled severe trouble for the Doha round.
For free traders and small farmers in the US the 2007 Farm Bill was a 
protectionist disaster. It increased, rather than reduced, damaging subsidies to large 
agribusiness, in a political system where they already received some 75% of payments 
(Agriculture Association Representative, Washington DC, July 2007; Think Tank 
Representative, Washington DC, May 2007; (Oxfam America 2007:3). The bill pushed 
out sustainability measures, encouraged the growth of crops to provide ethanol, and 
made positive statements about genetically modified foods.
While the US lost the battle to reduce its domestic support for agriculture, a 
major source of frustration for developing country WTO members, the EU was unable 
to match US offers on improving agricultural market access. Attempts to reform the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 2003 (the MacSharry Reforms) made it easier 
for the EU to compete on domestic support, but its market access record was a severe 
concern for developing countries.
For NGOs representing small farmers in developing countries, the breakdown in 
negotiations was a substantial setback. The worst poverty in developing countries is in 
rural areas and linked to the worst levels of malnutrition, illiteracy, gender inequality 
and child deaths. The majority of the rural poor rely on agriculture to survive. A large 
proportion of this activity is carried out by women who manage small plots of land 
(Watkins 2003). For these reasons, international development NGOs see the 
liberalisation of trade in agriculture as a key part of achieving the Millennium
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Development Goals, a set of targets for poverty reduction adopted by the UN General 
Assembly in September 2000. As we can see from table 5.1, the agricultural sector 
makes up a large percentage of GDP for developing countries, particularly Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs), but a much lower proportion of GDP in developed states. 
Despite this, developed countries maintain substantial levels of financial support for 
their farmers.
Table 5.1: Agriculture as Percentage of GDP, Selected Countries, 1994-2004
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
High Income 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.1 2 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7
Low Income 30.4 29.4 29.7 29.3 29.6 27.6 26 25.8 24.2 23.9 21.7
Middle Income 11.9 12 11.9 11.2 11.3 10.6 9.9 9.8 10 10 10.1
France 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.2 3 2.8 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.5
United States 1.8 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1 1.2 1.3
Ghana 37.8 38.8 39 35.8 36 35.8 35.3 35.2 35.2 36.5 38
Vietnam 27.4 27.2 27.8 25.8 25.8 25.4 24.5 23.2 23 22.5 21.8
Source: World Bank 2007, World Development Indicators Online.
The analysis in Chapter 2 showed that the EU was more likely to use rural 
development, health, environmental, and animal welfare arguments to justify continued 
agricultural protection, and to balance these arguments with pro-development policies. 
The US takes a much simpler stance and justifies its agricultural policy to outsiders 
using the rhetoric of free trade (and competitive liberalisation), reassuring domestic 
agribusiness that it will push for open markets abroad. This case study adds more detail 
to the analysis in Chapter 2, showing that the argument holds in two difficult and 
controversial cases that go to the heart of problems with the Doha round. The EU and 
the US both use hard (defensive action to protect subsidies) and soft (setting special 
preferences and pushing a normative model) approaches, but the EU uses a broad set of 
issues to justify its policies where the US relies more heavily on a narrow agenda.
The next section deals with international negotiations, explaining how the 
millennium round became the development round. International elites deliberately 
placed agriculture at the centre of the round and used development arguments to justify 
its focus. The second section examines differences between US and EU models of trade 
in agriculture, contrasting US emphasis on market competition and access with the EU’s 
‘multifunctional’ approach. The third section looks at attempts by the EU and US to 
reconcile their agricultural objectives with a ‘development’ agenda since the 2001 Doha 
Declaration. While the EU quickly incorporated the linkage between agriculture and 
development issues into its own rhetoric, the US continued to emphasise the benefits of
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free trade. Development issues are party oriented in the US. When Congress became 
Democratic again in late 2006, development NGOs reported better access to 
policymakers but still note the difficulties in overcoming entrenched agricultural 
interests. In contrast, the EU Commission has attempted to use the development agenda 
to legitimate its position on agriculture, creating new forms of consultation that allow 
development NGOs much greater access to decisionmakers.
From ‘Millennium Round’ to ‘Development Round’
Between 1998 and 2001, the proposed ‘millennium round’ of trade negotiations 
crystallised into a ‘development round’. First expressed by international organisations 
and officials from developed countries, the concept of a ‘development round’ became a 
shorthand for a particular vision of the world trading system which was all about 
increasing the ability of developing countries to participate in the existing WTO 
framework, while not necessarily adjusting it to fit their needs. The development round 
discourse is closely associated with ‘capacity building’ and ‘aid for trade’ initiatives that 
accompanied the round, particularly the Trade Related Technical Assistance (TRTA) 
programme and the peripheral capacity building initiatives attached to American and 
European bilateral agreements. A ‘development round’ would enable developing 
countries to reap the benefits of trade liberalisation.
UK Development Minister Clare Short (1999) called for a ‘development round’ 
as early as March 1999, refocusing Leon Brittan’s call for a Millennium Round on the 
elimination of poverty rather than the inclusion of new, non-trade issues (Raghavan 
1999). The British Department for International Development (DFID) has a reputation 
for being particularly open to development focussed NGOs (as noted by interviewees in 
both Brussels and Washington), and soon after Short’s speech, DFID announced that it 
would cooperate with the World Bank to fund research on trade and development issues 
(DFID 1999). James Wolfensohn, its President, was an early supporter of a 
development round. By July 1999, the heads of the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development had both 
publically declared support for a ‘development round’ (Business Line 1999). These 
sentiments were echoed by the new Director General of the WTO, Mike Moore (Moore 
1999) and Joseph Stiglitz, Chief Economist of the World Bank in September (Stiglitz 
1999), and in October by the OECD (China Daily 1999) and Supachai Panitchpakdi,
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Thailand’s Deputy Premier and Commerce Minister (Anders 1999), due to become 
Moore’s successor in September 2002.
At the same time, the US and the EU were still attempting to promote the 
inclusion of labour and environmental standards in the round. The Clinton 
administration in particular was responding to strong domestic pressures from trade 
unions and environmentalists. USTR Charlene Barchefsky commented that ‘"It's 
important that the WTO catch up with the domestic political reality of these issues” 
(Moulson 1999). In characteristic style, the EU sought to combine labour, environment 
and development issues in the new round (see Chapter 4 above). By November, EU 
officials referred to the forthcoming round as a ‘development round’ in position papers, 
and pushed the rhetoric of ‘sustainable development’ in public, pressured by 
development and environment NGOs in Brussels. EU Trade Commissioner Pascal 
Lamy attempted to use development language to his advantage, promoting the EU’s 
decision to offer tariff free treatment to 99 per cent of imports from LDCs -  the 
Everything But Arms initiative (Kenety 1999). In December, he warned a group of ACP 
trade ministers that ‘the EU's determination to make the new round a Development 
Round is not shared by everybody’ (Kenety 2000).
By the time of the Seattle meeting in December 1999, both the EU and US had 
announced their intention of making the round a ‘development round’. But labour and 
environmental standards were still a stumbling block for the Clinton administration. 
Charlene Barchefsky’s team pulled out of a joint press conference with the EU on 
development at the last minute and stressed to journalists that progress on development 
issues would depend on legislation going through Congress on Africa and the Caribbean 
(Marshall 1999).
The professed desire for a ‘development round’ did not have very deep roots. In 
the months leading up to the Doha ministerial declaration, neither the EU nor the US 
were focussed particularly on the needs of developing countries. The US was busy 
pushing for an ambitious agricultural reform agenda (Kanth 2001), while the EU 
emphasised its desire to include environmental policy in negotiations -particularly 
WTO recognition of the precautionary principle, a longstanding EU guiding principle 
which states that a course of action should not be followed until there is reasonable 
certainty that it will not cause harm. Developing countries became concerned that the 
EU would use ‘green’ excuses to validate protection for European agriculture. The US 
also opposed the EU’s suggestion. American negotiators could not ‘understand 
European concerns. Evolving case law suggest that environmental law trumps trade: but
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politicians in Europe, used to laws based on a civil code, like the rules to be clear in 
advance’(The Economist 2001).
By the time of the November 2001 Doha ministerial, the EU had lost this battle, 
and the new American administration had signalled to other WTO members that it 
would drop its emphasis on labour and environmental standards. It was clear that a 
repeat of the chaotic Seattle ministerial could kill the round altogether. Developed 
countries were under pressure to save the system they had created in the face of strong 
criticism from developing states. This paved the way for Michael Moore, then Director 
General of the WTO, to suggest that the talks should be named the ‘Doha Development 
Agenda’ (Koppel 2001). The name stuck.
Moore is widely credited with transforming the ‘Millennium Round’ into a 
‘Development Round’ and restoring the reputation of the world trading system after 
Seattle. Moore and his team had barely been in office for three months at the time of the 
Seattle ministerial, and he blames this lack of preparation time for the failure of the 
talks. After the battle, he set about ‘making agriculture a development issue’, in order to 
bring ‘Africa, most of Asia and Latin America together on a common agenda’ (Moore 
2003:114). He hoped that this strategy would cut across the round’s major divides: 
divisions between the EU and the US (backed by the Cairns group) over agricultural 
market access and export subsidies and between developed and developing countries 
over the introduction of new issues and the implementation of old ones, bringing 
developing countries together to push for agricultural liberalisation in the US and EU. 
Pascal Lamy followed this strategy within the EU itself, seeking to use a development 
agenda to limit the influence of his counterpart in DG Agriculture, Franz Fischler (Van 
den Hoven 2004)
The word ‘development’ occurs 63 times in the Doha declaration. Moore 
articulated this new focus:
‘In agriculture, all countries, but particularly developing countries, stand to gain 
substantial commercial benefits under the negotiating mandate. Currently, 
according to the OECD, rich countries pay out $1 billion a day to their farmers in 
agricultural subsidies; that is more than 4 times all development assistance going 
to poor nations. Negotiations will open markets and offer better conditions of 
competition’ (Moore 2002a).
The pitch to developing countries was that the round would be worth far more to them 
than increased aid, tackling some of the issues that had been left over from the previous 
round and leading to faster economic growth. This argument was backed up by research 
from other international organizations, such as a World Bank research programme
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which found that cutting agricultural subsidies and tariffs would raise real incomes in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia (Anderson and Martin 2005).
At the Doha meeting itself, developing countries came under pressure from the 
US and European countries to accept the declaration. Developing states were keen to 
protect future development assistance, preserve the prospects of a WTO waiver 
allowing EU/ACP tariff concessions, and to be seen as collaborators, not dissenters, in 
the ‘war against terrorism’. Developing country representatives also recount that 
developed countries, particularly the US and EU, collaborating with the Chairman and 
Mike Moore, used procedures to force developing countries to compromise -excluding
o n
countries from green room sessions , holding numerous informal meetings, removing 
bracketed passages (indicating points of disagreement) from the text, and then 
announcing to the Committee of the Whole on the last day that the document was now 
agreed and that changes were no longer possible (Wolfe 2004:581). They allege that 
Moore telephoned ministers over the weekend to persuade them to accept the 
introduction of new issues (Kwa 2003; Wade 2004). Moore went so far as to express his 
opinion in print, writing an article in the Financial Times in February 2002 that 
encouraged developing countries to accept the new issues (Moore 2002b).
Models of Agricultural Trade: Market Access & 
Multifunctionality
American and European models of agriculture are different, and these differences have 
consequences for their positions in agricultural trade negotiations. In the Doha round so 
far, the US has pursued a narrowly focussed market access agenda, while the EU has 
attempted to justify its actions on the basis of other ‘trade and’ issues. In a study of the 
Doha round negotiations on agriculture, Patrick Messerlin identifies four main motives 
for states: maintaining the current lifestyle for farmers; providing preferential access to 
goods; linking support for agriculture to environmental issues; and expanding market 
access abroad. He found that while the US was consistently strongly motivated by 
opening markets abroad across key agricultural products, the EU more often employed 
strategies that linked agriculture to environmental issues (Messerlin 2003:6).
The EU and US are both seen as agricultural protectionists by the rest of the 
world. As things stand, agriculture accounts for a comparatively small proportion of 
their GDP, while the subsidies they provide for agriculture are extensive. Agriculture is
33 Small working group meetings of select WTO members.
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a relatively ‘new’ issue in trade negotiations, exempt from negotiations until the 
Uruguay round (1986-1993), and a continuing major source of contention in the Doha 
round. Agriculture is the most disputed trade issue in multilateral settings (figure 5.2), 
with the EU and US involved in more WTO disputes concerning agriculture than any 
other issue. Debates addressing agricultural liberalization in the WTO are split into 
three ‘pillars’: arguments over increasing market access by lowering tariffs, over 
reducing the volume and value of exports that receive government subsidies, and about 
decreasing levels of domestic support for agriculture such as price supports.
Figure 5.2: Trade Disputes involving the EU or US, 1996-2006
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The EU and US are protectionist in different ways (table 5.3). The EU is the 
worst offender in terms of domestic subsidies and tariffs (23%). The US is considered to 
have much less to give on tariffs, with its average at 12%, but has a poor record on 
domestic support, which is slowly increasing. Both EU and US agricultural tariffs do 
fall way below the WTO average of 62%, but as developed countries with complex 
institutions, they have many other, less transparent ways to support the agricultural 
sector.
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The third pillar of the Agreement on Agriculture differentiates between domestic 
support policies that are acceptable under WTO rules, such as domestic food aid or 
environmental programmes, and ‘trade distorting’ policies, including market price 
support and input subsidies. A country’s ‘aggregate measures of support’ (AMS score) 
is used to compare levels of domestic support between WTO members and place their 
policies in one of four ‘boxes’: red (forbidden- this box no longer exists), amber (trade 
distorting), blue (amber box with conditions designed to reduce distortion), or green 
(non-distorting). The controversial ‘blue box’ contains policies which encourage 
farmers to limit production but are not linked to prices and volume of output. In the 
Doha round so far, the blue box has been strongly supported by the EU and opposed by 
the US.
Two groups of countries have taken up opposing positions which correspond 
closely to these different models of EU and US agriculture. The Caims Group of 19 
Latin American, African and Asian Pacific countries strongly opposes export subsides 
and amber box domestic supports. The group was formed in 1986 as a reaction to 
increasing EU and US agricultural subsidies. They argue that continuing to allow 
Americans and Europeans to subsidise their farmers while the EU and US push for 
developing countries to open their markets is unfair. These countries tend to have low 
AMS scores, meaning low levels of support for agricultural products as defined for the 
purpose of WTO negotiations.
Table 5.3: Trade and Agriculture__________________ EU_______US______
Agricultural Subsidies
Est. Total Support to Agriculture (2004) $m 152 807 103 482
% of GDP 1.2 0.9
Producer Support Estimate (2004) $m 109 577 42 869
Agricultural Trade
% of Total Exports (2004) 6.5 9.7
% of Total Imports (2004) 8.4 5.8
Average Agricultural Tariffs 23% 12%
S o u r c e :  O E C D  h t t p : / / h e r m m . s o u r c e o e a l  o r x / u n U > a d / 5 i 0 6 0 5 1 e . p d f
Figure 5.4: How America Thinks: Agricultural Support Before the Doha Round
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Figure 5.4 is interesting because it comes from a USDA publication. It plots 
‘green box’ subsidies, ‘good’ support measures allowed under WTO rules, on the y axis 
and ‘trade distorting’ support along the x axis. We can see that while the US provides a 
high percentage of ‘good’ support and a much lower percentage of trade-distorting 
support, EU support is mostly classified as trade-distorting. When plotted like this the 
US seems to fit very neatly within the Caims group of countries, flanked in the diagram 
by Australia and Brazil. The US sided with the Caims group during the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, and as a result was successful at tilting the negotiations in favour of the US 
agricultural model.
The group’s arguments resonate with the image that the US likes to project on 
trade and agriculture: one of freer trade and open markets. What the diagram doesn’t tell 
us is that the vast majority of US support in the green box is food aid: agricultural 
products bought by the US government and supplied (often sold) to developing 
countries. The US is almost exceptional in allowing private voluntary organisations to 
sell food aid to fund their development projects -most other countries donate their food 
(Murphy and McAfee 2005). This ensures an income for farmers when the price of 
agricultural goods drops in world markets and creates new export markets abroad. This 
is at the heart of the US model of agricultural support.
The second group of countries support the concept of ‘multifunctionality’ in 
WTO negotiations. They argue that domestic support for agriculture performs other
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functions than subsidising farmers, such as protecting the natural habitats or sustaining 
rural communities. These countries, unsurprisingly, tend to have high AMS scores. The 
EU argues strongly for agricultural multifunctionality, with the Council of Ministers 
advocating the multifunctional ‘European model of agriculture’ (DG Agriculture 1997). 
This argument dates back to the first days of the European Community’s controversial 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Proponents of the CAP argued that ‘agriculture 
was the defining condition of rural space and the purpose of the CAP was to create the 
conditions under which family farms and rural society could flourish’ (Potter and 
Bumey 2002:39). The next sections explore European and American positions in more 
detail.
The US: Opening Markets Abroad
‘By helping highly efficient and productive American farming operations, US farm  
policy also protects millions o f acres o f wildlands in the Third World where low 
efficiency, low productivity agriculture would otherwise increase ’ (House of 
Representatives Committee on Agriculture 2002).
This quotation, from a leaflet in support of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act 
of 2002, shows the US Congress at its most protectionist. The leaflet sets out various 
arguments in justification of agricultural subsidies, arguing that they make America 
more secure, produce cheap, good quality food, and help ‘all-American farm families’. 
Support for farmers in the US goes back to the great depression in the 1930s, and still 
evokes strong feelings despite the fact that farmers now make up a much smaller 
proportion of the population. In addition, each member of Congress represents a specific 
territory, and agriculture is concentrated in certain areas. Large rural states with smaller 
populations and more populous urban states are represented alike by two Senators each, 
giving farmers an advantage in the Senate.
Despite the focus on agricultural liberalisation in the Doha round, the US 
Congress has passed two farm bills since 2001, the Farm Security and Rural Investment 
Act of 2002, and the Farm Bill 2008. This fits a pattern that Congress followed during 
the Uruguay round, raising the level of agricultural support during the negotiations in 
order to lower them again per any commitments made in the final agreement.
Table 5.5: US Groups with the Most Trade Advisory Committee Members 
Organisation No. Representatives
123 of 204
American Farm Bureau Federation 5
Cargill, Inc. 5
Grocery Manufacturers of America 4
Altria Corporate Services, Inc. 3
American Forest & Paper Association 3
Monsanto Company 3
National Electrical Manufacturers Association 3 
State of Idaho 3
Source: Author’s calculations, from information published by participating agencies, 
2006.
Agricultural groups are well-known in the US for being solid iron triangles -  
close relationships between Congress, interest groups and bureaucrats which make it 
almost impossible for outsiders to break in. Interest group money has a strong effect on 
US agricultural policy (Gawande and Hoekman 2006). In USTR’s formal consultation 
process, the American Farm Bureau Federation and Cargill Inc. have five 
representatives each sitting on trade advisory committees, more than any of the other 
groups. More agricultural groups participate in the trade advisory committees than any 
other type of group (table 5.5).
The USTR takes a more competitive approach to agriculture than the US 
Congress (Coleman et al. 2004:106), aiming for the ‘total elimination of trade-distorting 
subsidies and barriers to market access’, an agreement which will ‘substantially 
decrease and harmonize levels of trade-distorting domestic support’ and ‘a substantial 
increase in real market access opportunities both in developed and major developing 
economies’ (USTR 2004b). The US proposals on agriculture during the Doha round 
prioritise the creation of market access opportunities for US farmers. One iteration, put 
forward by Portman, sees reform in two ‘stages’, in the first stage, ‘WTO Members 
would phase-in deep cuts in trade-distorting support and tariffs, thereby creating 
effective new market access opportunities’, only in the second phase would WTO 
members ‘deliver on the elimination of remaining trade-distorting practices’ after a 
‘period of consolidation’ (USTR 2005b). The USTR’s role therefore, is not to work 
against farmers in favour of consumers or other industries. It can be better understood as 
a broker for agricultural interests, seeking greater market access abroad as a first 
priority.
Negotiators also believe they must keep subsidies to use as leverage. As one 
prominent US agricultural negotiator remarked, ‘We don't get rid of subsidies because 
we need them as a bargaining chip for getting the EU and Japan to reduce theirs’ (Trade 
Negotiator, Washington DC, June 2007). One might argue that if negotiators see their 
tariffs as necessary bargaining tools, then multilateral talks within the WTO framework
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are not serving their purpose.
The EU: Let Them Eat Subsidies
‘The EU has a keen interest and much to gain in these areas and as we know from  
the Uruguay Round, negotiations have a much better chance o f success if there are 
possibilities to achieve trade-offs between differing sectors. It is not in our interest 
fo r  the focus to be exclusively on agriculture * (Brittan 1999).
The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) creates a huge problem for any European 
Trade Commissioner. In operation since 1962 and one of the oldest collective European 
initiatives, the CAP provides subsidies for farmers and agricultural exports. Despite a 
series of reforms which have caused it to fall as a percentage of the EU’s budget, the 
CAP still accounts for nearly half of total EU expenditure (47% in 2006). The benefits 
of the CAP are not evenly distributed amongst member states: France has a large 
proportion of European agricultural land and is the largest beneficiary of the CAP.
Spain and Germany also receive substantial support. Agricultural groups in the EU have 
traditionally reflected this bias, seen in the high number of French groups and the 
predominance of French as the language of agricultural policy. Even the UK’s National 
Farmers Union represents itself within the EU as the ‘Bureau d’Agriculture 
Britannique’. French resistance to the agricultural aspects of trade agreements is at least 
partially due to the willingness of French farmers to resort to direct action and cause 
widespread disruption (Nugent 2003:392).
These traditional cleavages have changed with the changing nature of the EU. 
The influence of large agricultural associations on the Commission has declined in 
recent years, as the Commission has been required to carry out agricultural market 
reforms (Grant 1997:170). The enlargement of the EU into Eastern Europe has enlarged 
Europe’s agricultural land and changed traditional patterns of influence among member 
states, although the new states are not entitled to the same level of support as old 
Europe. Agricultural lobbyists have found that they are dealing more often in English in 
their day to day work and adapting to the new demands of 27 member states 
(Agriculture Association Representative, Brussels, November 2006).
Subsequent reforms of the CAP have made it more multifunctional in nature, 
meaning that officials aim to pursue multiple goals with one policy, rather than simply 
focusing on food prices and output. WTO negotiations have created an important 
incentive for agricultural reform within the EU. In addition to replacing indirect with 
direct forms of support, the 1992 MacS harry reforms introduced new aid programmes to
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assist rural development, environmentally friendly agriculture, and re-forestation of 
agricultural land. Agenda 2000 expanded these programmes, with a new regulation 
promoting regeneration and diversification in rural areas and stronger environmental 
provisions (DG Agriculture 1999).
The position of agricultural groups can strongly conflict with that of 
development groups, who favour subsidy cuts at home and deviation from the 
international low tariff agenda in developing countries (Agricultural Association 
Representative, Brussels, September 2006).
As in many policy areas, the EU seeks to find consensus between these opposing 
views. Key to this argument is the acceptance of agricultural multifunctionality and pro- 
development policies as compatible. A large proportion of EU arguments for ‘trade and’ 
policies in areas like agriculture and the environment insist on the importance of public 
opinion and shared values -  they make claims about a shared European way of life. 
There is an established EU agenda here: ‘sustainable development’, meaning that the 
EU’s demands for agricultural multifunctionality -  environmentally sustainable, 
promoting rural development- and development assistance are seen as compatible.
These alternative ‘public goods’ can include ‘a pleasant-looking and environmentally 
friendly countryside, a stable social infrastructure and cultural heritage built on small 
towns and villages, high standards of plant, animal and public health, or quality artisanal 
foods based on centuries-old environmental payments’ (Coleman et al. 2004:97).
But the multifunctional model faces significant challenges from both the WTO 
framework and from within the EU itself. The EU’s multifunctional view of agricultural 
policy and its strong emphasis on health and safety issues played a strong role in its 
moratorium on genetically modified products in 1999. Looking at its record of 
decisions, the WTO displays a tendency to downplay the role of ‘non-science’ -values 
and public opinion- in risk regulation cases such as the GMO foods case. The SPS 
agreement, for example, contains a version of the precautionary principle, but it is much 
narrower and is restricted to scientific criteria only (Lee 2005:109).
At the time of writing, tensions are high between the French government and the 
Commission. With the French assuming the European Presidency on 1st July 2008, 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy launched criticisms against the Barroso Commission, 
and in particular against Peter Mandelson. Speaking at a press conference, Sarkozy used 
development arguments to justify French support for agricultural protection:
‘A child dies o f starvation every 30 seconds and the Commission wanted to reduce 
European agriculture production by 21 per cent during World Trade Organisation
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talks. This was really counter-productive...Frankly, there's only one person who 
thinks like that and it’s Peter Mandelson and it’s not France’s position ’ (Wagstyl et 
al. 2008).
Speaking on British television on 1st July, Peter Mandelson hit back at Sarkozy:
7 am being undermined and Europe's negotiating position in the world trade talks 
is being weakened and I regret that. It is very disappointing because the mandate 
on which I  am negotiating.. .has been agreed by all the member states. Indeed, at 
last week’s European Council it was again recorded that Europe wants these talks 
brought to a speedy and successful conclusion with a fair and balanced outcome, 
and I  regret that Mr Sarkozy's intervention last night will make it harder for me’
(Mandelson 2008).
This is a familiar pattern in EU agricultural policy. Both the EU Trade Commissioner 
and the USTR must share responsibility for trade in agriculture with the counterparts in 
other departments. US trade officials pride themselves on a ‘robust inter-agency 
process’ and presenting a unified front in negotiations. Their fight is with Congress, and 
the USTR clearly anticipates the views of elected representatives. The EU Trade 
Commissioner, however, must contend not just with bureaucratic rivals but with a 
powerful, autonomous national President. EU member state governments may exercise 
de facto vetoes here regardless of the formal process.
Promoting the Trade and Development
Facing strong opposition from developing countries to both the US ‘agricultural market 
access’ and EU ‘multifunctional’ agendas, the US and EU changed position to advocate 
a development round. This section explains how the EU made strong use of the 
‘development round’ framing while the US did not. Given that the US was generally 
less protectionist than the EU on agriculture, it is significant that US officials did not 
decide to emphasise their comparatively friendly position to developing countries.
There is some evidence that Americans and European view poverty differently. 
In their comparative analysis of poverty reduction policies in the United States and 
Europe, Alesina and Glaeser ask why some states are better predisposed to providing 
welfare benefits than others. They found that an ‘examination of explanations which we 
labelled purely 'economic' has left us almost completely empty handed' and so turn to 
other institutional and cultural explanations (Alesina & Glaeser 2004: 75). One of the 
factors they find significant is public opinion of the condition of poverty (table 5.6).
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Table 5.6: Beliefs About Poverty in the United States and Europe
(Alesina and Glaeser 2004:184)
Belief US EU
Believe that the poor are trapped in poverty 
Believe that luck determines income 
Believe that the poor are lazy
29% 60%
30% 54%
60% 26%
What is striking are the clear differences in perception between two regions with similar 
levels of economic development. As table 5.6 shows, Europeans are more likely than 
Americans to view poverty as structural and inescapable. Extrapolating from Alesina 
and Glaeser’s results, we would expect that those states where poverty is seen as 
structural would find it easier to get support for public aid programmes overseas, and 
vice versa. We would expect to see higher support for aid in European countries and 
less support in the US. There is some evidence to support this assertion. Use of foreign 
aid as a development tool does correlate with the extent of the domestic welfare state 
(Schraeder et al. 1998). Official Development Assistance as a percentage of GNI is 
particularly high in Denmark (0.85%), the Netherlands (0.85%), Sweden (0.78%), and 
Portugal (0.63%), although in other European countries, notably Greece and Austria, it 
is much lower. The US comes in last among OECD donors, giving just 0.17% of GNI 
(OECD 2005a).
Globally, however, the contemporary US model of development is winning. 
There has been a horizontal, gradual drop in levels of development assistance in recent 
years, while global trade flows have continued to increase (Delamonica et al. 2004: 22). 
To some extent this reflects a paradigm shift in ideas about the best way to improve 
conditions in developing countries 34. Aid is increasingly seen as a limited tool for 
economic development. This scarce aid is not always distributed on the basis of need. 
Colonial and linguistic ties are strong, as we see in the case of UK and India, or Spain 
and South America (OECD 2005b). Most aid is conditional, but conditions are rarely 
implemented unless they are already in line with the goals of the recipient country 
(Ikhide 2004: 129).
As the volume of trade has increased, and economies become more 
interdependent, trade becomes a much more important factor in ensuring growth. A 
small percentage increase in exports can provide benefits that dwarf changes in aid 
provision, whilst global price variations can wipe out aid benefits overnight. Both
34 Confusingly, ODA increased in 2004, but a large proportion of this increase was aid to Afghanistan and 
Iraq. The United States gives almost three times as much aid to Iraq as to its next greatest beneficiary, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (OECD 2005b).
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developed and developing countries see trade as a long-term means of reducing 
dependency upon handouts. World Bank economists Dollar and Kraay35 (2004; 2002) 
argue that increases in trade flows to the world’s poorest countries lead to increased 
growth, which in turn increases the income of the bottom quintile of the population in 
poor countries. Globalisation (they take this to mean increased trade flows and lower 
tariff barriers) leads to ‘faster growth and poverty reduction in poor countries’ (39). 
Developed nations see trade as a win-win strategy whereby they can also grow their 
economies by gaining access to new markets. Donor emphasis on trade is seen in the 
growing proportion of aid that tied to trade capacity building measures such as Trade 
Development Assistance, which totalled US$2,184 million in 2004 (WTO/OECD 2005: 
9).
Table 5:7 Official Development Assistance and Aid compared to Total Trade by Income and Region
(Glasius 2005: 313)
% Total Total %
Change Trade in Trade in Change
Aid in % Aid in % 1993- % GDP % GDP 1993-
Income GNI 1993 GNI 2003 2003 1993 2003 2003
Low Income Countries 4.1 3.0 -26 34.3 44.8 31
Middle Income Countries 0.7 0.4 -39 46.9 62.5 33
High Income Countries 0.0 0.0 -62 36.9 45.0 22
Low & Middle Income 1.4 1.1 -22 45.1 60.0 33
East Asia & Pacific 1.1 0.4 -67 49.3 80.8 64
Europe and Central Asia 1.0 0.8 -23 63.9 69.8 9
Latin America & Caribbean 0.4 0.4 -6 31.9 45.8 44
Middle East & North Africa 1.3 1.0 -20 62.6 61.6 -2
South Asia 1.4 0.8 -42 24.2 33.5 38
Sub-Saharan Africa 6.3 6.0 -6 56.2 64.5 15
World 0.3 0.2 -17 38.4 47.6 24
It is this discourse which emerged in the Doha declaration and became linked 
with calls for agricultural liberalisation, with an emphasis on how developing countries 
could be assisted in participating in this and future multilateral rounds. Policy experts’ 
prescription for the Doha round consisted of three steps. First, negotiations must ensure 
better market access for goods and services which does not exclude important sectors 
such as agriculture and textiles. Second, ‘greater attention should focus on ensuring that 
WTO rules support development, and are seen to be doing so by stakeholders’
(emphasis in original). And finally, these rules must be accompanied by an expansion in 
aid for trade and capacity building initiatives (Hoekman 2002:24). In 2005, the Hong 
Kong declaration mandated a new WTO work programme on Aid for Trade. At the 
summit, the EU and its member states pledged to raise trade related assistance to €2
35 This argument is dominant, though not uncontested. See (Rodriguez and Rodrik 2001).
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billion per year (DG Trade 2005c) and the US announced that it would double capacity 
building grants to USD 2.7 billion a year (USTR 2005a), both by 2010. In the modem 
global economy, giving money to build new markets has become a key goal.
The US: Making the Rules
The US has a bad reputation when it comes to negotiating trade agreements with 
developing countries. American development policies are pragmatic, making links 
between military and development aid and tying both to principle of freedom 
(Karagiannis 2004:25). When asked what the US could do to improve its trade policy, 
one USTR official replied:
7  think as a general matter we need to work on improving our collaboration with 
other governments...we're a very strong economy, we have a lot o f power, we have 
the ability to impose our will... The way we negotiated with our four partners over 
the terms o f the bipartisan trade deal...it wasn't really a negotiation. It was sort of 
a "take this or leave it, if  you leave it well then you won't have the access to our 
markets ”. It was a very heavy-handed thing ’ (USTR Official, Washington DC, June 
2007).
A European business association representative mirrored this view:
T'm convinced that a multilateral system is better from a development 
perspective...if you've seen how the Americans negotiate...this is not a negotiation! 
I t ’s (‘this is the text, sign here” and that's it’ (Business Association Representative, 
Brussels, November 2006).
US policy is also concerned with rules and the creation of a ‘level playing field’. In 
2006, the OECD’s Development Access Committee reviewed the United States’ aid and 
development policies. They found that since the events of September 11th 2001, 
‘Development is now part of the foundation of the U.S. National Security 
Strategy.. .Since that time, the government has used the logic of national security to 
resuscitate the image of development cooperation with Congress and the American 
public’. As we might expect when Canada and the UK are asked to review US policy, 
the report went on to recommend greater emphasis on poverty reduction, promotion of 
public awareness of the positive role of development as opposed to defence, and more 
consultation with civil society groups (OECD 2006). These are all elements which are 
strongly emphasised in European trade and development policy.
In contrast, most US trade and development policy is made via legislation not 
regulations, usually on a regional basis. On Africa, the Bush administration inherited 
two important development-focussed initiatives from Clinton: a focus on both trade and
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aid was enabled by the Trade and Development Act of 2000, which created Assistant 
USTR for African Affairs and the Trade Advisory Committee on Africa . The African 
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) also came into force in 2000, and was extended 
in 2004. In 2003, negotiations were launched towards a US-South African Customs 
Union (SACU) FTA.
The USTR envisioned that this agreement would eventually become a fully 
fledged Free Trade Area, with reciprocal benefits for US industries (Mattoo et al. 2002). 
Despite the strong arguments put forward by the administration and members of 
Congress for AGO A, the development community in Washington was still divided. One 
interviewee commented that ‘our concern [with AGOA] is that the tendency in trade is 
to make decisions here in Washington or New York or London or wherever, and not 
consult the people on the ground...these things are almost unilaterally decided and 
imposed, so it’s kind of neo-colonialism’ (Development NGO Representative, 
Washington DC, April 2006). The same interviewee also mentioned his organisation’s 
lack of access to decisionmakers.
The 1983 Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) was expanded in 
2000 by the US-Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA), to form the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). The CBI provides duty free access for 19 countries for 
a wide range of goods, giving signatories ‘NAFTA-like parity’ (Dypski 2003:132). The 
Acts aimed to ‘promote economic development, alleviate global poverty, and create 
new economic opportunities for American workers and businesses’ (Clinton 2000). This 
is a typical example of the reciprocity of US trade agreements: ideally, they should be 
‘win-win’.
The US also focussed its attention on its Latin American neighbours. There were 
two main planks of the US strategy in Latin America after 2001: CAFTA and the 
FTAA. Starting in 1994, the Summit of the Americas process, spearheaded by foreign 
ministries of 34 governments in the hemisphere, focussed on broad themes that include 
‘democratic governance, environmentally sustainable development, and other issues 
such as gender equality, education, and judicial reform’ (Korzeniewicz and Smith 
2001:7).
Civil society requests to access the FTAA process were not always heard, 
however. The Committee of Government Representatives on the Participation of Civil 
Society was created three years after negotiations started, in 1998. At first, it was little 
more than a ‘suggestion box’. After demonstrations at the Quebec 2001 summit,
36 Which has had an ad hoc, rather than a continuous existence.
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attempts were made to increase civil society’s role in the process, but these were still 
weak and mostly for appearances (Barenberg and Evans 2004).
Civil society involvement under later bilateral agreements was developed more 
fully in cooperation with ministries in signatory countries:
‘the agreement provides a framework to encourage co-operation...we actually 
actively facilitate co-operation between different agencies in the departments o f the 
US government and the departments o f the government o f Chile. Sometimes the 
other agencies come to us saying we want to do this and we put it in the work plan, 
and we ask the Chileans what they are interested in doing and then we work with 
our counterparts agencies and partners to get them to do things ’ (State Department 
Official, May 2008).
Despite this, funding for such initiatives is inconsistent between bilateral agreements, 
depending heavily on what gets written into the final bill. The resulting ‘capacity 
building’ activities are patchy and peripheral compared to their EU counterparts.
Domestically, US development groups are often outsiders, notably absent from 
the formal consultation process under the Bush administration despite inclusion under 
Clinton. Development is a difficult issue to sell to elected representatives with territorial 
constituencies. The links between development and trade are also hard to forge. There is 
an inherent contradiction between advocating a trade policy that protects citizens and 
one which promotes the interests of those in developing countries and in the US, this 
division is deep. Lower tariffs on agriculture and manufactured goods aid overseas 
development, but could also have harmful effects on domestic constituencies with a 
limited ability to adjust, hurting the election prospects of Representatives.
US trade and development policy alters drastically depending on partisan 
politics in Congress. Development organisations interviewed in Washington DC saw 
their natural arena as Congress rather than the Executive. While the larger groups do 
participate in roundtable meetings with executive officials, they found these to be 
largely symbolic with little real input. NGOs interviewed were weak compared to their 
European counterparts and had much less time to spend working exclusively on trade 
issues. During the period when the Republicans dominated Congress, many groups are 
narrowed their agendas, moving away from issues like trade to campaign on acute 
problems in specific countries or regions that they believed would appeal equally to 
Evangelical conservatives, such as the recent genocide in Darfur. Although many 
groups are part of larger coalitions, such as Jubilee USA and the One Campaign 
spearheaded by Irish singer Bono, they seem to be moving away from comprehensive 
‘trade, aid, debt’, ‘development round’ or ‘agricultural reform’ messages towards
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individual campaigns on key issues (Development NGOs, Washington DC, April 2006 
and July 2007). One interviewee explained the lack of resources his group had access to 
compared with other regional offices:
‘because we ’re so small we work on particular, specific issues and projects with 
partners in the US...in the UK we have 200 people...and some o f our big countries 
where we’ve been for a long time, like Kenya and India, have 200 people, and even 
Afghanistan we’ve got 80people or something...But we have a tiny capacity here’ 
(development NGO rep, DC, April 2006).
Another interviewee backed up this view, arguing that US NGOs have a much 
harder time presenting their views to elected representatives:
‘The influence o f [our organisation] is so much stronger in Europe than the US. 
That being said I  think they've really done a great job there carving out a place as 
being the voice o f poverty and really taking responsibility for their positions ...they 
also have this presence o f being in a big organisation with a very big following in 
the public...We don't have that here...one o f the Chairs o f the [Congressional] 
Agricultural Committee... he told somebody, one o f [our] staff members here “Why 
should I listen to you on agriculture issues? You really just represent European 
interests”. It's very depressing, but there you go’ (Development NGO 
Representative, Washington DC, July 2007).
Issues of jurisdiction are key in trade negotiations. How topics are divided up 
between negotiators can have a big impact on the outcome of the negotiations. This is 
especially acute given the expansion of the trade agenda: where does one issue area end 
and another begin? Unlike the EU, the US prefers to keep issues strictly separate in 
trade negotiations (Anderson and Cavanagh 2004). Officials spend considerable time 
and effort to coordinate positions across departments before attending meetings. 
Consultation with private interests is institutionalised and held in advance. According to 
one negotiator: ‘This turns into a negotiating tactic for foreign countries. The US likes 
to split Agriculture and NAM A [non-agricultural market access], and other countries 
don't like that’, wanting to link issues together and trade off concessions against one 
another. Although developing countries come willingly to the US to negotiate trade 
agreements, and officials use development arguments to promote them, the focus is on 
deals where the US market will gain an advantage (ex-USTR negotiator, June 2007).
The EU: Searching for Coherence
When changing direction from a millennium round to a development round, the EU 
simply folded development rhetoric into existing policy. In December 2002, the EU
133 of 204
Commission put forward a draft proposal with the headline ‘More market opening, less 
trade distorting support and a radically better deal for developing countries’. The 
proposal included ‘specific actions to give developing countries a better deal’, such as 
duty and quota free access for imports from LDCs, zero duties on half of imports from 
other developing countries, and a ‘food security box’ attached to a safeguard which 
would allow developing countries to shape agricultural markets based on food security 
and rural development objectives. The Commission also continued to emphasise the 
importance of environmental issues, especially the precautionary principle, rural 
development, and animal welfare (European Commission 2002). This multifunctional 
policy approach has seen animal rights campaigners in the EU attempting to create a 
joint platform with agricultural and development groups to protect the green box37 and 
the style of European policymaking which it represents (Animal Rights Campaigner, 
London, September 2006).
But the European model is under threat. From the 1976 Lome Convention, trade 
preferences granted to the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries 
were granted unilaterally. WTO rules, however, state that agreements must be reciprocal 
and non-discriminatory (GATT art. XXIV). In 1999, the US government, under 
pressure from US corporations who control the production of Caribbean and Latin 
American bananas, challenged EU trade preferences for ACP countries under the 
GATT. Despite the fact that only seven percent of Europe's bananas came from the 
Caribbean, the US does not itself export bananas to Europe, and US multinationals had 
a near monopoly, the US won the dispute (Barkham 1999). As a result, only preferences 
granted to all developing countries or all LDCs are now legal under WTO rules. In 
2000, the EU began negotiating a series of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), 
free trade agreements with ACP countries to replace the Lome conventions. Insistence 
on reciprocity, however, has resulted in agreements which could prove to be far less 
pro-development than their predecessors. Development NGOs have expressed concerns 
that the new agreements will result in lost revenue for signatory countries, that the 
newly created regional markets will be too weak, and that some ACP countries may not 
have the infrastructure needed to benefit from increased trade.
The EU has taken certain steps to appease these fears. In chapter 2, the analysis 
showed that the EU would often attempt to balance its agricultural policy stance with 
initiatives to promote the Union as ‘development friendly’. The EU Trade 
Commissioner has several policy tools at his disposal to do this. The principle of
37 The ‘green box’ refers to the WTO category of agricultural subsidies which are ‘non-trade distorting’.
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coherence indicates that all EU policy must be coherent with its commitments on 
development. The Maastricht Treaty states that ‘the Community shall take account of 
the objectives referred to in Article 130 U in the policies that it implements which are 
likely to affect developing countries’ (Hoebink 2003). EU trade officials under Pascal 
Lamy moved to fully implement coherence with ‘development friendly’ trade 
preferences and through greater consultation with development NGOs. At the same 
time, promoting wider awareness of these initiatives was key to the EU’s strategy.
In 2001, in time for the Doha ministerial meeting, the EU introduced a new 
system of pro-development trade preferences. The Council adopted regulation (EC) 
416/2001, which granted duty free access to all products from least developed countries 
without quantity restrictions- with the single exception of armaments. This policy 
became known as the ‘Everything But Arms’ initiative. EU officials promoted the 
benefits of EBA extensively, taking the moral high ground above other states. DG Trade 
argued that the US, Japan and Canada should follow the EU’s model policy initiative 
(DG Trade 2001a).
Secondly, DG Trade introduced a new consultation process in 1999, the Civil 
Society Dialogue, which provided for a series of regular and ad hoc meetings between 
civil society groups, Commission officials and, occasionally, the Trade Commissioner 
himself.
Development groups are not new to the EU -  the first ones arrived in the 1950s 
(Greenwood 2003) and have persisted ever since. They are well organised, and are 
actively encouraged to engage with the EU by the Commission. The Liaison Committee 
of Development NGOs (CLONG) was created in 1975. The Commission largely funded 
CLONG and considered it ‘vital to establish a European-wide network of Development 
NGOs’ (European Commission 2000). CLONG was later succeeded by the European 
Federation for Relief and Development (CONCORD)38, which now represents 1600 
European NGOs. The role of these groups has changed since the early 1990s. Compared 
to American and Asian regional trade agreements, EU agreements emphasise civil 
society involvement and capacity building (Gamble and Payne 1996), and an increasing 
amount of EU aid is now delivered through NGOs (Grugel 2000; Freres 2000:415).
Development groups began to pay greater attention to trade issues after the 
Seattle 1999 ministerial, and were facilitated in this by new forms of consultation with 
European institutions. The DG Trade Civil Society Dialogue has attracted a multitude of
38 After a financial mismanagement scandal where an audit found that €1 million were either not spent 
according to regulations or were unaccounted for.
135 of 204
development NGOs. The most influential group interviewed claimed to meet with 
Mandelson's Cabinet and the Director General of DG Trade approximately once a 
month and talk with the Permanent Representations every two weeks (Development 
NGO Representative, Brussels, November 2006). Weaker development NGOs lacked 
this formal access but participated in the DG Trade dialogue process to gather 
information (Development NGO Representative, Brussels, October 2006).
Representatives of NGOs which are part of international networks were able to 
compare their access with that of their counterparts on the other side of the Atlantic:
7  spent a fair amount o f time in Europe, networking with European campaigners, 
especially in the past two years, because it’s been really critical that we 
coordinate...what I ’ve learned from that process is that European governments are 
in a lot o f ways more inherently sympathetic to some o f this work. And I know that 
from looking at, fo r example, the access that colleagues in Europe have to their 
finance ministries...There is more o f a culture o f being able to go and meet 
administration officials and the political climate is more open to this sort o f work’ 
(Development NGO Representative, Washington DC, April 2006).
Another interviewee highlighted the national and regional differences at work:
‘Interviewer: Is what you do here in Europe different from what your counterparts 
do in America ?
Interviewee: Very much. The dynamic is completely different. I  think despite 
everything people say about the European Commission and EU member states 
there is a willingness to listen to us and to sit down -whether they take our demands 
into consideration is a different story- but I  think there is a willingness to 
engage...when I  hear what’s going on in Washington and how the lobbying is done 
and how to approach Congress and the White House I  think that the dynamic is 
completely different...in Washington if you're a correspondent there are so many 
high profile academics and political players that [development NGOs] can become 
a bit irrelevant... Are you from Britain? People there are very open to NGOs I have 
to say, whereas if  you talk to a Congressman from the Plains I'm not sure he's so 
open...the same applies here for Eastern European countries, and Southern 
[European] countries. I f  you talk to Italian politicians or you talk to Polish 
politicians you don't get a very warm welcome. The European Commission and the 
European players are very much aware o f [the differences between the EU and 
US], they see that the level o f engagement is different and they push us to be more 
engaged and pressure America further and further’ (Development NGO 
Representative, Brussels, November 2006).
It is interesting to note that it is the EU institutions themselves that have placed pressure 
on development NGOs to expand the lobbying efforts of their American counterparts.
A 2006 evaluation of the dialogue by a group of NGOs known as the European 
Trade Network criticised it as an ineffective tool that is time consuming and divisive of 
the NGO community without giving groups any real influence (Development NGO
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Representative, Brussels, October 2006). Although participants in the dialogue feel that 
they have gained valuable information about the positions of other groups, most had not 
changed their own position as a result. In a recent study (subtitled ‘A Voice, not a 
Vote’) dialogue participants felt that some ideological differences were irreconcilable 
and expressed frustration that some were still clinging to “old fashioned views of what 
development is” (Slob and Smakman 2006:52). Nevertheless, it is clear that the efforts 
of the EU Commission to engage with development groups contrast strongly with US 
consultation strategies.
The EU is not, of course, universally admired by developing countries for its 
trade and development policy. Market access for some key developing country exports 
such as sugar and bananas has actually decreased since the introduction of recent 
‘development friendly’ preferences under Cotonou and EBA. Some ACP countries have 
been rethinking their trade strategies, wanting to pursue trade relations with the US 
rather than the EU. Others are concerned that enlargement will slow down agricultural 
reform (Maxwell and Engel 2003:9). NGOs in Latin America have been more focussed 
on participating in US regional agreements such as CAFTA and the FTAA (Tussie and 
Botto 2002).
As it becomes clear that the ACP and Doha negotiations will deliver little in the 
way of development for the world’s poorest countries, European NGOs are reflecting 
more and more the sense of frustration felt among developing countries:
‘In the sense o f advocacy and lobbying we want war on the Commission. To say 
“listen, if you come to us months later with the exact same bloody deal...that's just 
not going to go through”...We believe [the Doha Round] has failed because o f the 
intransigence o f North America and Europe...and developing countries have been 
saying “no, no, no, no” every step o f the way. So which part o f “no” - 1 think it's 
the Zambian trade minister who said that- which part o f “no” don't you 
understand?’ (Development NGO Representative, Brussels, November 2006).
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the creation of the Doha Development Agenda, explaining 
how and why ‘trade and’ issues associated with agricultural policy (such as rural 
development and environmental preservation) and with development (such as aid and 
capacity building programmes) were advocated by the EU and US. Elite policymakers 
sought to link the agricultural policy aims of developed countries to the perceived 
benefits to developed countries from liberalisation in order to form a basis for the 
negotiations and overcome the impasse experienced at the Seattle WTO ministerial in
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1999. In the years since the Doha Declaration in 2001, the EU and US have promoted 
the Doha agenda and incorporated it into their existing trade agendas in different ways.
Following the lead of WTO officials, the EU tried to develop a broad Doha 
agenda, linking sustainable development issues at home with those abroad, and pushing 
for multifunctionality in agricultural domestic support. Incorporating development 
issues into EU trade policy served a double purpose for EU negotiators: one of popular 
legitimation of EU policies among developing countries (the use of ‘trade and’ issues as 
a policy model) and reassurance of continuing agricultural subsidies as part of a 
distinctly EU model at home (the use of ‘trade and’ issues as bargaining tools). This can 
be seen in the efforts of the European Commission to participate in a dialogue process 
with key NGOs, and the considerable access given to key development groups when 
compared to their counterparts in the US. The lack of legal formality in EU trade policy 
facilitates the ability of the Commission to use development arguments to justify its 
trade stance. Both the EU and US have increasingly supported capacity building 
initiatives and ‘aid for trade’, although EU aid to least developed countries is 
consistently higher.
Where the EU sought to use a broad agenda to justify its actions between 2001 
and 2007, the US has relied on free trade arguments. The USTR justifies its actions as 
‘opening markets’ abroad to the benefit of both domestic agribusiness and the 
developing country. The agency acts as a broker for its domestic agricultural interests, 
seeking out new market opportunities. US officials prefer to keep agricultural 
negotiations separate from ‘Non-Agricultural Market Access’ discussions, reflecting the 
special status of the agricultural sector in US trade policy. Agricultural issues are 
particularly territorial, and as it once did on trade, Congress has a natural tendency to 
logroll, resulting in higher and higher subsidies. The USTR derives its legitimacy from 
Congress and cannot ignore this strong message of support for agricultural protection. 
The USTR advisory committee system is also structured to allow disproportionate 
access to agribusiness. The formal legal style of US trade initiatives means that a 
bilateral overture to a developing country over a possible FT A is more likely than an 
extensive consultation document which details a pro-development position. The large 
imbalance between agricultural and development interests in the US is summarised 
perfectly in its dispute against the EU’s trade preferences for ACPs under the Lome 
convention. Despite the relatively weak economic case for supporting US banana 
producers, the USTR responded swiftly to their requests and actively pursued them at 
the international level. As a result of this case, US reciprocity, not EU unilateralism, is
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now the international norm for granting trade preferences to developing countries.
All of this reinforces the view that the crucial divide between the EU and US 
over trade policy is not one of hard or soft power per se but of the delegation and 
representation mechanisms which underpin each system. While the EU and US have 
both paid close attention to the needs of agricultural interests, the EU, concerned about 
its legitimacy amongst European citizens and developing countries, has sought 
consultation with development NGOs. In contrast, the US acts as a broker for specific 
agricultural interests, acting on clear legal responsibilities laid out by Congress. The 
next chapter extends this test to a newer area of policy, trade and health, exploring US 
and EU positions on access to essential medicines programmes and negotiations on 
trade in health services.
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6 Trading Lives: Health Policy Under TRIPS and GATS
‘...we affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in 
a manner supportive o f WTO members' right to protect public health and, in 
particular, to promote access to medicines for all’
-  Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, 2001
‘...the Parties affirm that this Chapter can and should be interpreted and 
implemented in a manner supportive o f each Party’s right to protect public health 
and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for a llA0
-  US-Peru FTA Draft Text, 2007
Governments do not seem prepared for the extent to which trade and health policies 
could become connected within the next decade. Bilateral and regional trade legislation 
now commonly contains restrictions on intellectual property rights and drug patents.
The developing trade in services agenda includes health and social services, and 
countries such as India and Thailand are keen to push forward liberalisation in these 
sectors to promote ‘health tourism’: patients travelling across borders to receive elective 
treatments from hip replacements to plastic surgery. The outsourcing of medical 
services such as transcription is now more common, and large private health providers 
from America are keen to expand into other markets. Health is a difficult policy to 
isolate: the liberalisation of financial services such as the insurance sector have a direct 
impact on the provision of care. The push to break down non-tariff barriers also calls 
into question domestic regulation addressing food safety and the use of genetically- 
modified organisms. The transborder spread of infections such as SARS and avian 
influenza is also related to increased global trade.
This chapter focuses on two of these areas, examining the issues surrounding 
access to generic medicines in developing countries and the creation of a global market 
in health services. It extends my argument to an issue area where there is still all to play 
for: it is issue areas where public spending and public services are at stake such as 
health, education and social policy where the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of ‘trade and’ policies 
will develop in future years. In each case, the EU and US have paid attention to 
different types of interests as a result of their domestic institutional arrangements. In the 
US, the importance of Congress, Presidential elections and the concentration of the
39 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, adopted 14th 
November 2001.
40 US-Peru Free Trade Agreement, draft text as revised 10th May 2007, Chapter 16, Article 16.3.
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health services sector in certain districts and states have all influenced the politics of 
trade and health. In the EU, the strong influence of diffuse groups such as development 
and public health NGOs at the European level has been key to shaping the EU’s broad 
agenda.
The TRIPS (Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights) case is unusual here due 
to the unprecedented degree of success enjoyed by fair trade groups. Unlike in the other 
two cases, the access to medicines movement has been truly transatlantic. Where trade 
unions might coordinate their strategies through an international confederation, and 
development NGOs through different national branches, the access to medicines 
movement was, from an early date, an international collaboration with a small number 
of policy entrepreneurs meeting face to face and enlisting the support of international 
organisations. Their persistence and joined up strategy resulted in one of the biggest 
successes for any fair trade coalition. Through advocacy efforts in Washington and 
Brussels, and by providing legal and technical expertise to developing country 
governments, the coalition helped to push America and Europe, two regions with huge 
pharmaceutical industries, towards a more flexible interpretation of intellectual property 
which affirmed the rights of developing countries to manage their own health affairs 
(Shadlen 2004).
The anti-GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) movement, by 
contrast, has remained small and uninfluential, yet the issue is still a good illustration of 
the differences between the EU and the US. In the EU, Pascal Lamy announced a 
moratorium on health services in the GATS negotiations. Although interest groups were 
a relatively small part of opposition to the health services negotiations, the EU 
Commissioner was representing the many interests that strongly opposed health sector 
liberalisation through an international trade agreement. In contrast, the US has pursued 
this agenda with vigour, pushing the interests of its private health sector, which is an 
increasingly large part of the US economy and one of few sectors where there is a trade 
surplus. In contrast to the TRIPS debates, in neither case have criticisms of the GATS 
become high profile public issues.
There is considerable potential for trade and health policy to develop along the 
lines of other ‘trade and’ policies. Health care is a controversial issue, and removing 
barriers to competition in health could stir up some very strong disapproval. Blouin 
makes five recommendations to ensure that trade and national health policies do not 
conflict: ‘space for dialogue and joint fact-finding; leadership by ministries of health; 
institutional mechanisms for coordination; meaningful engagement with stakeholders;
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and a strong evidence base’ (Blouin 2007). These are exactly like the measures already 
implemented (through different channels) by the EU and US in other trade-related 
policy areas (see Chapters 4 and 5 above). As we have seen, these measures are much 
talked about, but not necessarily effective. Domestic institutional arrangements directly 
influence the effectiveness of any consultation or data gathering exercise. Governments 
must have the will to enforce; awareness among the public and elected representatives 
must be raised; funding must be guaranteed. If these measures are ineffective or rarely 
used in developed countries with stable and fairly efficient infrastructure, are they 
viable in countries with fewer resources?
The next section examines EU and US support for the ‘access to essential 
medicines’ campaign, showing that support for the campaign in the US is governed by 
partisan politics and in the EU by the need to legitimate the EU project by enlisting 
interest group support. The rest of the chapter explains the different approaches the EU 
and US have taken towards including health services in the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services. Here again, the US is keen to promote the interests of its large private 
health sector and those members of Congress who support it, while the EU is concerned 
with maintaining its legitimacy in the face of opposition from its member state 
governments. The chapter concludes that health services may well shape up to be the 
next big battleground, comparing the patterns seen here with those already established 
on labour, the environment, development and agriculture.
Intellectual Property Rights and Access to Medicines
Both the EU and the US are huge markets for medicines. EU member states are the 
world’s largest exporters of pharmaceuticals, exporting $214.5 billion worth in 2006, 
$85.3 billion of this to countries outside the EU, and importing $172.8 billion, of which 
$43.6 billion came from outside the EU. The US exported $29.1 billion and imported 
$46.2 billion, a comparatively smaller amount, but nonetheless second only to the EU 
(WTO 2007b). Developing new medicines is an enormously time consuming and 
expensive task. Pharmaceutical companies based in America and Europe are responsible 
for the majority of research and development spending on drugs: US companies make 
up 49% of R&D spend on medicines worldwide. Pharmaceutical R&D makes up 23% 
of total R&D in the UK, 20% in France, and 19% in Germany (BERR 2006). Out of the 
23 disputes notified under TRIPS, the US is the primary complainant in 17 (74%). The
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EU is the primary complainant in 6 (26%). One other dispute was initiated by Canada, 
and another by Brazil41.
Given the strong interest of Europe and America in protecting their domestic 
industries, it is not surprising that the EU and US responded positively during the 1980s 
to demands from a coalition of businesses for greater protection of intellectual property 
rights, pushing for these protections to be incorporated in the new WTO framework.
The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS 
Agreement) came into effect on 1 January 1995. Using a decidedly European metaphor, 
TRIPS constituted the third of three ‘pillars’ of the WTO, along with trade in goods and 
trade in services. Unlike the other two pillars, however, the agreement is protectionist in 
nature rather than liberalizing. The agreement sets out minimum standards for the 
protection of intellectual property, including patents on pharmaceuticals, which must be 
made available for 20 years. Business interests had pulled off an enormous coup: at the 
core of an organisation which aimed to pull down trade barriers, they had placed an 
agreement which effectively protected their rights, and economic interests, over those of 
more diffuse groups.
Not all players in the international community were happy with the agreement. 
Developing country governments, in particular, found that although TRIPS gave them 
the right to use certain policy instruments to tackle health problems such as the rapid 
spread of AIDS and tuberculosis, actions by developed country governments often 
violated the spirit of the agreement. Countries with little international power or 
economic autonomy were struggling to assert their TRIPS rights in the face of pressure 
from powerful creditor and donor states.
It was from this standpoint that developing country governments sought a 
further agreement which would clarify their rights. In 2001, intense activity on this issue 
on the part of governments and NGOs brought about just such an agreement. The Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health confirmed the flexibility of 
TRIPS, clarified the right of countries to issue compulsory licenses to promote public 
health and made clear that crises relating to epidemics such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis 
and malaria could serve as grounds for issuing such licenses (Shadlen 2004:95-6).
The Doha Declaration succeeded in clarifying the rights of developing countries 
and strengthened the hand of groups seeking to hold developed countries to account in 
undermining the flexibility of TRIPS. But this did not solve the problem for countries 
without the domestic capacity to manufacture generic medicines. In order to tackle
41 Author’s calculations, based on data available at www.wto.org, accessed May 2008.
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severe health problems, these countries would have to import the drugs from overseas 
under a compulsory licence granted by the foreign government- something that the 
TRIPS agreement did not allow42 and the Doha Declaration did not address (Shadlen 
2004:96).
After failed attempts to address this problem, 2003 brought a significant turning 
point. WTO members agreed to a partial waiver of TRIPS restrictions on granting 
compulsory licenses for export in national emergencies -along with some significant 
new regulations and restrictuions designed to prevent the rules from being used to 
justify more routine transactions (Shadlen 2007:568). WTO members made these 
changes permanent in December 2005 by amending the TRIPS agreement -the first time 
a WTO agreement had ever been revised.
Aside from power struggles between state actors, the TRIPS agreement and the 
2001 Doha Declaration represent important victories for two very different types of 
interest group. Susan Sell and Aseem Prakash (2004) explore these two competing 
normative frameworks -the pro-IPR business lobby that pushed for the tough 
intellectual property rights contained in the TRIPS agreement, and the subsequent NGO 
campaign for better developing country access to essential medicines. The campaign 
against TRIPS grew out of actions by policy entrepreneurs with expert knowledge and a 
strong commitment to the issue. In the US, individuals such as Jamie Love and Ralph 
Nader started getting involved in these issues soon after TRIPS was agreed. Gradually, 
more individuals and groups began to get involved, not just in the US, but across the 
world. A small but motivated international network formed around the issue, and won 
the support of international organisations such as the United Nations Development 
Programme, the World Health Organisation and the World Bank (Sell 2003:146-162). 
While successful lobbying by major pharmaceutical companies led developed country 
governments to push for a highly protectionist agreement on IPRs, lobbying efforts by 
pro-access groups assisted developing countries in securing their own rights. The 
following two sections take a closer look at the domestic politics of IPRs and health in 
the US andEU.
The US and Access to Essential Medicines
America’s huge health market makes the availability of affordable medicines a major 
domestic policy issue which at times overshadows the foreign policy aspects of
42 TRIPS Article 31 f  states that the granting of a compulsory licence ‘shall be authorized predominantly 
for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use’.
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intellectual property rights. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, HIV/AIDS activists in the 
US were heavily focussed on campaigning for better awareness and improved funding 
and access to treatment within the US, and had few resources to consider or tackle the 
international dimensions of the issue.
At the same time, the HW Bush and Clinton administrations paid close attention 
to the demands of pharmaceutical companies in designing US trade policy. While texts 
addressing the protection of labour and environmental standards were added under 
Clinton as side agreements to NAFTA, intellectual property protection was already in 
the core of the agreement, discussed in the main text (Chapter 17). While labour and 
environmental standards were an afterthought, the US administration was already 
listening closely to demands from the pharmaceutical sector.
This remained the case throughout most of the Clinton administration, even as 
the access to medicines issue became more contentious internationally. In 1997, for 
example, South Africa passed the South African Medicines and Medical Devices 
Regulatory Authority Act. The act gave the South African government the ability to 
revoke patents on medicines and issue compulsory licences allowing manufacture of 
drugs to combat HIV/AIDS. US pharmaceutical companies reacted by complaining to 
the USTR and starting legal action against the Act. The USTR fully backed the pressure 
on South Africa to revoke the legislation, placing the country on the 301 watch list (Sell 
2003:151-2). Countries on the list come under considerable pressure from the US to 
address the problems identified, under the ultimate threat of trade sanctions.
With the Clinton administration listening to domestic HIV/AIDS activists to 
some degree, but siding with pharmaceutical companies on IPRs and trade, forging links 
between these two issues was crucial for pro-access activists. Policy entrepreneurs 
looking to influence the US government’s position on IPR and health were advised to 
engage with domestic activists such as ACT-UP, a grassroots network formed in the late 
1980s to fight for greater availability and affordability of experimental AIDS drugs 
(Devereaux et al. 2006). Working together, international and domestic NGOs and 
activists were able to frame IPRs as a public health issue rather than a trade issue, a 
perspective that the USTR had not previously considered. Critics of AIDS policy and 
critics of globalization came together to criticise the USTR (at one point activists 
chained themselves to desks in Charlene Barshefsky’s office) and to target Vice- 
President Al Gore’s Presidential campaign (Gellman 2000b).
These efforts were successful in bringing the administration’s attention to the 
problem. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky recalls that "Largely it was the
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activities of ACT-UP and the AIDS activists that galvanized our attention [to the fact] 
that there was an absolute crisis’ (Gellman 2000a). President Clinton announced his 
intention to change US policy in December 1999 at the Seattle ministerial meeting:
‘Did you see the gentleman holding up the big white napkin here before we started? 
He was doing that to get the light for the television earner as.. M ike [Moore, WTO 
Director General] whispered to me, he said, “Well, after yesterday, that could be 
the flag o f the WTO” ...the United States will henceforward implement its health 
care and trade policies in a manner that ensures that people in the poorest 
countries won't have to go without medicine they so desperately need’(Clinton
1999).
Significantly, in May 2000 the Clinton Administration followed through on this pledge 
by issuing an Executive Order which prohibited the USTR from putting pressure on 
countries not to issue compulsory licenses43. The change of framing played a crucial 
role in convincing the USTR to take on board the interests of constituencies other than 
pharmaceutical companies, contributing to the efforts of developing countries to get 
their problems addressed through the global trading system.
Throughout 2001, the new US administration struggled to define its position on 
TRIPS. In February, the Bush administration announced that it would extend Clinton’s 
Executive order, a distinctively pro-access decision. But other actions contradicted this 
position. In May, an evidence-based process for revising the essential medicines list was 
proposed in a World Health Organisation (WHO) discussion document. The proposal 
was well received, ‘with the exception of the USA, which attacked every aspect of the 
list in a detailed memorandum. Areas of dispute included the applicability of the list to 
developed countries and cost considerations’ (Laing et al. 2003:1726). In June, the US 
stood up for pharmaceutical companies at a TRIPS Council meeting (Boseley and 
Capella 2001). In the same month, the US announced that it was rescinding its WTO 
dispute against Brazil over patents, in favour of bilateral consultation between the two 
countries. USTR Robert Zoellick stated that this was an example of the administration’s 
‘flexible approach’ towards health and IPRs (Bureau of National Affairs 2001).
At the Doha WTO ministerial in November 2001, this ‘flexible approach’ was 
tested. The US and its allies underestimated how strongly developing countries felt 
about TRIPS. The position taken by US officials was very similar to PhRMA’s, arguing 
that the problem was ‘poverty not patents’ (Odell and Sell 2006:100). Despite publicly 
acknowledging the arguments of pro-access activists, USTR officials show considerable
43 Executive Order 13155, ‘Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals and Medical Technologies’, May 10th,
2000.
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concern for the opinions of concentrated interests and are reliant upon them to provide 
policy details and overall direction. On this issue as in others, officials appear to see 
their role as servants of industry, as illustrated in this speech by USTR Robert Zoellick:
‘The United States, working with other WTO members and our pharmaceutical 
industry, has strived to bridge the many differences and sought to develop with 
others constructive ideas about how to move forward...The consensus now reached 
in the WTO is a big step forward, removing a major hurdle to a successful 
Ministerial in Cancun and the overall Doha negotiations... The United States 
government appreciates the cooperative leadership o f the executives o f the 
pharmaceutical companies who are committed to developing the medicines o f the 
future while helping those most in need today’(USTR 2003a).
The formal duties of the USTR reinforce this viewpoint among staff, with many of the 
USTRs major policy instruments emphasising the agency’s action on behalf of private 
citizens and groups. Under the Trade Act of 1974 (as amended), the USTR has a duty to 
identify countries that do not provide adequate protection for or enforcement of 
intellectual property rights or market access to persons relying on and place the worst 
offenders under ‘priority foreign country’ status. Countries on the ‘priority watch list’ 
are subject to special bilateral attention from the USTR to try to reach an agreement, but 
may face sanctions if the situation is not rectified, although this is a rare occurrence 
(USTR 2006)44. Developing countries anticipate action by the US before its annual 
review, and sometimes amend laws accordingly to avoid being put on the watch list. If 
the USTR resolves the action, the resulting bilateral agreement spreads US norms about 
IPR protection (Drahos 2001:793). This legal obligation, placed on the USTR by 
Congress, toughens US policy, pushing it towards legal formality and away from 
diplomatic compromise.
This is evident in that the US has a history of negotiating bilateral agreements 
with intellectual property standards that are tighter than those in the TRIPS agreement 
itself (Fink and Reichenmiller 2005; Correa 2006; Mayne 2005). These tighter standards 
are known as ‘TRIPS-Plus’ provisions. Such provisions can
‘prescribe the patentability o f second therapeutic uses o f known medicine, provide 
a stronger protection for data submitted to regulatory authorities, extend the term 
o f protection, narrow the exceptions to the rights conferred, add conditions on the 
use o f compulsory licenses, proscribe the international exhaustion doctrine, and 
restrict the grounds for revocation (section 9)’ (Morin 2006:41).
Krikorian and Szymkowiak (2007) examine 14 US FT As from NAFTA onwards,
44 The 2006 Priority Watch List named China, Russia, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Israel, Lebanon, 
Turkey, the Ukraine and Venezuela for failing to protect against ‘unfair commercial use’ of undisclosed 
data submitted by pharmaceutical companies.
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scoring each according to the strength of its IP provisions. They find that IP restrictions 
in US FT As since 1992 are systematically tougher than those under WTO rules. IP 
protections in later bilateral deals (the Peru, Panama and Colombia FT As) are not as 
strong as those signed earlier with Oman, Bahrain and Morocco, however. Although 
Krikorian and Szymkowiak argue that this is due to a ‘regional effect’, there is another 
plausible explanation. The second set of FT As were signed after the Democrats 
regained control of Congress at the end of 2006. With even a limited Democratic 
majority, these issues found their way onto the agenda again. In the US, unlike the EU, 
political parties seem to make a difference.
Intellectual property issues were unfinished business for key Democrats heading 
up the Ways and Means Committee in 2007 (Congressional Staffer, Washington DC, 
May 2008). In May 2007, the committee agreed a package of amendments to the text of 
the US-Peru FTA that included an unprecedented number of annexes addressing ‘trade 
and’ issues, intended as a model for future FT As (see Chapters 4 and 5 above). The 
revised FTA text included a very clear restatement of US commitments to promoting 
access to essential medicines under the amended TRIPS agreement. Previously, NGOs 
had opposed the Peru and Colombia FTA text on intellectual property, arguing that the 
US had not responded adequately to negotiators’ alternative proposals and had instead 
stuck closely to model language provided by pharmaceutical lobbyists (Oxfam 
2006:13).
Emphasising the development debates surrounding TRIPS to elected 
representatives can be tricky. Congress responds to territorial interests above all. 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers provide skilled jobs and form a key part of the (still 
growing) health sector in certain states, often against the backdrop of declining 
manufacturing jobs. Another issue is the high domestic cost of drugs. It is difficult to 
sell constituents the idea that the US should promote cheap drugs for developing 
countries when many Americans, particularly retirees, face huge bills for medicines that 
they cannot afford to pay. From this viewpoint, access to medicines remains a domestic 
issue, if in a slightly different way to that experienced in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
(personal communication, health policy expert, Washington DC, May 2007). One pro­
access lobbyist described the difficulty in targeting members of Congress:
‘...you eliminate completely states where the pharmaceutical industry has a large 
mass of companies, and then you eliminate all the people who are ideologically just 
pro-business...you really have to limit down to a few  states where you don't have a 
lot of pharmaceutical companies, where the person has an interest in foreign issues 
or their staff understand intellectual property issues, and where they are actually
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going to trust you to come in and talk to them about it, and they've heard about 
your organisation. I  mean you really start narrowing down. And you have to 
convince the staffers that they have to take this issue on ’ (Development NGO 
Representative, Washington DC, July 2007).
Despite these difficulties, the May 2007 proposal was a clear change in tone:
‘there are members o f Congress who genuinely care. And it's changing somewhat, 
not even in the last six months but just over the last ten weeks. There's more 
engagement...because the Democrats came to control Ways and Means in the 
House -that was a big deal. Basically, a lot o f the [public health] groups have had 
relationships with the new head o f the subcommittee on Ways and Means, Sander 
Levin, who has always been interested in intellectual property issues. It's all luck. I f  
the Democrats had won the house and Sander Levin didn’t come up to be the Chair 
o f the subcommittee, who knows? Maybe none o f this stuff would have gone 
forward. He's really interested in the details, he’s always followed this issue... and 
he had a very good staffer working on this over the last six months. You need all o f 
that to work out just to even get it onto the agenda ’ (Development NGO 
Representative, Washington DC, June 2007).
The EU and Access to Essential Medicines
European debates on access to essential medicines focus on external development issues 
rather than domestic ones. From the late 1990s onwards, a network of likeminded 
NGOs exerted pressure on the EU institutions, in particular, persuading the previously 
pro-pharmaceutical DG Trade to change its opinion. The coalition was led by groups 
such as Medecins Sans Frontieres and Health Action International (Sell 2003), widely 
known as professionalised, knowledgeable and effective45. The coalition had a hard task 
ahead of them. In 1998, in response to the draft World Health Assembly resolution on 
the Revised Drug Strategy (RDS), DG Trade concluded ‘no priority should be given to 
health over intellectual property considerations’, responding to ‘considerable concern 
among the pharmaceutical industry’ ('t Hoen 2002:210).
As late as June 2001, in a communication to the WTO TRIPS Council, the EC 
and EU member states firmly stated that they thought that article 31 of the TRIPS 
agreement already left enough discretion to allow developing countries to grant 
compulsory licences on public health grounds (European Communities 2001). But by 
the end of the meeting a consensus had emerged (including the EU) that TRIPS should 
not interfere with the protection of public health (Sell and Prakash 2004:167). At the 
September 2001 TRIPS Council, the EU circulated its own draft text which was pro- 
compulsory licence, while the preferred American text focussed on limiting the
45 MSF, for example, won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1999 for its work in war zones.
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flexibility of the TRIPS agreement. But the US position became hard to maintain after 
Anthrax scares in Washington DC highlighted the possibility of a shortage of Cipro, the 
FDA’s approved treatment for inhaled Anthrax ('t Hoen 2002:42). By November 2001, 
the EU had signed the Doha declaration and on World AIDS day, Trade Commissioner 
Pascal Lamy called for more action going beyond the agreement (DG Trade 2001b).
In 2001, this change in direction was made more concrete in the Commission’s 
Programme for Action (PfA) on AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. This was updated by 
COM(2003)93, COM(2004)726, and COM(2005)179, which covered the period 2007- 
2011. Council Regulation 953/2003, passed 26th May 2003, was designed to avoid 
‘Trade Diversion into the European Union of certain key Medicines’. The European 
Commission argues that the policy ‘encourages manufacturers to distribute the 
medicines in question in the target countries at the lowest possible (“tiered”) price, 
while at the same time recouping their research and development expenditure by 
charging higher prices in developed (OECD) countries’ (DG Trade 2006). When asked 
to name a particular success from the past few years, several NGO representatives 
thought that progress on access to medicines had been a big breakthrough (Development 
NGOs, Brussels, November 2006; Commission Official, London, October 2006).
The pharmaceutical companies’ champion among the EU institutions is DG 
Enterprise. In a series of reports on the sector, DG Enterprise argues that the European 
pharmaceutical industry is losing ground due to higher labour costs and the 
‘peculiarities of the public regulatory and health care systems’ in European countries, 
which are impairing the competitiveness of European markets (Gambardella et al.
2000). A representative of a Europe-wide pharmaceutical association explained that DG 
enterprise was their most important point of contact within the EU:
‘They have a pharmaceutical unit established at DG enterprise. They've actually 
been very good at hosting a lot o f high-level stuff - there is a high level 
pharmaceutical forum going on right now which follows up on the G10 high level 
fora. There's been a growing awareness that, on the part o f DG enterprise in 
particular, there’s a willingness to try and find solutions’ (Pharmaceutical Industry 
Representative, Brussels, May 2008).
The EU took a tougher stance on IPRs as a whole after 2004, with the launch of 
an ‘Intellectual Property Enforcement Strategy’ in November of that year. But even this 
strategy follows general European trends. In its list of ‘solutions’, the EU includes 
‘political dialogue’, the ‘creation of public-private partnerships’ and ‘institutional 
cooperation’. The report also highlights the fragmented nature of such policies, as it lists
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no fewer than 8 DGs and two other agencies46 as responsible for IPR issues, while 
noting that many of the actual enforcement mechanisms are at member state level (DG 
Trade 2004b, 2004a).
Members of the European Parliament played a larger role on access to medicines 
than they have on many of the other ‘trade and’ issues47. The Council Regulation 
implementing the decision made on compulsory licensing at the December 2005 WTO 
ministerial harmonised member state legislation on patent law. It was therefore based 
not just on Article 133 (trade) of the EC Treaty, but also on the Article governing the 
single market (95), meaning that the co-decision procedure had to be used48. This gave 
the European Parliament a rare opportunity to act on trade policy, and the results were 
very interesting. Changes to the final text as a result of using the co-decision process 
included the extension of compulsory licensing to all least developed and low income 
countries, not just those who are members of the WTO, limits on the remuneration due 
to the patent holder, and attempts to reduce the regulatory burden on licensees (Comides 
2007). In 1998, when the European Commission joined with US officials to put pressure 
on South Africa to repeal the Medicines Act, it was the European Parliament that 
demanded that companies dropped the case (‘t Hoen 2002:37).
In May 2006, the European Parliament and Council passed Regulation 816/2006 
on compulsory licensing of patents to comply with the WTO decisions of 2003 and 
2005. Officials involved in drafting the regulation defend their work against criticisms 
from NGOs, arguing that the legal process was ‘rather swift’ and that the Commission’s 
draft was more accurate than the final text and less likely to have to be amended once 
the TRIPS amendment was adopted (Comides 2007). Nevertheless, in July 2007, MEPs 
obstructed plans to ratify the TRIPS agreement on the grounds that the amendment did 
not go far enough to assist developing countries in issuing compulsory licences -  
delaying the vote three times before ratifying the agreement in October 2007. In return 
for ratification, the Portuguese Presidency issued a statement committing the EU to 
financing technology transfer and the production of pharmaceuticals in developing 
countries, and the Commission agreed not to include public health or intellectual 
property provisions in bilateral trade agreements (including the Economic Partnership
46 DGs Trade, Internal Market, Agriculture, Taxation and Customs Union, Justice and Home Affairs, 
Development, External Relations, and Enterprise, the Europe Aid Cooperation Office, the European Anti- 
Fraud Office.
47 See, for example, EP Resolution on Access to Drugs for HTV/AIDS Victims in the Third World 2001 
OJ (C343) 300.
48 The co-decision procedure requires that the European Parliament adopt legislation jointly with the 
Council before a measure can be passed -  they must agree on the same text.
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Agreements) that would damage developing countries’ access to medicines (Euractiv 
2007). The EU formally accepted the 2003 amendment to TRIPS on 30th November. 
This shows that if all trade policy was made under the codecision procedure that results 
would be much more interesting: the Commission’s position would be quite different if 
it had to take the Parliament’s views into account a priori.
Trade in Health Services
In World Trade Organization (WTO) parlance, ‘services’ are very nebulous indeed, 
covering ‘everything that you can’t drop on your foot’ - the intangibles we pay for, 
including financial, IT and legal services, telecommunications, transportation, 
construction, and retail, as well as educational, environmental, health and social 
services. Since the 1970s, an epistemic community of individuals with expertise in the 
services sector pushed to define crossborder services as a trade issue (Drake and 
Nicolai'dis 1992). Health services have been traditionally a part of the domestic 
economy, not traded extensively across borders. Patients and professionals did not often 
travel abroad to receive or provide treatment; providers were national rather than 
international organizations, and x-rays, medical transcription and training were all 
provided domestically. But globalization -  in particular the rapid expansion of new 
technologies -  has changed this. Healthcare is no longer a ‘personal service’ between 
customer and provider, such as might occur between a patient and local doctor. 
Telemedicine sends information across borders and oceans; health ‘tourists’ travel 
abroad for surgery; nurses and doctors train in one country then move to another; and 
large health providers are seeking new markets worldwide. Privatization in developing 
and developed countries (the UK is a good example) means that health services around 
the world are more likely to be provided by a private company than ever before. A 
global market in health services is emerging.
The WTO is the likeliest candidate to regulate this market. The General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is an international agreement that came into 
force in 1995, the same year the World Trade Organization was bom. Its aim is to 
eliminate barriers to trade in the services sector, just as the GATT (General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade) did for trade in goods. The GATS differs, however, in that 
negotiators aimed to make it more flexible to the needs of governments with very 
different policy priorities. As a result, where WTO members were allowed to decide 
which service areas they would commit to liberalization, successive rounds of GATS
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negotiations applied greater pressure to open in new areas. As Article 19 of the GATS 
states, ‘Members shall enter into successive rounds of negotiations... with a view to 
achieving a progressively high level of liberalization’.
All of this seems highly advanced policymaking for a sector in which we have 
almost no reliable data. There is no established international dataset that can tell us the 
size and nature of the global health market, and comparing national data is fraught with 
problems. We can speculate that trade in health services has grown as global trade in 
services overall has increased, and point to evidence by country to show that certain 
services such as medical transcription are increasingly being outsourced and that more 
patients are crossing borders to get treatment, but an analysis of the broader picture is 
extremely difficult.
Despite this, several countries have made concrete commitments to lower 
barriers to trade in health services, with several more engaging in negotiations on 
insurance. The GATS negotiations cover four ‘modes of supply’:
■ Cross border trade: delivery of a service from the territory of one country into 
the territory of other country. This is most relevant for parts of the health sector 
where technology has made the outsourcing of telemedicine possible.
■ Consumption abroad: supply of a service of one country to the service consumer 
of any other country. An example would be a citizen going abroad to seek 
treatment.
■ Commercial presence: services provided by a service supplier of one country in 
the
territory of any other country. This refers to a foreign company providing health 
services in a country via an actual physical presence in that country.
■ Presence of natural persons: services provided by a service supplier of one 
country
through the presence of natural persons in the territory of any other country. This 
would apply to situations where a foreign professional travels to another country 
in order to provide some kind of treatment.
The WTO recognizes essential government services as lying outside the GATS, but 
according to GATS Article 1.3, a government service is one which ‘is supplied neither 
on a commercial basis, nor in competition with one or more service suppliers’. This 
creates a definitional problem of exactly what a government service is, and the rest of 
the GATS text does not elaborate. This ‘constructive ambiguity’ allows complex 
negotiations to be concluded, but causes trouble once the ambiguous phrases are 
interpreted. The WTO’s panels and appellate body are left to interpret these terms 
(Leroux 2006:345-6).
The broadest interpretation of private services included in the GATS by this 
definition would include those ‘wherever there is a mixture of public and private
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funding, such as a user charge or private insurance, or there are subsidies for non-public 
infrastructure, such as public-private partnerships or competitive contracting for 
services’ (Price et al. 1999:1890). Even applying a tighter definition, the US has the 
most commercial health market in the world, and it is likely that even the most publicly 
oriented reform plans will have a privately provided element, as the later sections of this 
report illustrate. As trade lawyer David Luff (2003) comments, a health service would 
be excluded from GATS rules if ‘supplied exclusively by the government, that is, in 
hospitals that are entirely dependent on the government and by doctors who are 
appointed by it and who serve on a completely or nearly gratuitous basis, without 
allowing the patient to choose among the hospitals or doctors available. This is seldom 
the case.’
Some of the disciplines on domestic regulations are modelled on language 
formulated to regulate the accounting industry. In addition, negotiators and those 
advising them are seldom public health advocates.
The most important feature of the GATS -the main reason that it could be 
negotiated at all- is that it allows differential commitment to the talks. Participating 
countries have more say over which sectors they commit to the services negotiations. 
Cooperation between countries on ‘immigration, labour-market policies, professional 
standards, mutual recognition, and licensing norms’ takes place within the GATS, 
OECD, WHO and in regional organisations such as NAFTA and the EU (Chanda 
2002:41). But although regional trade blocs have promoted liberalization in cross- 
border health services, they have been less successful in harmonizing the healthcare 
regulations and standards, particularly common standards for the licensing of 
professionals (Chanda 2002; Cortez 2008). GATS proved disappointing for business 
lobbies. It is a fundamentally weaker agreement than the TRIPS- the private sector 
wanted a much bigger liberalising agreement, but the GATS allows many exceptions 
(Sell 2003:166-7).
US Health Services
Americans often think of themselves as a nation of growers, producers, or 
manufacturers, but today the US is mostly a nation of service providers. In 2005, service 
industries accounted for 68% of US GDP, 79% of real GDP growth, and 80% of 
employment (USTR 2007). Before even a paragraph of commentary was written on the 
subject, trade and US healthcare were already intimately linked. In theory, trade should
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provide the means to fund the US healthcare system, through employment, wages or 
taxed profits which provide insurance coverage. But globalization has fundamentally 
changed the way the American economy operates: better transport links and rapid 
information exchange have altered the way products and services are provided, 
stretching supply chains across the planet. Although this generally means cheaper prices 
for consumers and increased employment opportunities in developing countries, it also 
means that the number of good jobs in the US with high quality healthcare and pension 
benefits packages has decreased as manufacturing jobs have moved overseas.
Many commentators have questioned the ability of the American healthcare 
system to deliver efficient, cost-effective, good quality care, and US healthcare costs 
continue to rise dramatically. In 2004, total health spending accounted for 15.3% of 
GDP in the United States, the highest in the world. The US spends more per capita than 
any other OECD country, $6102 per person: 55% of this is private money, ($3374 per 
person) while public funds make up the other $2728. In comparison, Canada spends 
$3165 per person: $956 from private sources and $2209 from the public purse. The 
public sector is the main source of healthcare funding for all OECD countries except the 
United States and Mexico.
What is the US getting for all of this money? Per 1000 population, the United 
States has 2 physicians (the OECD average is 3), 7.9 nurses (the OECD average is 8.3) 
and 2.8 acute care hospital beds (the OECD average is 4.1). On average, Americans 
lived 7.6 years longer in 1993 than they did in 1960, but the Japanese lived 14 years 
longer and the Canadians 8.6 years.
Nor do high expenditures in the US cover the entire population; healthcare 
coverage is decreasing yearly. In 2005,44.8 million people, 15.3 percent of all 
Americans, were without health insurance. 10.8 million of those people have a 
household income of $25,000 a year or less (US Census Bureau 2007b). Even fewer 
would be covered without public programs such as Medicare, Medicaid and the State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). SCHIP, for example, currently insures 
more than 4 million low-income children most of whom would otherwise lack 
insurance. Since 1997, SCHIP has been largely responsible for reducing the number of 
uninsured American children by one third (Broadduss and Park 2007).
America continues to move from a manufacturing-based to a service-based 
economy, with considerable effect on US healthcare. Health insurance coverage varies 
greatly by industrial sector. The largest sectors are now service based -  wholesale and 
retail trade, and education, health and social services (34% of the total private
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workforce in 2005). Between 52 and 58% of these workers had coverage in 2005, and 
only 29% of service employees as a whole had coverage. Workers in the manufacturing 
sector, in contrast, had a coverage rate of 71% (Gould 2006). Manufacturing jobs are 
much more likely to provide good health benefits, with labor unions increasing the 
bargaining power of workers. However, this influence is declining as the number of 
workers in manufacturing decreases. Federal, state, and local government employees 
(including elected representatives) are much better off than those in the private service 
sector in terms of employer-provided or subsidized coverage. Without this public 
employment, the quality and availability of healthcare provided to service sector 
employees would be a lot worse.
Recently, several prominent economists have reassessed the impact of 
outsourcing on the US economy and found it to be more damaging than they previously 
thought. Princeton University economist and New York Times columnist Paul Krugman 
(Krugman 2007) argues that outsourcing has fragmented the production process, 
creating increased inequality by hollowing out the skills pyramid. As figure 3 shows, 
income inequality has drastically increased since the 1980s.
Krugman’s theory is that the way trade redistributes income has contributed to 
the growing inequality. While a small number of new executive-level and highly- 
skilled jobs have been created in the US over the last two decades (for example, by 
foreign firms moving their management closer to Washington), a large number of mid­
skilled jobs have moved overseas. Moreover, China has such a large labor pool that 
there is no incentive for the economy to move away from lower skilled jobs to higher 
skilled sectors as other Asian economies have done, suggesting that the current situation 
may not change for some time. Princeton University economist and former Vice 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Blinder supports conventional trade and 
economic free trade theories, but has doubts about outsourcing:
7  would argue that there's something new about the coming transition to service 
offshoring. Those two powerful forces mentioned earlier- technological 
advancement and the rise o f China and India- suggest that this particular transition 
will be large, lengthy and painful...In some recent research, I  estimated that 30 
million to 40 million U.S. jobs are potentially offshorable. These include scientists, 
mathematicians and editors on the high end and telephone operators, clerks and 
typists on the low end.. .It's going to be painful because our country offers such a 
poor social safety net to cushion the blow for displaced workers. Our 
unemployment insurance program is stingy by first world standards. American 
workers who lose their jobs often lose their health insurance and pension rights as 
well. And even though many displaced workers will have to change occupations — a
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difficult task for anyone — only a fortunate few will be offered opportunities for  
retraining. All this needs to change ’ (Blinder 2007).
High healthcare costs in the US make travelling abroad for treatment an 
attractive option. Countries in Asia, Latin American and the Caribbean are actively 
seeking to attract health tourists. In 2003, over 350,000 patients travelled to Cuba, India, 
Jordan and Southeast Asia to seek healthcare (Pierce 2006). One recent study estimated 
that the US would save $1.4 billion per year if one in ten patients were to go abroad for 
‘a limited set of low-risk treatments’ (Mattoo and Rathindran 2005:6; Arunanondchai 
and Fink 2005). In terms of telemedicine, the Philippines have carved out a small export 
market through providing medical transcription services to the US, thanks to its pool of 
English-speaking medical school graduate students. Of the 25 companies exporting 
medical transcription services in 2004, the majority were owned by US investors . In 
exporting its healthcare, India leads the way, showing considerable interest in 
expanding its telemedicine services and eventually building hospitals in the US. The 
United States is second only to the UK as the most popular destination for training 
Indian doctors, and only 50% of all Indian doctors who train abroad return home (Gupta 
et al. 1998:233).
Developing countries see health services as a potentially big growth industry, 
and there is no reason to believe that the US health system will remain insular in years 
to come. It is also possible that domestic health providers, many of whom are becoming 
increasingly international, may choose to change their country of domicile to use 
international trade laws to their advantage in the US (Forum on Democracy and Trade
2006). Now that healthcare can be construed as a transborder service rather than a 
localized, domestic one, health policymakers will need to consider international aspects 
of healthcare in weighing possible reforms.
In the US, a group of at least 100 NGOs, trade unions, and faith based 
organisations were formally campaigning against the GATS49. This was a broader 
coalition than the groups focussing on TRIPS, which mainly consisted of policy 
entrepreneurs heading up small NGOs relying on their expertise. The GATS coalition 
has not been very effective, however, with little access to the administration and no 
concrete policy changes in their favour. In 2005,42 business organizations were 
represented on the USTR’s health related trade advisory committees. Although the 
USTR, like any other government agency, holds public hearings and must publish 
notices in the Federal Register, the advisory committees are allowed longer-term, more
49 Organisations listed on the CorpWatch web site, www.eorpvvatch.org. accessed 20th May 2007.
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extensive access to negotiators and legal texts, and are therefore important points of 
contact for groups wishing to change policy. Only one public health organization was 
represented, recruited to the Tobacco Advisory Committee after a hard fought campaign 
led by the Center for Policy Analysis on Trade and Health (Center for Policy Analysis 
on Trade and Health 2005).
Nor do public health advocates have much input into the interpretation of 
agreements. As a result of the complexity of trade rules discussed above, agreements 
tend to be interpreted through trade dispute settlements rather than by executives, 
legislatures or domestic courts. There are two methods of settling a trade dispute that 
bear on health services. Under the WTO dispute settlement process, a WTO member 
state government can challenge the policies of another WTO member. One of the main 
reasons the WTO was created was to improve upon the process for initiating and 
settling disputes under the GATT, a process that was considered too easily avoided. The 
WTO procedures have much tougher compliance requirements, allowing the prevailing 
state to enact retaliatory trade measures if the losing state doesn’t comply within a 
reasonable time frame.
Under the second method, the investor-state dispute mechanism, private 
investors can challenge governments by using investment provisions in agreements such 
as NAFTA, CAFTA and many bilateral deals. These investment provisions are highly 
controversial, in that they give greater rights to foreign than domestic investors. Most 
national law allows governments to expand public services into new areas without 
facing challenges from private companies on the grounds of lost profits. By employing a 
very broad definition of what constitutes “expropriation” of those profits, including not 
just the seizing of assets, but actions which deprive investors of expected economic 
benefits, investment provisions allow foreign investors to challenge public expansion. 
The investment provisions are not universally loved even among trade lawyers, with 
many regarding it as an unworkable mistake (Trade Negotiator, Washington DC, June 
2007).
Relying on dispute settlements as the means to clarify the language of trade 
agreements can lead to unintended consequences. For example, under national treatment 
provisions, regulations designed to protect patient privacy by requiring medical 
transcription to be carried out by domestic companies could violate trade rules by 
discriminating against foreign corporations (Schaffer et al. 2005:28).
The service sector is vital to the Administration’s trade policy, too, constituting 
$38 billion in exports in April 2007. Without these exports to prop up America’s trade
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balance there would be trouble: in 2007 the US had a $67 billion deficit in traded goods, 
but an $8.4 billion surplus in services (US Census Bureau 2007a). It is unsurprising, 
then, that the US and other developed countries in the same situation have been keen to 
put negotiations on trade in services firmly on the WTO’s agenda and open up foreign 
service markets over the last decade.
The US has made several health-related commitments under the GATS, 
affecting health insurance, the construction of hospitals and other health facilities, 
professional licensing, prescription drugs, the availability of tobacco and alcohol, and 
even requirements to maintain emergency care facilities.
The American pharmaceutical industry has proved its willingness to bring suit to 
prevent state intervention in drug pricing. Since 2004, states have been experimenting 
with various methods of containing the costs of prescription drugs, such as adopting 
formularies (preferred drug lists, where states require prior authorization or justification 
for a doctor to prescribe an expensive drug rather than a cheaper equivalent in the 
formulary) and measures that facilitate the importation of cheaper brand-name and 
generic drugs. This copies existing policy in other countries. In Canada, US brand-name 
drugs are sold at lower prices thanks to the ability of the provinces to negotiate with 
drug manufacturers. In the US, states encouraged manufacturers of expensive drugs to 
negotiate a Medicaid rebate to avoid requiring a prior authorization of their product. 
Although PhRMA, (the trade association representing pharmaceutical manufacturers) 
sued three states (Maine, Michigan and Florida) over their use of formularies and 
rebates, US courts have upheld the right of states to use these methods. After losing in 
US courts, PhRMA requested provisions to be included in the US-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement that could ‘serve as independent grounds for preempting or withholding 
federal funds from state programs’ that sought to cut costs by requiring prior 
authorization of expensive drugs (Gerbasi and Stumberg 2005).
Medical tourism is still a policy problem very much on the horizon, but 
nevertheless, interested groups are starting to pay attention to the issue. The American 
Medical Association issued guidelines for medical tourism in June 2008, warning that 
patients should not be forced to go overseas or to accept substandard care (AMA 2008). 
Pinnacle Health, based in Massachusetts, is the first US Preferred Provider Organisation 
(PPO, a network of providers) to announce a deal facilitating medical tourism. 
Pinnacle’s clients will be able to travel to New Zealand for treatment, potentially saving 
them considerable amounts of money (Fierce Healthcare 2008).
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EU Health Services
In theory, the European Union is the perfect test case for the provision of health services 
across borders. Patients can expect to receive medical treatment in any other EU country 
in the same way as local individuals, with very little adjustments; their domestic health 
insurance is, largely, portable. Health policy was not part of the original EU blueprint, 
and member states did not go to great lengths to include it in the EU project. 
Nevertheless, the EU is developing a health services policy, shaped by reforms in the 
internal market.
For scholars of EU policymaking, the story of EU health policy is a familiar one. 
Health has become a progressively more European policy area due to actions by the 
European Commission and the European Court of Justice, despite a relatively narrow 
treaty base. Health services are not mentioned in the treaties at all. While the 
Commission has sought to increase its jurisdiction over health, the ECJ, in a set of key 
rulings, has reinforced the European health market.
As its internal market for healthcare consolidates, the EU is looking outwards, 
examining links between health and its external relations. A recent report by DG Sanco 
(Health and Consumer Protection) which looks at the period 2009-2014 talks about 
globalisation and the ‘opportunities for exporting our standards’ it provides (DG Sanco 
2007). Robert Madelin, Director-General for Health and Consumer Protection from 
2004, spent the previous decade in DG Trade, first as Deputy Head of Cabinet to Leon 
Brittan, and then at Director level. The treaties give DG Sanco a little-known power to 
place ‘health in all policies’, in theory the power to assess the public health impacts of 
other EU policies and compel other Directorates to adjust them accordingly. In reality, 
however, this is rarely used.
The EU’s service sector has grown at an increasing rate in the last decade, and 
the EU remains the largest exporter of services in the world, boosted by recent 
enlargements, and larger than the US by a considerable amount. In characteristic style, 
the European Commission responded to complaints from service sector industries that 
they lacked representation by telling them to organise themselves. Prompted by Leon 
Brittan as Vice President of the Commission, the Europe-wide business association 
UNICE created the European Services Forum to assist the Commission in negotiating 
the GATS (Greenwood 2003).
ECJ decision 1/94 ruled that the Community and the Member States had joint 
competence over most GATS and TRIPS issues. This means that member states have an 
additional say over the authorization of the negotiating mandate other than via the 133
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committee and that ratification in the Council is unanimous and is accompanied by 
parliamentary ratification in each member state (Meunier and Nicolaidis 1999:481).
European interest groups started campaigning against the GATS negotiations in 
2000. Arguments against the GATS were made on two grounds: the potential 
deleterious effects on European publically funded health systems, and concern that the 
GATS would undermine the attempts of developing countries to build and maintain 
publicly funded health services. The network that formed on the issue therefore 
involved various different kinds of groups: trade unions, and development and 
environment NGOs as well as public health groups.
An anti-GATS campaign was formed in 2000, coordinated by the Corporate 
Europe Observatory in Amsterdam, Europe-wide NGOs such as Friends of the Earth 
and ATT AC, and trade unions. The European campaign was small, consisting of 
approximately 34 NGOs50. The groups expressed concern that the services negotiations 
would deregulate essential services such as health, education and environmental 
services, opening them up to private competition. It was argued that this would decrease 
the quality of the services or reduce access to them, or both. Interest groups from 
member states in the Northwest of the EU -German, British, Scandinavian and Dutch 
groups- are the most active in European health policy, much more so than those in 
Mediterranean countries or Eastern Europe (Greer et al. 2008), and this is reflected in 
the anti-GATS coalition.
In April 2002, a draft of the EU’s services offer was leaked to NGOs containing 
information about the service areas the EU wanted to liberalise in 29 countries (Friends 
of the Earth 2002). The document showed the detailed requests made by the EU to 29 of 
its principal trading partners, including the USA and Canada, as well as less developed 
countries such as Brazil, Philippines and Indonesia. Requests included the liberalisation 
of major service sectors including water supply, waste treatment, energy, transportation, 
scientific research and postal services.
Documents in the period 2002-2003 show how DG Trade’s position on GATS 
was refined, rather than reformed, in response to interest group pressure. In January 
2002, DG Trade argued that GATS does not apply to public services. Responding to an 
ETUC steering committee in January 2002, Pascal Lamy stated that ‘public services are 
not threatened because the GATS does not affect the services that are provided either on 
a commercial basis or in competition with other providers’. In May of that year, Lamy
50 As listed on the Corporate European Observatory web site, www.corporaleeuope.org, accessed 20th 
May 2007.
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confirmed that ‘the Commission has no intention to promote or request privatisation of 
public undertakings during the course of these or future negotiations irrespective of 
whether they are entrusted with the provision of public services or not’ but also noted 
that ‘One should however not over-dramatise the potential effects of carefully crafted 
and targeted liberalisation even in these sensitive sectors’ (Lamy 2002).
DG Trade press releases from 2003 onwards are careful to stress that ‘public 
services within the EU are fully safeguarded’, or ‘fully defended’, with no commitments 
in health or education (see, for example, DG Trade 2005b, 2003). On February 5th 2003, 
Lamy announced at a Commission meeting that the EU’s service agenda for the Doha 
Round would not include health and education (Geitner 2003). Government officials 
were keen to avoid alienating NGOs, stating ‘If we want to attempt to carry civil society 
groups, then we should avoid scaring them unnecessarily’(Buck and de Jonquieres 
2003). So although member states were already reluctant to include these issues in EU’s 
services offer, civil society groups still played a small role in limiting the ability of the 
Commission to press for liberalisation. This was far, however, from the overwhelming 
victory that NGOs claimed. After 2003, civil society activity on the issue markedly 
decreased and groups moved on to other issues, notably the development aspects of the 
Doha Development Agenda.
A moratorium on health services offers in the GATS may not be tenable in the long 
term. It was confirmed in 2006 that the EU’s internal Services Directive, with the same 
aims as the external GATS, would not apply to healthcare. But the creation of a 
transnational policy may not be intentional. As Greer (2006) explains, although the EU 
has taken steps to protect national sovereignty in health service regulation:
‘health systems are large organizations that require money, staff, users, and 
materials as they go about their tasks, and these factors are all subject to the EU 
legal regime. Regulations and judicial decisions concerning purchasing, workplace 
and employment issues, and principles o f non-discrimination all shape the 
environment from which health systems must draw their resources and within 
which they conduct their activities’ (135).
The EU’s health services policy, while influenced by European interest groups, is not 
primarily a response to their demands, but rather the result of Commission activism and 
a number of key decisions made by the European Court of Justice (Greer 2008). 
Likewise, health interests lobbying on trade fluctuate in their visibility and commitment, 
and trade interests pay only sporadic attention to health services. Others have focussed 
their resources elsewhere, biding their time until international negotiations pick up again 
(personal communication, health lobbyist, 2006).
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In the countries schedule of the GATS, under ‘horizontal obligations’, the EU 
stated that in all EU member states, ‘services considered as public utilities at a national 
or local level may be subject to public monopolies or to exclusive rights granted to 
private operators’ (WTO 1994:2). In other words, the EU retains the right to 
discriminate against foreign private health providers. But opponents of the GATS claim 
that this definition of public services is too broad, and that there is a risk that public 
services could be targeted under the GATS by private providers wishing to expand their 
markets. By not explicitly including or excluding specific public services from the 
definition, but providing a list of ‘examples’, the EU risks being limited to those 
examples in future negotiations (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2003:16).
The EU’s internal Services Directive has come under similar criticism for its 
definition of ‘services of general interest’. Recent reforms in the UK and Germany 
encourage private providers to participate in health service provision and aim at using 
market pressures to increase efficiency and drive down costs. These trends make it still 
more difficult to draw a line between public and private provision.
In June 2008, the EU made significant steps towards harmonising health services 
at the European level, unveiling plans to allow European citizens to be treated in any 
EU member state and be reimbursed by their home country . Although it is difficult to 
predict what might happen as an EU internal market in health services develops, it is 
likely that a harmonised market would prove attractive to US health providers. A 
harmonised EU health market may make discrimination against foreign providers less 
defensible in future rounds of services negotiations.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined two related issues which highlight one profound difference 
between European and American trade policy: their approach to markets. Despite a very 
strong pharmaceutical lobby, the EU has chosen to listen to other groups arguing in 
favour of compulsory licensing for developing countries. It then used this policy to sell 
its development credentials in other areas such as the EPAs. On health services, EU 
officials faced strong pressures from member state governments, trade unions, and 
NGOs to protect public services from liberalisation under the GATS. This resulted in 
the EU pledging to keep health and education out of its GATS offer. In both cases, the 
EC shares competency with member states.
163 of 204
The US has a very large private health market, and its pharmaceutical companies 
spend more on research and development than those in any other country. In trade 
policy, this resulted in the pursuit of strong protections for intellectual property and the 
opening of foreign markets to US health care providers. US institutional arrangements 
mean that the USTR is obligated to pay attention to requests from pharmaceutical 
companies to address perceived deficits in IP protection in other countries. It was only 
through Presidential intervention that these rules were altered, with Democrats acting to 
satisfy the demands that were expressed through key AIDS NGOs. The access to 
medicines agenda is still a partisan issue, with Democrats in Congress pushing for it to 
be included in recent trade agreements. On trade in health services, the opposite is the 
case. Anti-GATS groups are prioritising other issues, and the coalition is weak. 
Likewise, there is little enthusiasm amongst health professionals and policy experts to 
take on a new frontier in health care.
This chapter has explored the use of ‘trade and’ policies in a relatively new and 
evolving issue area. Together with the last two chapters, these case studies have 
explored the different ways that the EU and US have used ‘trade and’ policies to their 
advantage. They have explained how and why each issue was introduced onto the trade 
policy agenda, and described the varied policy mechanisms used in the two polities to 
promote ‘trade and’ issues. In each case, the EU and US have paid attention to different 
types of interests. The EU, concerned about its legitimacy in the eyes of European 
citizens and foreign governments, has sought consultation with diffuse groups. In 
contrast, the US acts as a broker for specific interests, acting on clear legal 
responsibilities laid out by a powerful legislature. The next chapter summarises these 
findings and explores their implications for future trade negotiations.
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7 Conclusion: Imagined Commodities
‘Two economists were trapped on a desert island. And one says to the other “What 
are we going to do? I f  we don't get off this island we’re going to die an agonising 
death from hunger and thirst”. And the second one thinks for a while and says 
“well first, we assume a boat... ”. I'm going to talk about boats and tell you why in 
the real world it is very hard to assume a boat. For me the May 10th deal is a 
recognition o f political reality -  that may not be economic reality - but it is political 
reality. ’ -  USTR General Counsel, 200751
Since the creation of the WTO in 1995 and the initiation of the Doha round in 2001, the 
trade agenda has expanded to touch on many domestic policy issues: from agriculture to 
workers’ rights, from competition to environmental protection and from intellectual 
property to public health. Governments have reimagined these ‘trade and’ issues as 
commodities, aiming to export their standards and values beyond their borders.
As the trade agenda has expanded, so too have the type and number of groups 
that claim a stake in the policy process. These demands have led to new forms of 
engagement with non-governmental organisations, including greater consultation within 
the WTO process, increased numbers of advisory committees in the United States, and 
the creation of new, more formal methods of consultation with NGOs in the EU. The 
conclusions of this study relate not just to debates on lobbying but to wider questions: to 
what extent do institutions shape behaviour, and what does this mean for our 
perceptions of the differences between business and civil society organisations?
I have examined the use of non-trade policies by US and EU trade negotiators to 
achieve their secondary goals -whether this is legitimating the policy process, 
distracting critics, or projecting the image of a benign foreign power. While both the EU 
and US use hard and soft approaches to trade policy, the EU attempts to justify its 
policy decisions by linking them to a broad range of other issues, such as rural and 
sustainable development, and public health. The US has promoted a more narrow 
agenda which focuses on free trade arguments, foreign policy relations and the benefits 
of these to groups back home. The explanation for these differences is not that the EU 
and US are irrevocably divided. The difference can be accounted for by the institutional 
settings in which decisions are made. Policymakers choose either to strictly enforce 
trade rules or convince foreign governments that new rules should be made. The 
evidence presented in this volume suggests that in trade policy, the EU and US each do
51 Warren Fukayama, AEI trade briefing attended by the author in Washington DC, 27th June 2007.
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both. In doing so, institutional factors -delegation and representation- influence their 
decisions regarding the incorporation of non-trade issues into their negotiating agenda.
The EU pursues a broad, informal agenda and is open to diffuse groups. 
Standards are included in trade agreements via Commission communications and 
regulations rather than directives. The codecision procedure, which allows the European 
Parliament to have a greater say in the policymaking process, is not often used. The 
power relationship between the EU Council and Commission has been contested 
through a series of ECJ decisions which make even the policymaking process variable. 
The EU’s policy is therefore strongly shaped by its need for legitimacy, which it 
bolsters through the involvement of a broad range of interest groups. Although the EU 
lobbying process is less transparent, there is a greater tendency for Commission officials 
to enter into dialogue with business associations, NGOs and other organisations.
In comparison, the American trade agenda is more closely governed by 
legislation, not regulation. Congress is a constant presence in the calculations of 
officials, who are required to consult with the powerful Ways and Means committee 
before and during negotiations. As American trade policy gains its legitimacy not from 
the input of groups alone, but from a powerful and territorial elected body, trade policy 
is much more partisan. The issues pursued by Democrats and Republicans can be 
clearly seen in the history laid out in Chapter 2. At a time when the Congressional 
bipartisan consensus on trade that emerged after World War two seems an anomaly, the 
President must clearly satisfy Congress in order to push forward the Administration’s 
agenda. The lobbying system affords less access to diffuse groups and requires that 
participants spend far more money, but it is more transparent. The US bureaucracy is 
more efficient than its European counterpart, meaning that the US system for trade 
defence mechanisms is more formalised.
Examining interactions between interest groups and policy officials I find that 
while US officials use these new issues to benefit domestic constituencies, EU 
policymakers use them to enhance their international standing in foreign policy. Behind 
this story are fundamental differences in the way that trade policymakers interact with 
key diffuse and specific interest groups. The consequences of this expanding trade 
agenda are a need for better coordination between government departments and 
agencies, increasing pressure on negotiators to address unfamiliar issues, and 
uncomfortable questions about the nature of policymaking in a globalized world.
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America and Europe in a Multipolar Economy
This is still a study of two policy ‘makers’ rather than policy ‘takers’. Successful WTO 
challenges by developing countries on vital products such as cotton and sugar 
demonstrate that developing countries can win against their more powerful neighbours. 
This makes a successful Doha round both less urgent for developing countries, whose 
have become ore likely to be met within the current system, more urgent for the EU and 
US, whose policies are being openly challenged (Anania and Bureau 2005:548).
But although the relative influence of the EU and US in the global trading 
system has diminished in the last two decades, they are still in a position which allows 
them to impose their preferences on other countries. The EU and US still have strong 
influence in the international economy due to their large internal markets (Drezner
2007). Holding on to this power is of primary importance to them, particularly in light 
of the rapid expansion of countries such as India, China and Brazil. For policy ‘makers’, 
domestic policy drives trade policy because it can. It becomes another tool for 
negotiators trying to defend domestic interests in the face of economic change.
The case studies in this volume show that the arrow of influence clearly runs 
upwards, from first, to second to third image (Gourevitch 1978). Negotiating or 
bargaining styles are affected by how authority is delegated and how various interests 
(whether citizens or organisations) are represented. In other words, how the EU and US 
negotiate, and the issues that they choose to prioritise, can be explained in large part not 
by international politics or economics, but by domestic institutions and interests. 
Delegation to policy officials, the amount of freedom that administrations have to 
decide the scope and priorities of trade agreements, explains the policy debates that lie 
behind EU and US actions on the global stage. In turn, representation of various 
interests explains why officials have those debates and not others. Perhaps someday the 
EU and US will be policy takers, but not just yet.
Chapter 4 explored how the EU and US use labour and environmental standards 
in their trade agreements. It demonstrated that the US uses more formal rules than the 
EU, often keeping non-trade issues separate from one another. In the US, partisan 
politics (in the Presidential race and in Congress) has determined which issues were 
incorporated into trade agreements. In the EU, labour and environmental standards are 
inseparable from a larger agenda that includes development and health policies in an 
attempt to form a coherent European foreign policy that can be a model for the world.
The politics of food will only get more controversial in an economic downturn,
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and there is already evidence of this in the 2008 French Presidency of the EU. Chapter 5 
examined the lengths to which the EU and US were willing to go to shape and promote 
a ‘development round’ of trade negotiations. At the WTO ministerial in Doha, Qatar in 
2001, elite policymakers and negotiators attempted to link two controversial issues: 
agricultural liberalisation and trade as a tool for development. After the ministerial, the 
EU used diffuse issues to simultaneously sell its trade agenda and defend its agricultural 
subsidies, while the US protected its ‘ranchers and farmers’ with little use of 
development rhetoric -even though the US is technically less ‘protectionist’ on 
agricultural issues. While the USTR was a broker for its agricultural interests, seeking 
increased market access abroad, the EU Commission has sought greater consultation 
with development groups to balance its defence of member states’ agricultural interests.
Chapter 6 explored EU and US behaviour on a relatively new issue, health care. 
It described EU and US reactions to an international NGO campaign for access to 
medicines, and officials’ subsequent decisions on trade in health services under the 
GATS. On access to essential medicines, the both American and European officials 
responded to calls from an international network of health activists and Inter- 
Go vemmental Organisations to amend the TRIPS agreement. US receptiveness to the 
essential medicines argument has varied by Administration. In the EU, the European 
Parliament played a vital role in persuading member states to support an amended 
agreement. Trade in health services is a comparatively new issue, as yet unresolved. 
While the US responded to pressures from its large commercial health sector, pushing 
for market access for its large health providers. The EU, responding to strong pressure 
from diffuse groups, placed a moratorium on negotiating on trade in health services 
during the Doha round.
Implications
Trade policy has the potential to evolve in a variety of different ways. On the one hand, 
a body of text in bilateral and regional agreements brings pure trade concerns into 
contact with other non-trade issues by turning non-trade issues into imagined 
commodities. They are imagined because their value is often more closely related to 
their power as symbols rather than their actual practical effects. This creation of 
commodities, the commodification of non-trade policies, produces the same kinds of 
distortions that Polanyi discussed and thereby the same kinds of resistance (Polanyi 
1944). Imagining policies as commodities changes the way they are framed within the
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law, placing them within the scope of WTO rules. On the other hand, governments seem 
reluctant to enforce the measures they have placed in these agreements.
The evidence presented in this volume suggests that the old bipolar model of 
free trade versus protectionism is not a good fit with modem trade policy (if indeed it 
was ever a fit with past trade policies). Not even the revised version -free trade versus 
fair trade- is particularly accurate. Yes, many of these ‘trade and’ policies can and are 
used as non-tariff barriers. But the relationship between protectionism and legitimate 
policy concerns is more complex than it looks at first glance, and very heavily value 
laden. Terms such as ‘free trade’, ‘fair trade’ and protectionism change their meaning 
depending on who is wielding them.
The case studies above reveal a multipolar world of trade policy where interest 
groups of all kinds compete to have their rights formalised in international trade law, 
resulting in a blurred line between public and private law at the international level 
(Shaffer 2003). The new trade paradigm is a model of competing rights. The right of 
businesses in various sectors to trade freely across borders without undue interference or 
protect investments in intellectual property sometimes conflicts with an individual’s 
right to adequate compensation for their labour, a clean environment, or adequate 
healthcare. The right of a state to maintain its own food supply competes with the right 
of other states to pursue economic development. Some authors see the EU model of 
‘social citizenship’ rights plus free trade as an ideal form for new regional trade 
agreements (Abrahamson 2007). This demonstrates the Union’s normative pull. But 
social citizenship rights have to be positively established; they don’t happen by 
accident. If we rely solely on imperfect markets, the result is an unequal distribution of 
wealth- social citizenship rights are created to establish ‘islands of equality in a sea of 
inequality’ (Greer and Matzke 2009). The expansion of the trade agenda could interfere 
with the state’s ability to establish these rights at the national level.
The structure of the World Trade Organisation is straining under this expanded 
agenda. The large number of member states at different income levels, combined with a 
unanimous decisionmaking system is means that multilateral negotiations are the most 
complex in the world. This has led some commentators to suggest that some form of 
subsidiarity is necessary to slim down (Rollo and Winters 2002; Sauve and Zampetti 
2000). Other critics have focussed on improved legislative oversight as the solution. 
Philippe Schmitter (1997) argues that ‘Reciprocal Representation’, reserving some seats 
in a country’s national legislature for representatives from another country, could be a 
modest solution to the tensions between globalisation and democracy. How will we
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regulate this policy space? This may be particularly salient in areas such as health and 
social services, where lives are dependent on good regulation.
This research has three main implications for understanding the consequences of 
globalisation for policymaking: increasingly complex agreements requiring additional 
resources; legalization of diplomatic relations, narrowing policy options; and difficulties 
of oversight and control.
Complexity
Increased links between foreign and domestic policy mean increased complexity. The 
number of pages in a typical European or American trade agreement has increased 
exponentially in the last decade (Congressional Staffer, Washington DC, May 2008). 
This causes several considerable problems. First, while bureaucrats and negotiators may 
be expected to deal with a much wider range of issues than ever before, human capacity 
has not increased. As a result, one individual may not be completely familiar with all of 
the issues they are asked to deal with. This makes extensive coordination with experts in 
other parts of government increasingly important (Trade Negotiator, London, April
2008).
But complexity can also make coordination between departments difficult. The 
USTR must deal with over 90 committees in 19 different government departments and 
agencies (Government Accountability Office 2005). The EU situation is even more 
fragmented, with policy coordinated between 27 member state governments, the Article 
133 Committee, multiple DGs in the European Commission, the EU’s nascent foreign 
policy apparatus and a host of subject committees, consultative forums and high level 
groups. Many of these units are territorial and protective of their influence. If the 
jurisdiction of a ‘trade and’ issue is not clearly defined, turf wars can ensue.
This is a large problem even in developed countries with plenty of resources. It 
is easy for an incoming President to gain approval for additional staff members to focus 
on ‘trade defence’, the identification of rule-breaking behaviour in foreign countries. It 
is not so easy for countries with little legal, financial or institutional capacity to deal 
with very complex trade agreements or disputes. The recent emphasis on ‘trade capacity 
building’ initiatives seeks to rectify this inequality through targeted aid payments and 
training programmes, although it is difficult to determine whether these initiatives are 
being successful.
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The fundamental problem at the heart of WTO negotiations themselves is that of 
over 150 countries trying to come to unanimous agreement on a single undertaking. The 
difficulties experienced by the European Union in attempting to reform inefficient 
institutions against the background of an expanding membership foreshadow the 
difficulty of any proposed reform of the WTO. More countries are still waiting to join 
the WTO and any reform would have to overcome the political conundrum of 
persuading states to give up their vetoes. Complexity undoubtedly makes selling the 
benefits of multilateral trade agreements much harder. Long rounds with disappointing 
results and poor implementation damage arguments in favour of free trade.
Legalization
Another problem with the body of global trade rules is the language that they use. Trade 
agreements themselves are complicated, difficult to understand, and full of trade- 
specific language that often makes the implications of the text difficult to pin down. The 
possible effects of trade agreements on a particular good or service are sometimes 
difficult to spell out, even for those who have developed considerable expertise in the 
subject. Foreign policy measures that used to rely on diplomatic relations have been 
legalized, limiting available policy options, making negotiation much more time 
pressured, and introducing the possibility that measures could be struck down (Peterson 
and Pollack 2003:128).
A second, related problem is that once a particular piece of trade jargon has 
made its way into the body of trade rules, it tends to persist. It is much easier for 
negotiators, once they have agreed on the principles of a deal, to recycle language that 
has been agreed on in the past. Potentially harmful or imprecise terms such as one might 
expect from such a large scale bargaining process can be reused without being more 
clearly defined. In trade policy, small details -  and their possible implications and 
interpretation — matter, and given the longevity of trade agreements, they matter a great 
deal. One example is the concept of ‘like’ services under the GATS. There is little 
agreement, even among trade experts as to exactly what ‘like’ services are in practice. It 
is likely that in a future GATS dispute, it will be a legal decision, not a political one, on 
a single case, that determines whether a particular service is ‘like’ and hence whether 
the GATS agreement applies.
Third, once a commitment has been made in a trade agreement, breaking that 
commitment is very difficult. In some cases, there are measures in place that require a
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government to provide compensation to other states if it changes its original 
commitments to relax barriers to trade. The rule-based WTO is a much less flexible 
system than one made of diplomatic ties. This has some advantages. In negotiations, the 
negotiating parties may be reluctant to backtrack for fear that the agreement will fall 
apart. Governments can be more easily held to their liberalisation commitments. There 
will also be domestic consequences for a government that breaks its word to vested 
interests. Early and extensive scrutiny of trade texts is, therefore, vital.
But locking in fixed preferences on ‘trade and’ issues narrows the range of 
policy options available to national decisionmakers in domestic policy. Governments 
may begin to anticipate conflicts and shape their programmes accordingly. A system 
that seems practical and effective for lowering tariffs may not be appropriate in other 
policy areas, going against deeply held principles of federalism and subsidiarity.
Control
If modem trade policy is highly complex and relies on legal rules rather than diplomacy, 
it is appropriate to ask: who controls this complex policymaking process? Who is 
accountable for trade policy? Understanding trade policy in any depth requires a 
remarkable extent of expertise -legal, economic and political. Some of the implications 
of a particular agreement may not be fully understood (even by experts) at the time of 
ratification. The full impact of an agreement may only be understood on a very long 
time frame, perhaps only many years later, after key disputes have clarified the rules. 
Once made, such agreements are very rarely renegotiated -there is little room for 
modification. This is a problem that has been recognised in many fields of international 
organisation and multilevel governance: how to maintain accountability to any kind of 
democratic public while simultaneously adapting to the demands of the policymaking 
system. Over and over again, the answer turns out to be delegation and the difficulty of 
establishing democratic accountability breaks down into who is the principal in the 
principal-agent relationship, and how does the principal-agent relationship work.
The large gap in expertise between elected representatives and officials in terms 
of ‘trade and’ policies means that problems of accountability and control are 
exacerbated. When dealing with ‘trade and’ policies, these problems can also be 
experienced between the trade negotiating authority and other departments and 
agencies.
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In solving problems of legitimacy at different levels, there is a great deal that the 
EU and US can learn from each other (Nicolaidis and Howse 2001). The EU 
policymaking process suffers from a lack of transparency and a lack of perceived 
legitimacy. These two faults are inherently related, stemming from the way that EU 
institutions have been constructed. Firstly, the very process by which trade policy is 
made is contested. Jurisdiction over policy can change with rulings from the ECJ or the 
rules used under a particular procedure. Secondly, the EU’s much discussed ‘democratic 
deficit’ means that EU citizens are very far away from where policy decisions get made, 
making the line of accountability both long and blurred. The lack of a ‘European’ media 
and weak relationships between MEPs and their constituents mean that EU issues are 
not always publicly discussed outside Brussels circles.
Lobbying in the EU is highly secretive. In 2005, the European Commission 
launched the European Transparency Initiative, which included the introduction of an 
‘EU Register of Interest Representatives’ in June 2008. This is an online searchable 
register which provides details of an organisation’s objectives, funding, group 
participation and clients. This is in part modelled on the US system for lobbying 
disclosure, although unlike the longstanding, effective US system, signing up is 
voluntary. Participants must also agree to a code of conduct for lobbying which sets out 
general principles for dealing with the Commission (European Commission 2008). At 
the moment, the database is more of a boon for those studying the EU than those 
lobbying it or its citizens, but with plans to expand it to cover the European Parliament 
the initiative has at least some potential to be more than just another web site.
The US delegation mechanism first created in the 1930s and refined in several 
iterations since is struggling to cope with the new realities of trade politics. The latest 
legislation authorising the USTR to negotiate agreements and refer them to Congress for 
an up or down vote without amendments via the fast track mechanism expired in July
2007. At the time of writing, the future for US trade agreements looks doubtful:
‘before you even get to talking about new trade agreements you have to come up 
and deal with Congress on issues about either perception or reality that existing 
trade agreements aren ’t enforced...until you deal with the kind o f enforcement, 
income and inequality issues in the United States and whether trade is exacerbating 
it we don't get to the second ha lf (Congressional Staffer, Washington DC, May 
2008).
The fundamental assumptions of the fast track mechanism are being challenged by 
elected representatives. Job losses from trade have fallen disproportionately in the 
manufacturing sector, where large plants often form the backbone of a community’s
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economy. When jobs move overseas, communities are affected just as much as 
individuals. Representatives have responded strongly to these territorial changes by 
opposing new fast track legislation. Without fast track authority, the scope of new 
policy initiatives is limited:
‘Over the last few years we've been focused on negotiating various free trade 
agreements and that's obviously come to a stop so others in the building are 
looking at implementation or looking at other types o f arrangements that don't 
require Congressional approval * (USTR Official, Washington DC, June 2007).
While Congressional committees have some power to shape and scrutinise the detail of 
trade agreements, they have much less ability to affect the administration’s overall trade 
strategy, which is determined by the President and USTR. Some commentators have 
suggested that the Ways and Means committee should be given an added ability to 
shape and approve the administrations overall trade strategy before any agreements are 
negotiated. Other critics have opposed the renewal of any fast track legislation, arguing 
that the practice is undemocratic and should be abolished.
A final point regarding control refers to the normative implications of ‘trade 
and’ policies, where developing countries are concerned, there are plenty of economic 
levers available to the EU and the US to exert control over proceedings. Including non­
economic policy requirements in trade agreements, backed up by enforcement 
mechanisms invites comparison with the structural adjustment policies attached to aid 
and debt relief programmes. Although ‘trade and’ chapters of agreements not do not 
strictly force developing countries to change their domestic policies, attempting to 
influence an economically weaker trading partner in this way may simply be a 
continuation of ‘colonial’ control by other means. There is a very fine line between 
cooperation and control, and governments and NGOs alike pushing for ‘trade and’ 
policies have not fully addressed or answered accusations of neo-colonialism.
Conclusion
Policies are becoming commodities. The EU and US have responded to economic 
globalization by seeking to export their values beyond their borders, with the ultimate 
goal of incorporating them into key international institutions. By doing this, the two 
polities seek to reduce the impact of negative economic externalities on their home 
populations. These values act as ‘imagined commodities’ in trade negotiations: they 
have a value to negotiators as bargaining tools, to officials in forming relationships with
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other countries, and in justifying and enforcing systems of trade preferences and 
subsidies.
As the case studies in this volume show, these ‘trade and’ policies are not always 
substantial, sometimes little more than statements of intent. Yet because we imagine 
them to be substantial, they become so. As bargaining tools, they counterbalance or 
provide justification for other policies which may otherwise be considered protectionist. 
As policy models, they assist officials in exerting soft power, attracting the attention of 
other countries who wish to emulate them and fostering communication and 
cooperation. Attached to enforcement mechanisms, they expand the tools available to 
officials to coerce other states while protecting their own interests. ‘Trade and’ policies 
can be instruments of both soft and hard power. They can be both a means of trade 
diplomacy, creating new trade relationships, and a means of trade defence, enforcing 
existing trade rules.
The different ways in which the EU and US have used ‘trade and’ policies tells 
us something significant about their foreign policy actions as a whole. The US model 
emphasises reciprocity in trade agreements. US officials are keen to make ‘win-win’ 
deals, as long as the benefits for the US are clear. Officials and elected representatives 
alike emphasise ‘fairness’ in trade relations, and playing by the rules. US trade rhetoric 
focuses on a narrow range of key issues, emphasising the benefits of agreements to 
domestic constituencies. The USTR sees itself as a broker for these constituencies, 
seeking out new market opportunities for them in other countries and consolidating 
these within trade agreements.
Policy outcomes are legitimated through the involvement of Congress, with a 
large proportion of trade policy taking the form of legislation, not regulation. This has 
two implications. First, non-trade issues have been placed onto the trade agenda by 
elected representatives (Congress and the President) responding to demands from 
organised interests. Representatives’ responses vary according to their party affiliation -  
and so US emphasis on different ‘trade and’ issues varies according to which party 
controls the Presidency and the Chair of the Ways and Means committee. Secondly, the 
use of legislation means that once ‘trade and’ issues are on the agenda, they persist.
The EU focuses on formulating and maintaining a coherent ‘trade and’ policy 
position where issues overlap and influence one another. The resulting European model 
is exported beyond EU borders by the European Commission, which promotes the idea 
of a diverse, democratic and flexible EU through its public statements and 
Communications on policy. But in fact, issues of jurisdiction are pressing problems in
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the EU. The Commission answers not to one government, but 27. The relationship 
between the European Communities and the member states continues to be contentious, 
particularly regarding the new trade issues brought up by agreements such as GATS and 
TRIPS. Rulings by the European Court of Justice have the power to change the nature 
of this relationship overnight.
Policy outcomes are legitimated by member state governments, and through the 
consultation of organised interests. In contrast, the European Parliament plays a minor 
role in most issue areas. Because of the contested nature of trade policymaking power, 
the European Commission seeks to build constituencies to legitimate its trade policies 
from among organised interests at the European level. The funding and access made 
available to diffuse groups allows them correspondingly greater influence on policy 
outputs.
Neither political system is static. The ways that the EU and US attempt to export 
imagined commodities are constantly changing, and will change again with new 
governments and altered institutions.
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Appendix 1: Interviews
The following interviews were conducted by the author for this study between 2006 and
2008. On average, the interviews lasted 1 hour.
1. Agricultural Association Representative, Brussels, September 2006
2. Development NGO Representative, Brussels, October 2006
3. Development NGO Representative, Brussels, October 2006
4. Business Association Representative, Brussels, October 2006
5. Business Association Representative, Brussels, October 2006
6. Energy Industry Lobbyist, Brussels, October 2006
7. Women’s Association Representative, Brussels, October 2006
8. Business Association Representative, Brussels, November 2006
9. Environmental NGO Representative, Brussels, November 2006
10. Trade Union Representative, Brussels, November 2006
11. Agricultural Association Representative, Brussels, November 2006
12. Development NGO Representative, Brussels, November 2006
13. Environmental NGO Representative, Brussels, November 2006
14. Business Association Representative, Brussels, November 2006
15. Environmental NGO Representative, Brussels, November 2006
16. Commission Official, Brussels, November 2006
17. Business Association Representative, Brussels, December 2006
18. Pharmaceutical Industry Representative, Brussels, May 2008
19. Animal Rights Campaigner, London, September 2006
20. Commission Official, London, October 2006
21. Trade Negotiator, London, April 2008
22. Development NGO Representative, Washington DC, April 2006
23. Development NGO Representative, Washington DC, April 2006
24. Development NGO Representative, Washington DC, April 2006
25. Development NGO Representative, Washington DC, April 2006
26. Think Tank Lobbyist, Washington DC, May 2007
27. Think Tank Representative, Washington DC, May 2007
28. Think Tank Representative, Washington DC, June 2007
29. Think Tank Representative, Washington DC, June 2007
30. Trade Union Representative, Washington DC, June 2007
31. Trade Union Representative, Washington DC, June 2007
32. Trade Negotiator, Washington DC, June 2007
33. Trade Negotiator, Washington DC, June 2007
34. Trade Negotiator, Washington DC, June 2007
35. Environmental NGO Representative, Washington DC, June 2007
36. USTR Official, Washington DC, June 2007
37. Congressional Staffer, Washington DC, June 2007
38. Congressional Staffer, Washington DC, May 2008
39. Trade Negotiator, Washington DC, June 2007
40. Agricultural Association Representative, Washington DC, July 2007
41. Defence Contractor, Washington DC, July 2007
42. Development NGO Representative, Washington DC, July 2007
43. Development NGO Representative, Washington DC, July 2007
44. Development NGO Representative, Washington DC, July 2007
45. State Department Official, Washington DC, May 2008
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Interview Schedule for Interviews with Interest Groups 
Statement of Intent
Thank you for agreeing to participate in my research. This study aims to measure and 
compare the effects of interest group lobbying and other campaign activities on trade 
policy in the United States and European Union. This interview is only for my own 
research, and the information you give me will be held anonymously and securely and 
will not be passed on to a third party. The research may be published at a later date, but 
I will not identify individual interviewees by name in the final text. None of the 
questions are of a sensitive nature, but you are entitled at any point to request that 
certain statements or sections of the interview are not associated with your organisation. 
If you request this, your name and the name of your organisation will not be used to 
identify these statements.
Section 1: Agenda
Could you tell me a little about your role here at [organisation]?
What do you see as the most important trade-related issue for your organisation? / Why 
is this? / What other trade-related issues do you deal with? / How do you decide which 
are the most important issues?
What do you think about recent events in the Doha Round negotiations? / How have 
they affected your organisation?
Section 2: Strategy
Now I’m going to move on to some detailed questions about how your organisation 
promotes its views on trade. First, I’m going to show you a list of activities, and for 
each one I’d like you to tell me if this is something you do regularly, sometimes or 
never.
Direct contact with policymakers or their staff
Encourage members to make direct contact with policymakers or their staff
Arrange press conferences
Send out press releases
Attend government organised meetings
Attend meetings organised by a coalition you are part of
Initiate meetings on behalf of a coalition of groups
Sign on to joint statements/amicus curiae briefs/petitions
Initiate joint statements/amicus curiae briefs/petitions
Gather information for your members
Gather information for the public
Gather information for policymakers
Organise protests or demonstrations
Initiate legal challenges
Give evidence to a tribunal/committee
Donate money to political campaigns
Is there anything you do to promote trade issues that I haven’t mentioned?
Which of the activities on my list are the most important for your organisation?
What factors make you decide which of these actions to take?
178 of 204
Can you give me an example of an action that was particularly successful? /  Are there 
any that weren’t so successful?
Here’s a second list which shows different organisations. Could you tell me if you 
interact with them often, sometimes or never.
World Trade Organisation
Other International Organisations (which ones?)
European Parliament 
European Commission
European Council/Permanent Representations
European Court of Justice
Other European Organisations (which ones?)
National Government Departments or Agencies 
National Parliaments/Congress 
US Court of International Trade 
State Governments 
Local Governments
Are there any other government organisations that you have contact with that I haven’t 
mentioned?
Which of the organisations on my list are most important to you? / Why is that?
What factors make you decide which of these organisations to contact? / Are there some 
organisations on the list that are more difficult for you to interact with than others? / 
Why is this?
Section 3: Working with Other Organisations
Does [organisation] participate in any networks or coalitions of like-minded groups?
Are there any groups outside these coalitions that you work with often?
Of all the groups that you work with, are there any that you look to for leadership on 
trade issues? / Are there any groups that look to you for leadership?
In terms of attracting resources (and members), are there any groups that you see as 
competing with your organisation?
Section 4: Expand on any interesting issues in the previous discussion.
Section 5: Fill in any details from the personal information or organisation categories 
that have not been determined prior to the interview, e.g. level of education, previous 
employment, languages spoken.
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Appendix 2: Correspondence Analysis Data Tables
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These pages provide summaries of the content analysis results for this project. The 
first table in each section shows data on the correspondence analysis, including the 
percentage of variance covered by each dimension. The second table in each 
section summarises the classes determined by Alceste’s hierarchical classification 
analysis, the themes assigned by the researcher, typical words, and validation data.
Jan-June 2001
Dimensions Eigenvalue Percentage of Variance Cumulative Variance
Factor 1 0.31 22.3% 22.3%
Factor 2 0.25 18.1% 40.4%
Class Theme Typical Words (x2 value, indicating association with this class)
#01
#02
#03
#04
#05
#06
#07
Congressional Politics President+ (115.9), Congress+ (91.6), committee+ (81.7), America+ (80.5), environment+
(59.0), university (54.7), administration (53.9), Senators (49.2), executive (47.7), hemisphere 
(43.7)
Pascal Lamy (194.7), Russia+ (68.8), accession+ (55.1), European Union (52.4), China+ 
(47.3), Egypt+ (43.2), bilateral+ (36.6), liberalis+ (35.9), multilateral (32.1), visit+ (28.7) 
product+ (91.47), panel+ (90.5), body (87.6), appellate (83.1), export+ (82.4), turtle+ (60.9), 
glut+ (54.2), subsid+ (54.2), safeguard+ (52.1), Canada+ (51.9) 
competit+ (166.2), carrier+ (154.0), telecom+ (144.8), market+ (109.3), supplier+ (98.1), 
service+ (88.5), regulator+ (83.73), German+ (76.1), entrant+ (76.1), Japan+ (75.5) 
intellectual (237.7), proper+ (214.5), piracy (190.8), protect+ (137.1), Ukraine+ (122.3), 
enforce+ (115.2), Greece+ (113.5), television (103.9), TRIPS (77.2), Robert Zoellick (59.4) 
target+ (97.6), develop+ (95.0), fund+ (89.8), technical+ (85.2), medicine+ (85.1), preference+
(75.1), GSP (73.0), disease+ (73.0), drug+ (66.9), Pascal Lamy (63.8) 
telework+ (419.1), social+ (221.4), compan+ (187.4), employ+ (185.2), corporate (155.8), 
employee+ (141.2), guidelines (123.4), technolog+ (91.2), Pascal Lamy (89.2), respons+
(88.2)
930 E.C.U.s classified (83%), threshold for validation 60%.
Trade Diplomacy
Trade Defence
Services & Telecoms
Intellectual Property
Access to Medicines
Corporate
Responsibility
July-December 2001
Dimensions Eigenvalue Percentage of Variance Cumulative Variance
Factor 1 
Factor 2
0.30
0.24
42.1%
32.6%
42.1%
74.7%
Class Theme Typical Words (x2 value, indicating association with this class)
#01 Development Develop+ (131.5), Pascal Lamy (118.6), countries+ (86.4), Europe+ (31.4), incentive+ 
(27.8), aid+ (26.4), medicines (26.2), social (24.4), health+ (22.8), labour+ (19.8)
#02 US Trade Defence panel+ (368.5), body+ (204.0), appellate (194.0), Canadian (130.9), ruling+ (112.6), United 
States (96.1), dairy (94.4), wheat (94.4), subsid+ (92.1), settle+ (82.0)
#03 Competitive Liberalisation Robert Zoellick (213.0), minister+ (115.3), China+ (89.7), economic+ (76.8), President+ 
(73.2), America+ (54.9), Taiwan (47.2), free (37.1), India+ (36.6), Japan+ (35.7)
#04 EU Trade Defence banana+ (179.7), quota+ (166.3), duties (107.6), European Union (91.0), Pascal Lamy 
(86.7), rate+ (74.8), tariff+ (71.7), cloth+ (67.9), supplier+ (55.2), duty (54.4)
1321 E.C.U.s classified (81%), threshold for validation 60%.
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Jan-June 2002
Dimensions______Eigenvalue_______Percentage of Variance_______________Cumulative Variance
Factor 1 0.32 36.9% 36.9%
Factor 2 0.23 26.4% 63.3%
Class Theme Typical Words (x2 value, indicating association with this class)
#01 Trade Diplomacy visit+ (288.4), meet (254.5), President+ (182.8), Zoellick (144.9), Lamy (126.8), relation+ 
(66.1), delegation+ (64.9), Asia+ (63.8), Singapore+ (57.1), leader+ (53.9)
polic+ (208.3), social+ (165.6), Pascal Lamy (163.7), environment (130.2), sustain+ (122.5), 
govem+ (104.0), develop+ (101.3), poverty (88.5), educat+ (82.9), support+ (81.9), co-oper+ 
(79.9)
panel+ (431.1), body+ (290.5), dispute+ (280.3), appellate (256.9), safeguard+ (224.6), United 
States (191.1), ruling+ 174.1), WTO (173.8), case+ (158.3), findings (109.7)
Doha (234.4), negoti+ (210.3), develop+ (153.8), countries+ (150.7), technical (139.0), 
agenda+ (112.4), build (100.4), capacity+ (93.2), ACP (75.2), access+ (57.6) 
product+ (88.6), protect+ (82.0), export+ (60.1), market+ (56.0), price+ (55.8), competit+ 
(51.0), United States (45.8), tariff+ (45.1), airline+ (44.2), industr+ (44.1)
1947 E.C.U.s classified (82%), threshold for validation 60%.
#02
#03
#04
#05
Sustainable
Development
WTO Disputes 
Doha Development 
Protection
July-December 2002
Dimensions Eigenvalue Percentage of Variance Cumulative Percentage
Factor 1 
Factor 2
0.33
0.29
32.5%
28.8%
32.5%
61.3%
Class Theme Typical Words (x2 value, indicating association with this class)
#01
#02
#03
#04
#05
Competitive
liberalisation
Robert Zoellick (197.8), America+ (103.9), bilateral+ (98.4), Australia+ (93.4), FTAA (86.5), 
Congress+ (85.9), discuss+ (73.6), leader+ (69.7), Lamy (57.0)
panel+ (393.1), countervail+ (229.0), steel (207.4), subsid+ (205.6), United States (178.2), 
appellate (171.5), body+ (171.5), exclusion+ (160.6), Robert Zoellick (106.6), safeguard+ 
(105.6)
textile+ (317.1), cloth+ (291.6), quota+ (241.0), tariff+ (191.5), Brazil+ (116.8), export+
(93.2), wheat (92.9), bill+ (86.4), barley (85.0), import+ (67.0)
farm+ (674.4), rural (348.0), payment+ (282.2), animal+ (242.5), welfare (242.5), CAP 
(221.5), mid-term (190.9), policy+ (172.3), environment (114.6), Pascal Lamy (110.1)
Pascal Lamy (188.7), develop+ (134.5), poor+ (68.7), medicine+ (65.4), AIDS (53.4), need
(50.3), protect-i- (49.4), HIV (46.5), capacit+ (40.7), health+ (39.5)
1729 E.C.U.s classified (82%), threshold for validation 60%.
US Trade Defence
EU Trade Defence
Agricultural Reform
Access to Medicines
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Jan-June 2003
Axes Eigenvalue Percentage of Association Cumulative Percentage
Factor 1
Factor 2
0.29
0.26
26.7%
23.2%
26.7%
49.9%
Class Theme Typical Words (x2 value, indicating association with this class)
#01 Trade Diplomacy
#02 Competitive
liberalisation
#03 Agriculture & Food 
Safety
#04 Services
#05 US Trade Defence
#06 Health
Lamy (188.2), discuss+ (143.0), meetings (85.2), dialogue+ (77.3), Cancun (70.1), Patten 
(67.8), transatlantic (58.7), agenda+ (56.0), TABD (54.8), Pascal Lamy (49.7)
Robert Zoellick (487.4), FTA (297.6), free+ (266.0), Chile+ (138.4), Morocco (132.0), 
America+ (110.9), South (98.9), African+ (97.6), liberal+ (92.9), Bahrain+ (90.2)
agricultural (204.3), farm+ (112.2), payment+ (109.4), export+ (107.1), cut (73.9), food+
(67.6), tariff+ (65.2), increase+ (56.2), maize (56.1), GM (52.6) 
services+ (581.6), companies+ (219.8), foreign+ (163.3), national+ (96.5), loyalty (95.9), 
computer+ (89.6), sector+ (85.4), cross-border (76.6), telecom+ (75.9), insurance (67.4) 
panel+ (663.8), body+ (367.5), dispute+ (332.2), appellate (310.8), settle+ (306.1), dump+
(239.9), findings (194.8), investig+ (162.6), appeal+ (160.2), Canada+ (160.1)
Pascal Lamy (181.3), health+ (94.3), disease-i- (62.4), Commission-i- (58.9), fisheries (55.4), 
medicine+ (55.4), environment (48.7), public+ (47.9), tobacco (43.7), control+ (40.1)
2077 E.C.U.s classified (74%), threshold for validation 60%.
July-December 2003
Axes Eigenvalue
Factor 1 0.34
Factor 2 0.27
Class Theme
#01 Doha Round
#02 Agriculture & Textiles
#03 Commission’s Cancun 
Agenda
#04 WTO Disputes
#05 Latin American FT As
Percentage of Association Cumulative Percentage
34.7%
27.0%
34.7%
61.7%
Typical Words (x2 value, indicating association with this class)
Cancun+ (176.6), Pascal Lamy (168.25), access+ (72.6), Saudi (70.8), Doha (60.9), European 
Union (55.0), develop+ (49.4), need (47.2), clear+ (46.1), spirit+ (39.2)
export+ (236.3), price+ (200.6), sugar+ (198.5), quota+ (117.2), import+ (98.4), agricultural
(79.0), cotton (77.9), duties (73.6), textile+ (58.7), poultry (55.8).
Pascal Lamy (159.2), regulation-i- (112.7), right+ (97.0), health (88.2), rule+ (76.3), inform+
(64.6), enforce+ (54.7), authorities (54.7), direct+ (51.4), legal+ (50.8)
panel+ (762.4), body-i- (454.9), appellate (411.4), dispute+ (251.5), Japan+ (235.6), appeal+
(222.0), settle+ (193.2), apple+ (172.7), findings (160.4), fire (148.2)
Robert Zoellick (636.1), America+ (144.1), FTA (142.6), free+ (141.2), central (115.7), 
CAFTA (99.0), Dominican (88.1), Congress+ (87.3), FTAA (76.4), President-i- (76.2)
1684 E.C.U.s classified (80%), threshold for validation 60%.
183 of 204
Jan-June 2004
Axes Eigenvalue Percentage of Association Cumulative Percentage
Factor 1
Factor 2
0.35
0.30
39.6%
33.6%
39.6%
73.2%
Class Theme Typical Words (x2 value, indicating association with this class)
#01
#02
#03
#04
Trade Defence panel+ (278.6), dispute+ (228.2), anti-dumping (208.4), request+ (137.0), Mexico+ (132.7), 
ruling+ (132.2), appellate (132.2), countermeasures (132.2), body (123.0), FSC (116.1)
product+ (214.0), export+ (208.5), agricultural (184.3), euro+ (177.3), cotton (156.2), Pascal 
Lamy (123.7), tariff+ (122.3), import+ (107.5), quota+ (106.5), ACP+ (75.6)
Pascal Lamy (426.1), Commission-)- (300.6), enlarge-)- (114.7), social-i- (95.1), common+ 
(78.4), dialogue-)- (75.6), develop+ (67.9), cooperat+ (64.5), Russia-i- (64.0), globalisation+ 
(43.0)
Robert Zoellick (980.5), FTA (310.2), firee-i- (167.1), CAFTA (103.2), Dominican (102.9), 
President-)- (91.7), Australia-i- (81.9), expand-)- (81.9), Bahrain-)- (81.5), agree-)- (77.9)
2109 E.C.U.s classified (68%), threshold for validation 60%.
Agriculture & Textiles 
Cooperate & Consult
Competitive
Liberalisation
July-December 2004
Axes Eigenvalue Percentage of Association Cumulative Percentage
Factor 1 
Factor 2
0.30
0.22
34.2%
25.3%
34.2%
59.5%
Class Theme Typical Words (x2 value, indicating association with this class)
#01 Quotas & Preferences
#02 EU Regionalism
#03 Airbus Dispute
#04 Competitive
Liberalisation
#05 Development
product-i- (264.7), quota-)- (217.7), sugar-i- (200.1), import-t- (150.3), tariff+ (100.0), textile-i-
(99.0), export-i- (77.1), GSP (76.7), subject-i- (63.1), beneficiar-t- (55.7)
minister-)- (197.5), negoti-i- (160.3), Pascal Lamy (122.5), EPA (108.3), Brussels (100.0), 
regional-i- (81.5), Euromed+ (74.0), senior-)- (60.9), talk+ (59.2), integr-i- (56.5)
subsid+ (260.5), panel-)- (218.3), United States (141.0), dispute-i- (134.9), airbus-)- (118.1), 
boeing+ (92.6), aircraft (83.7), sanction-i- (77.2), obligation-)- (76.3)
Robert Zoellick (465.4), FTA (388.6), free-i- (233.6), Congress-)- (227.7), Morocco (175.3), 
Bahrain-i- (151.7), sign-i- (144.4), President-t- (135.1), Jordan-i- (126.1), pass-t- (112.9) 
develop-i- (96.9), intellectual (91.4), proper-f (78.0), cooperat-t- (69.5), standard-i- (56.3), 
regulatory (53.2), strengthen-i- (41.1), enforce-)- (39.8), enhance-i- (39.4), help-i- (35.8)
1905 E.C.U.s classified (82%), threshold for validation 60%.
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Jan-June 2005
Axes Eigenvalue Percentage of Association Cumulative Percentage
Factor 1
Factor 2
0.32
0.25
34.8%
27.0%
34.8%
61.8%
Class Theme Typical Words (x2 value, indicating association with this class)
#01
#02
#03
#04
#05
Doha Development 
Agenda
US FT As
ACP (313.4), EPA+ (256.9), develop+ (221.8), regional+ (221.8), Peter Mandelson (145.1), 
access+ (129.6), market+ (103.9), integr+ (86.8), Cotonou (77.9), capacity (76.8)
Robert Portman (371.5), Robert Zoellick (292.7), CAFTA (146.5), Congress+ (126.9), 
counterfeit+ (92.5), free+ (83.1), house+ (72.3), intellectual (72.27), enforce*- (68.7), piracy
(66.3)
summit+ (212.9), Peter Mandelson (181.3), visit+ (116.9), dialogue+ (92.2), partner+ (72.2), 
transatlantic (70.0), polic+ (67.6), strateg+ (62.7), phytosanitary (60.4), social (51.3)
offer+ (529.2), service+ (478.4), revise+ (350.5), energy (183.2), financial+ (160.7) transport+
(97.1), telecommunication+ (90.8), profess+ (78.3), computer+ (53.3), educat+ (53.2) 
investig+ (101.9), product+ (101.2), panel*- (95.9), import+ (94.2), regulation+ (70.0), subsid*-
(65.9), textile+ (58.0), China+ (53.5), body+ (49.0), appellate (49.0)
1919 E.C.U.s classified (74%), threshold for validation 60%.
Dialogue
Services
Trade Defence
July-December 2005
Axes___________Eigenvalue______ Percentage of Association_____________Cumulative Percentage
Factor 1 0.28 38.3% 38.3%
Factor 2 0.24 33.0% 71.3%
Class Theme Typical Words (x2 value, indicating association with this class)
#01 Doha Negotiations/ Peter Mandelson (176.4), proposal+ (119.0), tariff* (103.0), Hong Kong (91.8), banana+
Agriculture (88.0), access+ (86.8), Commission*- (66.6), MFN (50.7), ACP (45.1), arbitrator+ (39.3)
#02 Aid billion+ (221.5), aid (216.5), export+ (182.5), food+ (153.3), goods (66.2), euro+ (60.0),
product+ (52.6), benefit+ (48.9), ship+ (41.5)
#03 Dialogue India+ (319), cooperat+ (248.9), dialogue+ (202.6), Peter Mandelson (182.0), summit+
(122.2), exchange+ (117.2), mutual+ (92.1), strateg+ (84.5), research+ (69.6), human (58.6), 
society+ (55.8)
#04 Trade Diplomacy Robert Portman (596.6), President+ (112.7), meet (73.7), commerce+ (64.8), negoti+ (63.6),
announce+ (59.7), agenda+ (52.2), east (49.1), Congress+ (42.3), free*- (41.3)
1708 E.C.U.s classified (68%), threshold for validation 60%.
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Jan-June 2006
Axes Eigenvalue
Factor 1 0.30
Factor 2 0.26
Class Theme
#01 Environment
#02 Multilateral
Negotiations
#03 Agriculture
Development
#04 Trade Defence
#05 WTO Disputes
#06 Bilateral Negotiations
Percentage of Association Cumulative Percentage
27.4%
23.7%
27.4%
51.1%
Typical Words (x2 value, indicating association with this class)
service+ (294.1), financ+ (147.0), telecommunic+ (122.9), environmental (83.9), insurance,
(81.6), energ+ (73.0), innovation+ (63.4), biodiversity (63.4), postal (54.3), transparent+
(54.3)
Commission+ (305.7), negoti+ (119.4), Peter Mandelson (94.3), Doha (82.7), successful+
(58.3), Hong Kong (56.1), Vienna (55.1), counterfeit+ (52.5), summit (44.4), ambitious (40.5) 
develop+ (242.5), cut (166.9), agricultural (137.1), industrial+ (132.8), Peter Mandelson
(131.3), tariff+ (123.2), farm+ (103.7), liberalis+ (94.7), aid (92.7), access+ (69.9) 
duties (185.0), import+ (155.2), export+ (121.5), dump+ (86.5), leather (70.2), duty free
(65.9), Mexico+ (61.8), shoe (61.5), sugar+ (58.8), Byrd (57.9)
dispute+ (221.8), Robert Portman (209.1), panel+ (200.9), request+ (126.3), article+ (81.2), 
enforce+ (79.9), Section 301 (67.5), ruling+ (66.9), review+ (64.4), intellectual (47.1) 
free+ (292.7), East (228.0), region+ (203.4), FTA (152.4), ties (144.4), Oman+ (113.2), 
Bahrain+ (101.7), investment+ (87.4), nation+ (83.3)
2938 E.C.U.s classified (70%), threshold for validation 60%.
July-December 2006
Axes Eigenvalue
Factor 1 0.33
Factor 2 0.32
Class Theme
#01 Trade Defence
#02 US Bilaterals
(negotiation)
#03 Investment
#04 Doha Agriculture
#05 US Bilaterals
(Congress)
#06 Global Europe
Percentage of Association Cumulative Percentage
29.1%
28.0%
29.1%
57.1%
Typical Words (x2 value, indicating association with this class)
panel+ (126.7), investigation (110.9), dump+ (101.9), body+ (101.9), antidumping (91.8), 
duties (88.7), dispute+ (88.2), request+ (82.2), appellate (78.5), wine+ (70.2)
Susan Schwab (248.4), GSP (230.3), duty free (200.8), preference+ (136.0), ATPA (128.0), 
Peru+ (114.0), beneficiary (108.1), Colomb+ (102.5), product+ (94.8), Haiti+ (93.6)
TLA (146.8), Susan Schwab (142.7), discuss+ (95.1), Asia+ (71.4), Indonesia+ (66.8), 
cooperat+ (65.9), invest+ (57.0), Rwanda+ (51.3), Southeast (51.3), relation+ (49.4) 
farm+ (215.4), cut (191.3), Doha (109.0), agricultural (76.0), trade distorting (70.8), offer+
(61.5), subsid+ (59.1), tariff+ (51.6), G20 (49.9), caricature (40.1) 
free+ (128.4), middle (106.4), Susan Schwab (100.0), opportunit+ (81.5), Oman (79.6), 
consumer+ (76.6), Panama+ (71.5), Bahrain (67.0), Congress+ (64.2), service+ (62.1)
Peter Mandelson (480.6), Commission+ (189.3), China+ (155.9), argue+ (84.4), global+
(67.7), strateg+ (60.9), business (52.6), competit+ (52.6), counterfeit+ (40.32), partner* (39.5) 
threshold for validation 60%.1972 E.C.U.s classified (75%),
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January-June 2007
Axes Eigenvalue Percentage of Association Cumulative Percentage
Factor 1
Factor 2
0.35
0.24
36.5%
25.3%
36.5%
61.8%
Class Theme Typical Words (x2 value, indicating association with this class)
#01 Mandelson (164.8), argue+ (83.0), ACP (81.2), Commission (77.5), Economic Partnership 
Agreements (57.1), global+ (53.0), political+ (41.9), debate+ (39.0), negoti+ (38.5), energy
(31.8)
investment+ (162.9), forum (137.2), Schwab (131.5), initiat+ (90.3), bilateral+ (88.2), ties
(85.6), official+ (68.5), discuss+ (55.0), Vietnam+ (48.9), Indian (48.1)
Intellectual property (149.6), enforce+ (130.4), China+ (102.4), Special 301 (72.3), serious+
(57.7), geographical (56.7), counterfeit+ (56.7), protect+ (43.1), indication+ (42.5), software
(36.0)
Panama+ (191.2), Congress+ (168.4), bipartisan (167.9), Trade Promotion Authority (155.8), 
farmers+ (154.9), ranchers (131.6), Peru (130.9), Colombia (95.0), Korea (88.9), Dominican 
Republic (71.4)
Dispute+ (200.2), panel+ (164.4), WTO (159.0), request+ (137.2), duties (131.2), settle+ 
(131.2), spirit+ (122.2), consult+ (115.3), wine+ (111.7), resolve+ (62.3)
1299 E.C.U.s classified (77%), threshold for validation 60%.
#02
#03
#04
#05
Economic Partnership 
Agreements
Bilateral Investment 
Treaties
Intellectual Property / 
China
FT As & Bipartisan Deal
WTO Disputes
July-December 2007
Axes Eigenvalue
Factor 1 0.36
Factor 2 0.29
Class Theme
#01 Bilateral Investment 
Treaties
#02 WTO Disputes
#03 China, Russia & Energy
#04 Economic Partnership 
Agreements
#05 ‘Trade And’ Issues
#06 FTAs Bipartisan Deal
Percentage of Association
27.5%
22.2%
Cumulative Percentage
27.5%
49.7%
Typical Words (x2 value, indicating association with this class)
Negoti+ (112.8), Trade and Investment Framework (95.2), discuss+ (91.6), Schwab (86.2), 
text+ (69.7), progress+ (61.7), group+ (61.5), delegation+ (48.3), bilateral+ (47.5), Doha
(43.9)
Panel+ (214.0), WTO (205.6), request+ (191.1), subsid+ (121.8), settle+ (87.7), claim+ (79.2), 
public+ (76.3), Boeing+ (66.2), prohibit+ (59.1), Antigua (52.4)
Mandelson (204.6), textile+ (98.7), Commission+ (83.5), argue (61.3), China+ (53.1), Russ+
(51.3), speech (46.9), instrument+ (43.9), summit (41.9), defence (41.8)
Economic Partnership Agreements (271.2), ACP (220.7), region+ (164.5), develop+ (155.4), 
aid (128.9), Pacific (102.5), agree+ (64.9), Africa+ (63.5), initiall+ (54.3), partner+ (46.6) 
Technolog+ (91.7), enforce+ (79.6), environmental+ (78.5), intellectual (78.5), anti- 
counterfeiting (61.9), non-tariff (61.9), NAFTA (60.9), services+ (59.2), goods (48.5), global+
(45.3)
Billion+ (145.4), export+ (144.4), ranchers (139.9), total+ (133.5), farm+ (115.3), duty free
(110.6), million+ (96.4), Peru+ (83.2), job+ (67.0), Colombia+ (59.8)
1091 E.C.U.s classified (66%), threshold for validation 60%.
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